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Anti-Subordination Analysis after
United States v Virginia:
Evaluating the Constitutionality of
K-12 Single-Sex Public Schools
Denise C. Morgant
Disregarding the historical trend in favor of co-education, in
recent years educators have begun to introduce a new generation
of single-sex public schools and programs in the United States.
Opponents of single-sex public education have challenged the le-
gality of those new schools and programs - arguing that they
violate the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment. Their arguments rely heavily upon United States v Vir-
ginia,1 a 1996 Supreme Court decision that held that the all-male
Virginia Military Institute violated that constitutional provision.2
Specifically, the opponents of single-sex public education argue
that Virginia requires the government to defend its use of sex-
based classifications with an "exceedingly persuasive justifica-
tion," indicating that courts should now apply the same strict
scrutiny to sex-based classifications that they have traditionally
used to evaluate the constitutionality of classifications based on
race As strict scrutiny has almost always proved fatal,4 they
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Human Rights symposium Finding a Path to Gender Equality, and at the Third Annual
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NYLS '99. My work on this project was supported by summer research grants from New
York Law School.
518 US 515 (1996).
Id at 519.
I refer to such classifications as "sex-based" because they treat anatomical and
physiological traits as accurate markers of a person's gender identity. Usually we do just
the reverse - we attempt to ascertain a person's anatomical sex by observing how he or
she performs his or her gender. For example, a few years ago, a little boy pointed to my
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contend that Virginia spells the end of single-sex public education
in this country.5
The Supreme Court's decision in Virginia - particularly its
statement that sex-based classifications must be supported by an
"exceedingly persuasive justification" in order to survive constitu-
tional scrutiny - caused quite a lot of excitement. Those who
were pleased with the Court's analysis and those who were un-
happy about it were equally keyed-up about its implications for
all-male and all-female public schools.' In fact, even those who
did not believe that the constitutionality of all single-sex educa-
tion was called into question by the case were excited about de-
fending that proposition in light of the "changed" language.7
closely cropped hair and asked his brother whether I was a man. His exasperated brother
responded, "No, she is wearing earrings."
Mary Anne Case explains that "[a]s most feminist theorists use the terminology,
'sex' refers to the anatomical and physiological distinctions between men and women;
'gender,' by contrast, is used to refer to the cultural overlay on those anatomical and
physiological distinctions." Mary Anne C. Case, Disaggregating Gender from Sex and
Sexual Orientation: The Effeminate Man in the Law and Feminist Jurisprudence, 105 Yale
L J 1, 10 (1995). While sex is generally assumed to be binary - one is either a man or a
woman - gender is not neatly divisible into the categories of masculinity and femininity.
Rather, gender is fluid and culturally situated - what are considered to be sex appropri-
ate gender identities and roles are defined by tradition, learned from prior generations,
and constructed within peer groups. Compare Judith Butler, Gender Trouble 7 (Routledge
1990) (arguing that "[g]ender ought not to be conceived merely as the cultural inscription
of meaning on a pregiven sex (a juridical conception); gender must also designate the very
apparatus of production whereby the sexes themselves are established").
Gender is also frequently conflated with sexual orientation. However, while gender
can be measured by behavior in a myriad of different social interactions including sexual
ones, "[iun this society, sexual orientation is measured chiefly by... whether the object(s)
of one's desire are of the same or of a different sex than oneself." Case, 105 Yale L J at 13
(cited in this note).
4 See note 119 and accompanying text.
See 60 Minutes: School or Scandal? ACLU and NOW Organizations Strive to Shut
Down the Young Women's Leadership School for Girls in New-York (CBS television broad-
cast, June 8, 1997).
' Compare Ellen Goodman, Court Knocks Down Last Bastion of Male-Only Tradi-
tion, St. Louis Post-Dispatch 11B (July 5, 1996), with Anita K. Blair, The New Move Equal
Protection Clause, 44 Federal Lawyer 35, 35 (Jan 1997) ("Any fair reading of the VMI
decision shows that it prohibits states from denying educational opportunities to either
young men or young women solely on the basis of their sex. It also forbids consideration of
what girls or boys, as a class, of any age or situation want or need."); Steve Forbes, Rigidly
Wrongful Ruling, Forbes 26 (Aug 12, 1996); Michael Prowse, Give men a break: Self-
righteous American feminists are waging a holy war against the beleaguered male of the
species, Financial Times 16 (July 15, 1996); George F. Will, Ruling on VMI Endangers All
Single-Sex Education, Sacramento Bee B7 (July 5, 1996); Jeffrey Rosen, Single-Sex
Schools and Double Standards, NY Times A2 (July 3, 1996). See also Virginia, 518 US at
601 (Scalia dissenting) (describing the majority opinion as having succeeded "in abolishing
public single-sex education").
' See Cass R. Sunstein, Foreword: Leaving Things Undecided, 110 Harv L Rev 4, 75
(1996) ("The Court left open the possibility that a new legislature, acting on the basis of
concern for the well-being of both men and women, could separate the sexes as long as it
provided equal opportunity."); Elizabeth M. Schneider, A Postscript on VMI, 6 Am U J
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However, the "exceedingly persuasive justification" language
in Virginia does not indicate a shift from intermediate to strict
scrutiny of sex-based classifications. Since the Supreme Court
decided Frontiero v Richardson' in 1973, constitutional scrutiny
of those classifications has turned on two considerations: "fit" -
whether the challenged practice actually serves the objective the
legislature intended it to serve; and "anti-subordination" -
whether the legislative objective is to disadvantage, and some-
times, whether the challenged practice has subordinating effects?
And since 1979 the Court has consistently said that "an exceed-
ingly persuasive justification" is necessary for a sex-based classi-
fication to survive the first element of the intermediate scrutiny
test.1" Thus, the use of the same phrase in Virginia should not be
taken to mean that sex-based classifications should now be
strictly scrutinized.
Nor is there any reason to believe that the "exceedingly per-
suasive justification" language in Virginia necessarily spells the
end of the new generation of single-sex public schools. The Vir-
ginia Military Institute ("VMI") failed to satisfy the fit require-
ment of the intermediate scrutiny test because the Court was not
convinced that an all-male student body advanced the success of
the school's adversative method.11 In other words, VMI's defend-
ers were unable to demonstrate a tight enough fit between the
state's objective and its methodology for the all-male school to
survive constitutional scrutiny. In contrast, the new generation of
single-sex schools and programs is more likely to satisfy the fit
requirement. The proponents of those schools are more likely to
try to match their use of a single-sex pedagogy to a specific edu-
cational goal and to be able to demonstrate that the pedagogy
actually helps to achieve that goal.
However, the excitement over the Court's decision in Virginia
was not entirely unjustified. Indeed, that case introduced an im-
Gender & L 59, 63 (1997) ("[Tlhe majority opinion in VMI appeared to view single-sex
schools ... that are intended to remedy a history of subjugation, as different from those
... that continue a pattern of historical exclusion.").
8 411 US 677 (1973).
See notes 85-113 and accompanying text; see also Denise C. Morgan, Finding a
Constitutionally Permissible Path to Sex Equality: The Young Women's Leadership School
of East Harlem, 14 NY L Sch J Hum Rts 95, 102-03 (1997).
" See Personnel Administrator of Massachusetts v Feeney, 442 US 256, 273 (1979)
("Precedents dictate that any state law overtly or covertly designed to prefer males over
females in public employment would require an exceedingly persuasive justification to
withstand a constitutional challenge under the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment.").
" See notes 133-38 and accompanying text.
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portant change in the anti-subordination requirement of inter-
mediate scrutiny that may significantly affect the constitutional-
ity of the new generation of single-sex public schools. For the first
time in the Supreme Court's sex equality jurisprudence, Virginia
explicitly articulated an asymmetrical anti-subordination princi-
ple. The Court said that the Equal Protection Clause of the Four-
teenth Amendment prohibits the use of sex-based classifications
that "create or perpetuate the legal, social, or economic inferiority
of women."12 That language may indicate that intermediate scru-
tiny is a one-way ratchet that prohibits the use of sex-based clas-
sifications only when they subordinate women. In fact, the lan-
guage suggests that the goal of intermediate scrutiny is to iden-
tify and strike down rules that maintain the traditional hierarchy
of men over women, -rather than to determine which differences
between the sexes can justify their disparate treatment.
Accordingly, this Article addresses the most significant ques-
tion left open by Virginia: If the single-sex composition of a public
school can be pedagogically justified, under what circumstances
should that school survive an anti-subordination challenge? Are
sex-based rules that deny students the freedom to attend the
educational institutions of their choice subordinating because
they negatively affect students' liberty interests - their interests
in freedom from arbitrary, state-imposed constraints on choice?
Or, is the anti-subordination principle only offended by laws that
compromise students' equality interests - their interests in
avoiding state-enforced rules that permit their sex to be system-
atically used to harm their political or economic fortunes? And
how should the fact that the new single-sex public schools serve
kindergarten through twelfth grade ("K-12") students rather than
adults affect the analysis? In sum, what does Virginia say about
the constitutionality of the new generation of K-12 single-sex
public schools and programs that are increasingly popular in ur-
ban public school systems?
This Article will proceed in five parts. Part I briefly traces
the evolution of single-sex education in the United States and
reviews the justifications, both traditional and modem, for single-
sex schools. Part II discusses the application of equal protection
doctrine in sex-equality cases and assesses how Virginia has
changed that doctrine. Part III applies the current doctrine, as
refined in Virginia, to the new generation of single-sex public
schools. It concludes that the Supreme Court's asymmetrical de-
12 Virginia, 518 US at 534 (emphasis added).
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scription of the anti-subordination test makes the most sense if
understood as privileging equality interests over liberty interests
- prohibiting only those sex-based classifications that steer men
or women toward gender identities and roles that perpetuate the
inferiority of women. Moreover, Part IV argues that equality in-
terests should trump liberty interests when the anti-
subordination principle is applied to K-12 single-sex public
schools. The liberty interests of children may properly be some-
what curtailed, while their equality interests - such as their in-
terests in constructing preferences and discovering abilities in
educational environments not tainted by the history of sex in-
equality - weigh more heavily than those of adults. Finally, Part
V applies the interpretation of the anti-subordination principle
developed in this article to the current crop of K-12 single-sex
public schools. It concludes that those schools do not violate the
Equal Protection Clause when they are voluntary, educationally
beneficial, allow alternatives to traditional gender identities and
roles, and do not harm women's economic or political status.
I. THE EVOLUTION OF SINGLE-SEX EDUCATION
IN THE UNITED STATES
Since the early days of the American Republic, educators fa-
voring single-sex education have been called upon to justify that
preference.13 The demand for justification has intensified as
mixed-sex schools have grown more firmly entrenched as the
norm at all levels of education. Moreover, as single-sex education
has evolved in response or in opposition to changing notions of
sex-appropriate gender roles and of proper relationships between
the sexes, so have the rationales offered for maintaining those
schools.
In marked contrast to the tradition of single-sex schools that
prevailed in Europe at the beginning of the nineteenth century,
co-education was a defining characteristic of the K-12 public
school systems that developed in the United States during that
same time period 4 :
" See David Tyack and Elisabeth Hansot, Learning Together: A History of Coeduca-
tion in American Public Schools 47 (Russell Sage Foundation 1990) ("The adoption of
coeducation seems to have been one of those major transitions in practice in which citizens
moved gradually from why to why not.") (emphasis in original).
1 See id at 4 (noting the European practice of segregating the sexes in public
schools). Over time, co-education has gained popularity in Europe: "In Great Britain, for
example, where separate-sex schools had been common for the middle and upper classes,
educators deliberately emulated the American model of coeducational and socially com-
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[T]he practice of coeducation moved almost imperceptibly
from the family to the common school. From the colonial
period on, women were entrusted with the instruction of
the young, first in the home or dame school, then in sum-
mer and winter schools taught at public expense. The en-
try of women into public-school teaching... made the idea
of educating girls with boys in the school seem as natural
as teaching brothers and sisters in the home. 5
Financial rather than pedagogical concerns fueled the popularity
of co-education, as smaller communities could not afford to build
separate schools for both boys and girls. 8 Thus, the prevalence of
mixed-sex schools was not the result of an ideological commit-
ment to sex equality. 7 Nevertheless, by the 1890s it was widely
accepted that schools should offer essentially the same curricu-
lum to both boys and girls and educate children of both sexes to-
gether. 8
Co-education took root more slowly and uncertainly in higher
education. Oberlin, the country's first co-educational college, was
not established until 1833.'" Although mixed-sex schooling be-
came "dominant in public and private universities in the 1870s,
and new universities thereafter took [it] for granted,"0 those in-
stitutions remained overwhelmingly male.2 Even colleges that
prehensive schools. By 1982, only 449 English comprehensive schools were single-sex,
whereas 2,634 were coeducational." Id at 280.
1 Id at 287-88.
16 Id at 48 ("To have created separate schools for boys and for girls would have
greatly increased the costs, whereas educating them together in a common building under
the same teacher was cheaper and more efficient.").
17 See Jill Laviguer, Co-education and the Tradition of Separate Needs, in Dale
Spender and Elizabeth Sarah, eds, Learning to Lose: Sexism and Education 206 (Women's
Press 1988).
" See Tyack and Hansot, Learning Together at 110 (cited in note 13).
19 See Barbara Miller Solomon, In the Company of Educated Women: A History of
Women and Higher Education in America 21 (Yale 1985).
'0 Id at 47. Co-education in higher education gained increasing popularity after the
Civil War, as attitudes toward mixed-sex socializing became more relaxed. See Rosalind
Rosenberg, The Limits of Access: The History of Coeducation in America, in John Faragher
and Florence Howe, eds, Women and Higher Education in American History 109-10 (Nor-
ton 1988) (attributing the change in cultural attitudes to the early women's rights move-
ment, the fact that many men were killed in the Civil War thus forcing young women to
support themselves without the assistance of husbands, and financial constraints that
prevented the maintenance of separate schools for boys and girls).
21 "In the 1870s and 1880s women represented a small minority of the students at
coeducational institutions." Id at 115. The popularity of the writings of Dr. Edward H.
Clarke, a professor at Harvard Medical School, and G. Stanley Hall, a psychologist and
the President of Clark University, both of whom argued that advanced schooling was
harmful to the health and fertility of women, contributed to women's underrepresentation
on college campuses well into the twentieth century. See Edward H. Clarke, Sex in Educa-
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were co-educational from their founding, such as the University
of Chicago and Stanford, retreated to single-sex classes and caps
on the admissions of women when their student bodies became
almost fifty percent female around the turn of the twentieth cen-
tury.22 Furthermore, some of the more prestigious all-male col-
leges in the East and the South - such as Yale, Princeton, and
the University of Virginia - did not admit women until the early
1970s.'
Despite these fits and starts, the distinctly American prefer-
ence for co-education has become increasingly obvious in the last
few decades2': "[F]ar fewer single-sex schools now exist in the
public sector than was the case at mid-century; [and] in the pri-
vate sector, there has been a pronounced decline in numbers of
single-sex institutions."" With the integration of the Citadel in
1995 and the Virginia Military Institute in 1997, only one single-
tion; or, A Fair Chance for the Girls 116 (J.R. Osgood 1873) ("It has been reserved for our
age and country, by its methods of female education, to demonstrate that it is possible in
some cases to divest a woman of her chief feminine functions; in others, to produce grave
and even fatal disease of the brain and nervous system; in others, to engender torturing
derangements and imperfections of the reproductive apparatus that imbitter [sic] a life-
time."); G. Stanley Hall, 2 Adolescence: Its Psychology and Its Relations to Physiology,
Anthropology, Sociology, Sex, Crime, Religion and Education 614 (D. Appleton 1905) ("The
more scholastic the education of women, the fewer children and the harder, more danger-
ous, and more dreaded is parturition, and the less the ability to nurse children. Not intel-
ligence but education by present man-made ways is inversely as fecundity.").
Black women did not fit this general pattern: "[Bly 1910 [black] women slightly
outnumbered black male college graduates. With the exception of the decade between
1920 and 1930, black women have earned more college degrees than black men in [every
decade of the twentieth] century." Jeanne Noble, The Higher Education of Black Women in
the Twentieth Century, in Faragher and Howe, eds, Women in Higher Education 89 (cited
in note 20). The fact that women historically have made up a much larger proportion of
Black college graduates than of White college graduates correlates strongly with the lack
of opportunities historically available to college educated Black men. Due to sex-
segregation in employment, "black women knew that degrees would guarantee them jobs
as teachers at segregated schools, while the utility of degrees for black men was more
doubtful." Solomon, Educated Women at 145 (cited in note 19). Moreover, Black women
educated for women's professions, like teaching, were less threatening to the racial hierar-
chy of White over Black than were Black men educated for the traditionally White male
roles of economic and political leadership.
See id.
2 See id at 203. Princeton admitted women students in 1969, as did Yale and the
University of Virginia in 1971. See also Ann Gibson, U.Va. Added New Dimension 20
Years Ago, Richmond Times-Dispatch E4 (Aug 19, 1990).
In the twenty years between 1966 and 1986, the percentage of private single-sex
colleges and universities dropped from 25 percent to 6 percent. See Tyack and Hansot,
Learning Together at 280 (cited in note 13).
Mary Moore, Conference Summary, in 1 Single-Sex Schooling: Proponents Speak,
69 (Office of Educ Research and Improvement US Dept of Educ 1993).
388 THE UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO LEGAL FORUM [1999:
sex public college remains in the United States." And as recently
as 1995, there were only two single-sex K-12 public schools in the
country, one in Baltimore and the other in Philadelphia, both of
which were all-female.27 The last remaining K-12 all-boys public
school admitted girls in 1983,2 and Milwaukee, Detroit, and New
York City all rejected proposals for new K-12 all-boys public
schools in the early 1990s.29 Perhaps because co-education was
almost universally practiced, its pedagogical advantages over
single-sex schooling were, most often, assumed without question.
However, single-sex institutions have always also been part
of the educational tradition in the United States. The first col-
leges established in this country - Harvard in 1636, William and
Mary in 1693, and Yale in 1701 - were only open to male stu-
dents." Single-sex education remained popular in public colleges
in the South even after the Civil War when co-education had be-
' Douglass College in New Brunswick, New Jersey, only admits women students,
but shares the campus of Rutgers University, a larger co-educational institution. See
United States v Virginia, 766 F Supp 1407, 1420 (W D Va 1991).
'7 Baltimore's Western High School was established in 1844 to train young women to
be primary school teachers. The mission of the school has evolved over time: Principal
Anne Carusi says, "I'm working to make [the students] realize that there are good things
about being a young lady - and I'm not talking about the white gloves and prim-proper
attitude either. It's about being worthwhile, being in touch with yourself so you can give
something important back to others." Traci Johnson Mathena, Best Western, Balt Sun Mag
8 (Oct 30, 1994). Neither Western High School nor the Philadelphia High School for Girls,
which opened four years after Western, has ever had a male applicant nor has the single-
sex admissions policy of either school ever been challenged in court. See Laura Rehrmann,
Girls Feel Free to Succeed at Single-Sex Public School, Wash Post M2 (Jan 14, 1993).
" In that year, a Pennsylvania state court ordered Central High School in Philadel-
phia to admit female students. See Newberg v Board of Public Education, 478 A2d 1352,
1354 (Pa Super Ct 1984); Philadelphia School Admits Women, NY Times A14 (Sept 13,
1983). The Boston Latin School admitted female students in 1972. See Muriel Cohen,
Academy and Latin compared, Boston Globe 73 (Aug 20, 1995).
In 1990, the Milwaukee School Board's African-American Male Task Force sug-
gested opening three all-Black all-boys public schools in that school system. Gretchen
Schuldt, Three all-black schools for males urged, Milwaukee J Sentinel BI (Mar 2, 1990).
Although two schools with Afro-centric curricula opened the next fall, the student body
was about half female. Prescilla Ahlgren, Black culture evident at immersion school, Mil-
waukee J Sentinel B1 (Sept 3, 1991).
The following year, the Detroit School Board cancelled plans to operate three all-
boys public schools with Afro-centric curricula after civil liberties organizations obtained a
preliminary injunction to prevent the schools from opening. See Garrett v Board of Educa-
tion, 775 F Supp 1004 (E D Mich 1991). The suit settled after the school board agreed to
adopt a sex-neutral curriculum and to accept applications from female students. Arthur
Hayes and Jonathan Moses, Detroit Plan for All-Male Schools is Scrapped by Board of
Education, Wall St J B2 (Nov 8, 1991).
Also in 1991, organizers in Brooklyn, New York proposed opening the Ujamaa
Institute, an Afro-centric all-boys public school with an all-Black, all-male faculty. Nick
Chiles, Ujamaa Institute: The Real Deal, Newsday 5 (Jan 27, 1991). The plans for that
single-sex school were canceled in the face of political opposition.
Solomon, Educated Women at 2 (cited in note 19).
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come the norm in the rest of the country. 3' And well into the
twentieth century, the all-female Seven Sisters colleges - Mount
Holyoke, Vassar, Wellesley, Smith, Radcliffe, Barnard, and Bryn
Mawr - successfully competed with co-educational schools for
the most talented female students.32
Moreover, in recent years there has been a resurgence of in-
terest in single-sex schooling - particularly on the K-12 level.
This modern movement for sex segregation can be traced, in sig-
nificant part, to a report published in 1992 by the American As-
sociation of University Women entitled How Schools Shortchange
Girls.3 1 While that report did not advocate single-sex education, it
found that in co-educational settings "girls do not receive equita-
ble amounts of teacher attention, that they are less apt than boys
to see themselves reflected in the materials they study, and ...
they often are not expected or encouraged to pursue higher-level
mathematics and science courses."' The report's exposure of gen-
" Id at 47.
See generally Helen Lefkowitz Horowitz, Alma Mater: Design and Experience in
the Women's Colleges from their Nineteenth Century Beginnings to the 1930s (Massachu-
setts 1984). See also Wendy Kaminer, The Trouble with Single Sex Schools, Atlantic
Monthly 22 (April 1998) (describing the Seven Sisters colleges as a "female Ivy League,
educating the daughters of elites and providing social and professional mobility to some
members of the middle class). The stature of those schools has declined somewhat in
recent years: "[i]n the 1970s, after men's colleges and universities began accepting women,
the SAT scores of Smith college applicants declined; they stabilized and rose slightly dur-
ing the 1980s." Id at 24.
' American Association of University Women Educational Foundation, How Schools
Shortchange Girls (Marlowe & Co 1992). See also Jeanette Stephenson, Women's Colleges
Called Progressive; Ranks of Freshmen Up, Dallas Morning News 14A (Feb 2, 1993) (giv-
ing credit for the renewed interest in single-sex institutions to the report).
' American Association of University Women, How Schools Shortchange Girls at 147
(cited in note 33). See also Cornelius Riordan, Single-Gender Schools: Outcomes for Afri-
can and Hispanic Americans, 10 Research in Sociology of Education and Socialization 117,
180 (1994) ("In mixed-sex schools, researchers have found that: (1) female cognitive devel-
opment may be depressed or impaired; (2) female educational and occupational aspira-
tions and their ultimate attainment may be lowered; (3) female self-confidence and self-
esteem may be damaged; (4) females may receive unequal treatment in the classroom and
in curriculum opportunities; (5) teachers may devalue the work of female students relative
to males."); Elizabeth Sarah, Marion Scott, and Dale Spender, The Education of Feminists:
The Case for Single-Sex Schools, in Spender and Sarah, eds, Learning to Lose (cited in
note 17) (discussing gender bias in co-educational schools); David Sadker, Where the Girls
Are: Confusing Political Arguments with Educational Research, 61 Education Week 49
(Sept 4, 1996) (same); Myra Sadker and David Sadker, Failing at Fairness: How America's
Schools Cheat Girls (Charles Scribner's Sons 1994) (same); Bernice R. Sandler, The Class-
room Climate: Still a Chilly One for Women, in Carol Lesser, ed, Educating Men and
Women Together: Coeducation in a Changing World 113 (Illinois 1987) (same); Myra Sad-
ker and David Sadker, Sexism in the Classroom: From Grade School to Graduate School,
67 Phi Delta Kappan 512 (1986) (same).
Sexual harassment, which denies a disproportionate number of female students
equal educational opportunity, is prevalent in co-educational public schools. See American
Association of University Women Educational Foundation, Hostile Hallways: The AAUW
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der bias in co-educational schools led students, parents, and edu-
cators to reconsider the educational advantages of single-sex
schools. Indeed, this renewed interest in single-sex education is
empirically justified. While educators hesitate to generalize based
on the academic achievements of students in existing single-sex
schools,35 most of which are private or parochial, there is consid-
erable evidence that a single-sex pedagogy can benefit some stu-
dents educationally. 36
Survey on Sexual Harassment in America's Schools 7 (SoftLine Info 1993). The study
found that 81 percent of all students surveyed reported being sexually harassed at some
point: 85 percent of girls and 76 percent of boys. Among students reporting harassment
.often" or "occasionally" there is a seventeen-point difference by sex: 56 percent of girls
report often or occasional harassment compared to 49 percent of boys.
Some studies indicate that the effect of gender bias on adolescent girls in co-
educational settings "var[ies] among ethnic groups. Far more African American girls re-
tain their overall self-esteem during adolescence than white or Latina girls, maintaining a
stronger sense of both personal and familial importance .... The one exception for African
American girls is their feelings about school: black girls are more pessimistic about both
their teachers and their schoolwork than other girls." See Peggy Orenstein, SchoolGirls:
Young Women, Self-Esteem, and the Confidence Gap xvii (Doubleday 1994).
W See American Association of University Women Educational Foundation, Sepa-
rated by Sex: A Critical Look at Single-Sex Education for Girls 2 (The Foundation 1998)
("The 'success' or 'failure' of any K-12 single-sex education initiative is relative to a par-
ticular group of students in a particular setting and a given set of academic or social objec-
tives. Claims that single-sex education is inherently 'better' or 'worse' than coeducation
beg the questions: What constitutes 'good' education? And for whom?").
, Studies show that single-sex education is particularly beneficial for girls. See Cor-
nelius Riordan, Girls and Boys in School: Together or Separate? 61 (Teacher's College
Press 1990) ("Girls in single-sex schools.., seem to obtain higher cognitive outcomes than
their counterparts in mixed-sex schools."); Anthony Bryk, Valerie Lee, and Peter Holland,
Catholic Schools and the Common Good 239 (Harvard 1993) ("A cursory examination of
our findings indicates a broad base of positive effects for single-sex schools across a diverse
array of educational outcomes .... On the basis of the empirical evidence assembled here,
we conclude that a single-sex school organization effect is the most plausible explanation
for the observed results."); Sadker and Sadker, Failing at Fairness at 232-34 (cited in note
34) ("Girls in single-sex schools have higher self-esteem, are more interested in nontradi-
tional subjects such as science and math, and are less likely to stereotype jobs and ca-
reers.").
At least two studies have shown that single-sex schools can also improve the educa-
tional achievement of Black and Latino boys. See Riordan, Girls and Boys in School at
101-13 (cited in this note). However, there is evidence that single-sex settings can nega-
tively effect the educational achievement of the majority of boys when White boys are
factored into the equation. "[B]oys in single-sex schools score lower on the cognitive tests
than boys in mixed-sex schools .... The affective outcomes follow the same pattern. Boys
in mixed-sex schools have higher self-esteem, higher sense of environmental control, and
more egalitarian attitudes toward the role of women in society." Id at 110-11; Cornelius
Riordan, The Case for Single-Sex Schools, in 2 Single-Sex Schooling: Proponents Speak, 48
(Office of Educational Research and Improvement US Department of Education 1993). But
see Sadker and Sadker, Failing at Fairness at 239-41 (cited in note 34) ("the jury is still
out when it comes to all-male education"); Bryk, Lee, and Holland, Catholic Schools and
the Common Good at 238 (cited in this note) ("Our analyses also suggest possible [positive
educational] effects for boys' schools, although the evidence here is not as strong.").
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In the fall immediately following the publication of How
Schools Shortchange Girls, 85 percent of women's colleges na-
tionwide enrolled more freshmen than they had the previous
year.37 And a few years later, in the fall of 1996, the Young
Women's Leadership School, the first new K-12 single-sex public
school to operate in this country in decades, opened its doors.3
All-boys K-12 public schools followed a year later when California
established seven matched pairs of K-12 single-sex public
schools.39 Attendance is voluntary at all of these new schools.
While the number of single-sex public schools remains small,
there is a considerable amount of separation by sex within co-
37 Stephenson, Women's Colleges Called Progressive, Dallas Morning News at 14A
(cited in note 33). See also Sandra Reeves and Anne Marriott, A Burst of Popularity: Most
Women's Colleges are Flourishing by Offering Students a Sense of Empowerment, US News
& World Rept 105 (Sept 26, 1994). According to the Women's College Coalition, since 1992
"women's colleges have reported a surge in applications and a cumulative 15 percent to 18
percent increase in enrollment." Emily Bazar, Thriving Oakland College Glad it Chose to
Remain All-Female, Sacramento Bee Al (March 11, 1999) (referring to the all-female Mills
College).
See Jacques Steinberg, Central Board Backs All-Girls School, NY Times B3 (Aug
22, 1996); Jacques Steinberg, All-Girls School Opens to Muffins and Media, NY Times B6
(Sept 5, 1996). In 1986, Schools Chancellor Nathan Quinones had ordered Washington
Irving High School, which at the time was the last remaining single-sex school in the New
York City public school system, to admit boys. See Larry Rother, Order to Add Boys Up-
sets City High School for Girls, NY Times B3 (July 2, 1985); Eleanor Blau, An Era Ends at
Girls' School, NY Times 46 (Aug 17, 1986). See also Jones v Board of Education, 632 F
Supp 1319, 1320 (E D NY 1986) (denying parents' challenge to decision to convert Wash-
ington Irving High School into a co-educational public school).
The Young Women's Leadership School served fifty-five seventh grade students in
the 1996-97 academic year. The majority of those students were girls of color who live in
the East Harlem community in which the school is located. The school has expanded to
serve eighth, ninth, and tenth graders, and expects to admit eleventh and twelfth graders
within the next few years. See Kristina Lanier, No Boys? No Problem, says all girl school,
Christian Science Monitor 18 (Feb 9, 1999); Jacques Steinberg, Just Girls and That's Fine
With Them, NY Times 21 (Feb 1, 1997); Interview with Celinia Chevere, Principal of the
Leadership School (Oct 25, 1996). [Editor's Note: The University of Chicago Legal Forum
does not verify personal interviews.] Although the teachers at the school are predomi-
nantly female, there is at least one male member of the full-time faculty and the school's
chess coach is a man. See Steinberg, Just Girls, NY Times at 21; conversation with
Chevere. The school's curriculum is geared to emphasize math and science, subjects in
which boys have traditionally performed better than girls. All of the school's programs and
course offerings, however, are available to male and female students in co-educational
settings throughout New York City. See Jacques Steinberg, Plan for Harlem Girls School
Faces Concern Over Sex Bias, NY Times Al (July 16, 1996). The school's only unique fea-
ture is that it provides the opportunity to study in an environment in which all of one's
peers are girls.
' The schools are located in Stockton, Siskiyou County, San Francisco, El Monte,
San Jose, East Palo Alto and Orange County. Richard Lee Colvin, Single-Sex Classes a
First for State's Schools, LA Times Al (Aug 29, 1997); Julian Guthrie, S.F. School Launch-
ing Single-Sex Classes, SF Examiner Al (Aug 29, 1997); Tamar Lewin, In California,
Wider Test of Same-Sex Schools, NY Times Al (Oct 9, 1997).
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educational public schools.40 Currently, many mixed-sex schools
offer single-sex classes and programs to boys and girls - sex-
segregated athletic programs are standard in K-12 public
schools,4 single-sex math and science classes are now offered in
some public schools,42 and educational programs for pregnant,
parenting, and incarcerated students are often offered in single-
sex settings.43
Although some of the rationales offered for establishing this
new generation of single-sex schools and programs resemble
those that have traditionally been put forward, many of the mod-
em defenders of single-sex education rely upon a new set of justi-
fications.
A. Traditional Justifications for Single-Sex Education
Traditionally, proponents of single-sex education have offered
three primary rationales to justify the existence of those schools.
First, educators have argued that single-sex schools were the best
way to train men and women for what they considered to be sex-
appropriate gender roles. Second, supporters have insisted that
single-sex schools were necessary to provide educational opportu-
nities to women that would otherwise not have been available to
' Indeed, the existence of co-educational schools has never guaranteed that girls and
boys would be taught in the same classrooms or receive the same instruction. See Tyack
and Hansot, Learning Together at 4 (cited in note 13).
" Id at 268.
" Many of these programs are modeled after the all-girls math classes offered by the
Ventura High School in Los Angeles, California, in 1993. See Maia Davis, Ventura Schools
Offer Girls Own Math Courses, LA Times B1 (Nov 7, 1993). The legality of those single-sex
classes was challenged by the US Department of Education, and school officials ultimately
agreed to open the classes to all students based on need. See Ventura's All-Girl Math
Classes Investigated After Bias Charge, LA Times A27 (Jan 6, 1995); Catherine Saillant,
New Math Class Recruiting Method, LA Times B2 (Feb 4, 1995). See also Clair Davis,
Single-sex classes teach lesson at Fitz-Simons Middle School, Philadelphia Trib 8E (Feb
27, 1996) (all-girls and all-boys classes in Philadelphia, Pennsylvania); Sharon Massey,
Education: Co-Ed Schools Are Studying All-Girls Classes, Wall St J BI (Sept 10, 1993)
(all-girls math classes in New York, New York); Jessamy Brown, Coleman School's all-
male class a success, Baltimore Sun 1D (June 12, 1991) (all-boys reading classes in Balti-
more, Maryland).
' "Of the many programs developed over the past decade to meet the needs of teen-
age parents, most have focused on prenatal work with adolescent mothers and postpartum
services for their babies. Historically, relatively few have worked to define or to address
the needs of the teenage father. As of 1976, only one third of teenage parent programs
offered any services to teenage fathers." Martha Cole McGrew and William B. Shore, The
Problem of Teenage Pregnancy, 32 J Family Practice 17, 20 (Jan 1991). See also Monica J.
Stamm, A Skeleton in the Closet: Single-Sex Schools for Pregnant Girls, 98 Colum L Rev
1203 (1998) (discussing the constitutionality of separate public schools for pregnant and
parenting girls). Most prisons in the United States and the educational facilities within
them are also sex segregated. See Rosemary Herbert, Women's Prisons: An Equal Protec-
tion Evaluation, 94 Yale L J 1182 (1985).
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them. Third, supporters have argued that all-male and all-female
education would eliminate the sexual tensions that distracted
students from their studies in co-educational settings.
1. Teaching Sex-Appropriate Gender Roles.
Given the historical assumption that gender should map per-
fectly onto sex - that all men should be stereotypically mascu-
line and all women should be stereotypically feminine - one
primary purpose of single-sex education has been to prepare men
and women to fill the gender roles deemed appropriate for their
sex." Thus, while the higher education necessary to pursue a ca-
reer as a minister, lawyer, doctor or politician has always been
available to men of sufficient wealth and social status,45 the edu-
cation of women has often been limited to what was necessary to
serve as wives, mothers, and housekeepers."6 For example, the
1884 charter of the Mississippi Industrial Institute and College
for the Education of White Girls - the school was later renamed
Mississippi University for Women - articulates the school's aims
for preparing women to fulfill traditionally female gender roles:
The purpose and aim of the Mississippi State College for
Women is the moral and intellectual advancement of the
girls of the state by the maintenance of a first-class insti-
tution for their education in the arts and sciences, for their
training in normal school methods and kindergarten, for
their instruction in bookkeeping, photography, stenogra-
phy, telegraphy, and typewriting, and in designing,
drawing, engraving, and painting, and their industrial ap-
plication, and for their instruction in fancy, general and
practical needlework, and in such other industrial
branches as experience, from time to time, shall suggest is
necessary or proper to fit them for the practical affairs of
life.47
" See Clarke, Sex in Education at 180-81 (cited in note 21) ("Physiology condemns
the identical, and pleads for the appropriate education of the sexes, so that boys may be-
come men, and girls women, and both have a fair chance to do and become their best.");
Hall, Adolescence at 636-46 (cited in note 21) (suggesting a curriculum to prepare women
for marriage and motherhood).
' See Solomon, Educated Women at 2 (cited in note 19).
See Claudia Center, "Boys Keep Out!": Historical and Legal Perspectives on the
Contributions of All-Female Organizations to Sex Equality, 8 Wisc Women's L J 1, 4
(1992).
" See Mississippi University for Women v Hogan, 458 US 718, 720 n 1 (1982).
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Through the 1920s, "[miost institutions, both co-educational
and women's colleges, included domestic studies as part of the
female collegiate course."48 Even the founders of the more aca-
demically oriented Northern women's colleges worried that their
programs might discourage students from fulfilling their roles as
wives and mothers9.4  "Vassar's location, Wellesley's beauty,
Smith's much-copied cottages, and Radcliffe's boarding houses
were planned to insure that higher education not unsex women
students."0 The architecture as well as the curriculum in many
women's colleges were designed to steer women toward tradition-
ally female gender roles.
On the other hand, VMI excluded women since its founding
in 1839 because fulfilling the role of citizen-soldier and partici-
pating in the adversative method were not considered to be ap-
propriate endeavors for them." Since only men were "suited for
leadership in civilian life" and capable of military service,52 only
men needed to attend military school. All-male schools were in-
tended to prepare men for lives of "leadership and scholarship" -
roles not seen as fitting for women. 3 Proponents of single-sex
schools argued that those schools best provided the sex-specific
training necessary for men and women to fulfill what were as-
sumed to be their biologically determined gender roles.
2. Compensating for the Lack of Educational Opportunities
Available to Women.
The authors of the 1848 Seneca Falls Declaration protested
that "[man] has denied [woman] the facilities for obtaining a
thorough education, all colleges being closed against her."4 In
response to that sentiment, a number of private women's colleges
were established during the decades after the Civil War ended -
including Vassar in 1865, Wellesley and Smith in 1875, and Bryn
See Solomon, Educated Women at 85 (cited in note 19).
, See Horowitz, Alma Mater at 5, 29 (cited in note 32). John Raymond, President of
Vassar College from 1864 to 1878, worried that education would "impair womanliness of
character in our students, & encourage the formation of those mannish tastes & manners
which are so disgusting to every right mind &.feeling." Id at 59.
See id at 167.
5, See Henry A. Wise, Drawing Out the Man: The VMI Story 278 (Virginia 1978);
Dianne Avery, Institutional Myths, Historical Narratives and Social Science Evidence:
Reading the 'Record" in the Virginia Military Institute Case, 5 S Cal Rev L & Women's
Stud 189, 251 (1996).
52 United States v Virginia, 766 F Supp at 1425.
See Horowitz, Alma Mater at 97 (cited in note 32).
Declaration of Sentiments and Resolutions, Seneca Falls in Miriam Schneir, ed,
Feminism: The Essential Historical Writings 79 (Vintage Books 1972).
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Mawr in 1884."5 The founders of those schools sought primarily to
compensate women for their exclusion from many of the existing
colleges and universities by offering them "opportunities for edu-
cation equivalent to those usually provided in colleges for young
men.""6 Whether their founders intended to expand the gender
roles available to women,57 or aimed to train women for tradi-
tional marriages," those single-sex schools succeeded in giving
their students a chance to obtain advanced degrees previously
unavailable to women.
3. Eliminating Distracting Sexual Tensions.
Proponents of single-sex education have also argued that sex-
segregation is necessary to eliminate distracting sexual tensions
in schools. According to this line of argument, in co-educational
settings, women distract men who are sexually attracted to them
and drive men who are loath to compete with them out of
classes.59 In contrast, single-sex schools have often severely lim-
ited cross-sex contact because educators and parents were con-
cerned about the morality of pre-marital interactions between the
sexes.0 Proponents of single-sex education argued that the prac-
tice reduced the tension between men and women that existed on
mixed-sex campuses. Some modern champions of single-sex edu-
cation agree that sex segregation benefits students educationally
See Solomon, Educated Women at 47 (cited in note 19).
See id at 48 (quoting Henry Fowle Durant, the founder of Wellesley College). See
also Horowitz, Alma Mater at 70 (cited in note 32) ("Sophia Smith [the founder of Smith
College] left the bulk of her estate to accomplish 'the design to furnish for [her] own sex
means and facilities for education equal to those which are afforded now in our College to
young men.).
" For example, M. Carey Thomas, the first dean and second president of Bryn Mawr
College, said, "Our failures only marry." Solomon, Educated Women at 84 (cited in note 19)
(emphasis added). Similarly, Emma Willard, founder of the all-female Troy Seminary,
agreed that she did not "wish women to act out of their sphere; but it is time that modern
improvement should reach their case and enlarge their sphere from the walls of their own
houses to the limits of the school district." Id at 25.
' Sarah Lawrence and some of the other women's colleges founded in the 1920s
initially advertised themselves as institutions to prepare women for marriage. See
Horowitz, Alma Mater at 322-25, 341 (cited in note 32).
" See Solomon, Educated Women at 60-61 (cited in note 19).
o See id at 159-60. For example, up until the turn of the twentieth century, women's
colleges routinely "permitted only remote acquaintance with young men, sometimes lim-
iting callers to relatives (it is said that brothers grew in number). Even when this extreme
isolation diminished, occasions when men were allowed on campuses were either formal
events or, when informal, still very tightly structured." Id at 100.
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by forcing them to focus on academics and by depriving them of
the distractions created by cross-sex relationships."1
B. Traditional Justifications for Single-Sex Education Cannot
Support Modem K-12 Single-Sex Public Schools
The traditional rationales used to support single-sex educa-
tion cannot justify the recently established K-12 single-sex public
schools. First, the new schools do not attempt to steer boys and
girls into traditional gender roles by making particular subject
matter areas available exclusively to one sex. Unlike some of the
older generation single-sex schools, the new schools do not offer a
sex-specific curriculum.62 Instead, they offer the same classes that
are available to both sexes in co-educational settings. Therefore,
supporters cannot justify the new single-sex schools on the
grounds that they are designed to train men and women in what
are assumed to be their biologically determined gender roles.
Second, the purpose of current crop of single-sex schools is
not to compensate women for the fact that they are excluded from
other educational opportunities. Today, the vast majority of
schools are co-educational, more females graduate high school
than males, and more women are enrolled in college than men.'
Accordingly, all-female education can no longer be justified on the
grounds that women have few other educational opportunities
available to them.
Finally, the newly created single-sex schools and programs
do not eliminate sexual tensions and their attendant distractions.
Despite offering single-sex classes, most of the new schools do not
completely isolate the sexes from one another. The parallel sin-
gle-sex schools recently established in California, for example, are
each housed in the same building and the students are in co-
educational settings for some of their classes, between classes,
and during lunch." The same is true of students in single-sex
8 See United States v Virginia, 776 F Supp at 1435, citing deposition of David Ries-
man at 38-39 ("At an all-male college, adolescent males benefit from being able to focus
exclusively on the work at hand, without the intrusion of any sexual tension.").
See note 38.
In 1981, 92 percent of colleges in the United States were co-educational. See Solo-
mon, Educated Women at 44 (cited in note 19). In 1994, there were 6.7 million women
enrolled in colleges in the United States compared to 5.3 million men. Cynthia B. Costello,
Shari Miles, and Anne J. Stone, The American Woman 1999-2000: A Century of Change -
What's Next? 234 (Norton 1998).
" Guthrie, S.F. School, SF Examiner at Al (cited in note 39). Even some of the older
institutions now have some co-educational housing on campus. See Bryn Mawr College,
Room Draw 1999 Residential Life and Housing Council 10 (1999).
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programs within co-educational schools. Moreover, even if mod-
ern single-sex education did isolate the sexes, it would not elimi-
nate sexual tension. Same-sex relationships can distract students
as much as cross-sex ones, and homoerotic horseplay and overt
sexual relationships are common in single-sex settings.65 Thus,
single-sex schools are not justifiable on the basis that they are
devoid of that element of distraction.
C. Modern Justifications for Single-Sex Education
Today, several new rationales are offered to justify single-sex
education. Modern educators argue that single-sex schools en-
hance the diversity of educational opportunities within school
systems, respond to sex-specific educational needs, and promote
sex equality by challenging the societal traditions that constrain
males and females to particular gender identities and roles. It
remains to be seen, however, what effect the evolution in single-
sex education and in the rationales offered to justify its existence
will have on judicial evaluation of the constitutionality of the new
generation of all-male and all-female public schools.
1. Enhancing the Diversity of Educational Opportunities in
Public School Systems.
Capitalizing on the overwhelming popularity of co-education,
some defenders of the new single-sex public schools justify these
schools' existence by arguing that they enhance diversity in pub-
lic education systems." They contend that "[a] state which offers
a single-sex option, in addition to its variety of co-educational in-
stitutions, has dramatically expanded the diversity of its entire
system, and consequently has provided new opportunities for
students to select the type of education most closely-tailored to
his or her [sic] own developmental and learning needs."7
" See Avery, 5 S Cal Rev L & Women's Stud at 368 (cited in note 51) (describing
nude male bonding at VMI); Susan Faludi, The Naked Citadel, New Yorker 62 (Sept 5,
1994) (describing sexual tension and homosexual relationships among male students at
the Citadel); Solomon, Educated Women at 99 (cited in note 19) ("women's campuses facili-
tated 'smashing,' with its rituals of courting a special friend; flowers, poems, gifts, and
missives accompanied declarations of affections and love of the kind usually associated
with male-female relations"); Horowitz, Alma Mater at 13, 65-68, 166-67, 282 (cited in
note 32) (describing a range of intimate relationships between students at women's col-
leges, including intense female friendships, smashes, crushes, and long-term lesbian part-
nerships).
" See Kristin S. Caplice, The Case for Public Single-Sex Education, 18 Harv J L &
Pub Pol 227, 251 (1994).
Id at 252.
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Unlike some of the older generation single-sex schools, the
newer schools do not deprive one sex of the opportunity to study a
particular subject matter while steering the other sex toward the
study of that subject matter. They are not like VMI, which de-
prived women of access to comparable military training within
the state of Virginia, or the Mississippi University for Women
("MUW"), which made it more inconvenient for men to study
nursing than for women to do so." Instead, all of the educational
opportunities provided in the new single-sex public schools are
also available in co-educational settings within the same school
district. Thus, the schools' supporters argue, without limiting the
options available to one sex, they expand the options available to
the other by providing a choice between co-educational and sin-
gle-sex environments.
The diversity justification for modern single-sex education
has significant weaknesses. It is true that interaction among stu-
dents from diverse backgrounds within the same school results in
a qualitatively improved educational experience for all, because
"[dliversity of stimulation means novelty, and novelty means
challenge to thought."69 However, employing a diverse array of
educational approaches within a single school system does not
have a similar inherently positive effect. The use of different
types of pedagogy is a quantitative change which does not neces-
sarily result in the same qualitative educational improvement
produced by interaction among students from diverse back-
grounds. Greater choice is only beneficial to the extent that the
additional pedagogical choices are themselves desirable. There-
fore, the diversity which single-sex schools add to public educa-
See Virginia, 518 US at 540 (describing VMI as "serv[ing] the Commonwealth's
sons, [but making] no provision whatever for her daughters"); Mississippi University for
Women v Hogan, 458 US 718, 723 n 8 (1982) ("MUW's admissions policy worked to Ho-
gan's disadvantage. Although Hogan could have attended classes and received credit in
one of Mississippi's state-supported coeducational nursing programs, none of which was
located in Columbus, he could attend only by driving a considerable distance from his
home .... A similarly situated female would not have been required to choose between
forgoing credit and bearing that inconvenience.").
The differences of degree and of kind between the inconvenience caused by the new
K-12 single-sex public schools and that caused by the single-sex colleges and graduate
schools of the past generation are of constitutional significance. First, because there are
many more K-12 public schools than public colleges or universities, an adult who is turned
away from a collegiate or graduate-level single-sex programs is likely to have to travel
considerably further to attend a comparable co-educational offering. Second, it is more
arbitrary to exclude adults from single-sex programs than it is to exclude K-12 students
from those offerings because adults' preferences are likely to be more informed and their
qualifications are likely to be the product of greater personal investment. See notes 235-
40 and accompanying text.
" John Dewey, Democracy and Education 85 (Free Press 1916).
381] SINGLE-SEX PUBLIC SCHOOLS AFTER VIRGINIA 399
tion systems is good for students only if the schools themselves
are educationally beneficial.
2. Responding to Sex-Specific Educational Needs.
Other defenders of single-sex education argue that the new
single-sex schools and programs respond to sex-specific educa-
tional needs. While few modern educators openly endorse the
traditional argument that schools should promote sex-
stereotypical gender roles, many contend that the training of boys
and girls would be more effective if it acknowledged differences
between the sexes."0 A large popular literature suggests that men
and women communicate differently, and some feminist and non-
feminist educators agree that the sexes are best served by differ-
ent teaching methods. 1 They attribute the success of single-sex
schools to the fact that segregation allows teachers to respond
more effectively to sex-specific developmental and educational
needs. Indeed, the recent resurgence of interest in single-sex edu-
cation is, in part, the result of an effort to address concerns about
the efficacy of responding to the educational needs of male and
female students with the same pedagogical approaches.7"
However, the argument that single-sex education is neces-
sary to respond to sex-specific educational needs is also problem-
atic. First, it does not square with the new single-sex public
schools - none of which employs sex-specific teaching methods.73
Second, like the diversity justification, this argument is circular.
Sex-specific training is only necessary to respond to the very sex-
'0 For example, Richard Hawley, the founding director of the Boy's School Coalition
and the Headmaster of the all-male University School in Cleveland, defends all-male
education on the grounds that "[bliology, anthropology, and all manner of social sciences
confirm that we are deeply gendered; gender runs more deeply than culture; more deeply,
I believe, than even biology." Michael Ruhiman, Boys Themselves: A Return to Single-Sex
Education 359 (Henry Holt 1996). David Riesman, a professor of sociology at Harvard,
agrees that "girls and boys develop at different rates through adolescence, with enormous
variations by ethnicity and race, social class, and a constellation of individual circum-
stances. Boys tend to be more prideful than girls, less emotionally connected .... Girls
seem to be somewhat less prideful and more cooperative. But by middle school they like to
be with those girls, the potential cheerleaders, whom boys like." David Riesman, Quixotic
Ideas for Educational Reform, Society 17, 20-21 (March/April 1993).
" See Mary Field Belenky, Blythe McVicker Clinchy, Nancy Rule Goldberger, and
Jill Mattuck Tarule, Women's Ways of Knowing: The Development of Self, Voice, and Mind
229 (Basic Books 1986) (arguing that "connected knowing comes more easily to many
women than does separate knowing"); United States v Virginia, 766 F Supp 1407, 1434 (W
D Va 1991), citing deposition of David Riesman at 63-65, 95, 106-07 ("Males tend to need
an atmosphere of adversativeness or ritual combat in which the teacher is a disciplinarian
and a worthy competitor. Females tend to thrive in a cooperative atmosphere in which the
teacher is emotionally connected with the students.").
See notes 34-36 and accompanying text.
7' See note 38.
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based differences which opponents of single-sex education claim
are exaggerated and perpetuated by sex-specific educational ap-
proaches.
3. Promoting Sex Equality.
The most persuasive modern justification for single-sex
schools is that, in addition to boosting student academic achieve-
ment, they promote sex equality by providing an environment in
which students can more easily challenge the societal traditions
that constrain members of their sex to particular gender roles.
Single-sex schools create an environment where it is relatively
safe for students to express and construct their gender identities
in non-traditional ways. The effects of sex solidarity are the same
as those promised by feminist consciousness raising - they pro-
vide an "experience that strikes at the fabric of meaning of social
relations ... by calling their givenness into question and recon-
stituting their meaning in a transformed and critical way." 4
While women are just as capable of policing traditional gender
norms as are men, in single-sex environments, women can be less
inhibited about exploring a range of gender identities and roles
because the traditionally male roles remain open to them.75 Sup-
porters note that students at all-women's colleges "discover how
to wield power and to act collectively; through aggressive sport, to
play as a team member and to win; through dramatics, to take
male roles."76
In addition to being conducive to gender role experimenta-
tion,77 single-sex environments encourage women to value female
' Catharine A. MacKinnon, Toward a Feminist Theory of the State 95 (Harvard
1989). See also Katharine Bartlett, Feminist Legal Methods, 103 Harv L Rev 829, 866
(1990) (describing feminist consciousness raising as allowing women "to draw insights and
perceptions from their own experiences and those of other women and to use these in-
sights to challenge dominant versions of social reality"); Frantz Fanon, The Wretched of
the Earth 37 (Grove 1963) (similarly describing the process of racial decolonization as
requiring "a complete calling into question of the colonial situation").
" See Sarah, Scott, and Spender, The Education of Feminists, in Spender and Sarah,
eds, Learning to Lose at 60 (cited in note 17) ("in single-sex schools where it is possible for
a variety of roles to be open to girls... this can have the effect of opening up possibilities
that might be inconceivable in mixed schools.").
" See Horowitz, Alma Mater at 163 (cited in note 32). See also Jill Laviguer, Co-
education and the Tradition of Separate Needs, in Spender and Sarah, eds, Learning to
Lose at 205 (cited in note 17) ("[Tlhe single-sex environment places women and girls in a
position to exercise initiative, leadership and authority, with no pressure to adopt a sec-
ondary role, and enables 'masculine' subjects to be studied without the constraints of
belonging to a minority group.").
" "[Glirls' school students held increasingly less stereotypic views of women's role in
the family than their coeducational female counterparts over the course of the last 2 years
of high school. Four years later, they still held significantly less stereotypic views of
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friendship and, thus, to value one another. The student culture in
single-sex schools is crucial in this respect. Even more than
teacher-student relationships, solidarity among student peers can
create a space in which new norms can be generated and vali-
dated. As some scholars have argued, "In mixed classrooms girls
may never have the opportunity of relating to each other as a
group and may never know the strength that can come as a result
of collective action."78 Indeed, some feminists argue that the best
way to prevent the reproduction of the traditional sex hierarchy
is through single-sex schools where the "subversive potential" of
public schools can be appropriated for feminist practice.7 9
This justification for single-sex education seems, at first
blush, to apply only to female students. Indeed, it is true that the
sex-solidarity that is specific to single-sex environments has par-
ticularly subversive potential for women because it can encourage
them to cast off subordinating images imposed upon members of
their sex and encourage them to assume more empowering self-
conceptions. 0 However, given that gender roles constrain both
men and women, this justification for single-sex education also
applies to all-male schools. Both all-male and all-female classes
demonstrate that sex is not a good predictor of aptitude in any
subject matter area because the entire range of grades is allo-
cated to students of the same sex. Moreover, in same-sex spaces,
women's appropriate roles than their educational counterparts, although the focus had
switched from the environment of the family to that of the workplace." Valerie E. Lee and
Helen M. Marks, Sustained Effects of the Single-Sex Secondary School Experience on Atti-
tudes, Behaviors, and Values in College, 82 J Educ Psych 578, 588 (1990). See also Sara J.
Solnick, Changes in Women's Majors from Entrance to Graduation at Women's and Coedu-
cational Colleges, 48 Indus & Lab Rel Rev 505, 511 (1995) ("the net effect of women's col-
leges is to produce more graduates in male-dominated majors and fewer graduates in
female-dominated fields for a given distribution of intended majors"); M. Elizabeth Tid-
ball, Baccalaureate Origins of Entrants into American Medical Schools, 56 J Higher Educ
385, 389-90 (1985) (women's colleges send twice as many women into medical schools
than do co-educational schools); M. Elizabeth Tidball, Baccalaureate Origins of Recent
Natural Science Doctorates, 57 J Higher Educ 606 (1986) (women's colleges graduated five
times the national average of women who continued their education to earn doctorates in
the natural sciences). But see Faye Crosby et al., Taking Selectivity into Account, How
Much Does Gender Composition Matter?: A Re-Analysis of M.E. Tidball's Research, 6
NWSA J 107, 108 (1994) (challenging Tidball's research methodology and conclusions).
7 Sarah, Scott, and Spender, The Education of Feminists, in Spender and Sarah, eds,
Learning to Lose at 64 (cited in note 17).
Id at 65.
See Horowitz, Alma Mater at 56-68, 145-78 (cited in note 32) (arguing that the
student culture at women's colleges reshaped the consciousness of female students). See
also Application for the Emma Willard School (1996) (on file with publisher) ("The single-
gender school, with its dedication to the intellectual and emotional development of girls,
has a special power to help girls shed the chrysalis of adolescence and emerge as self-
confident young women, ready to excel in college and the real world.").
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students of either sex can explore their common experiences and,
by studying the patterns that emerge, gain the perspective neces-
sary to challenge dominant social conventions and to discover
more authentic and capable selves. Some defenders of single-sex
education argue that schools that live up to these ideals create a
space for the reevaluation and reconfiguration of the relationship
between sex and gender - and thus promote sex equality."1
II. WHAT IS So EXCITING ABOUT UNITED STATES V VIRGINIA?
Single-sex public schools, like all government action involv-
ing the use of sex-based classifications, are subject to heightened
judicial scrutiny.82 Many commentators have argued that the Su-
preme Court's decision in Virginia signaled a significant change
in the test that the Court had previously applied to evaluate the
constitutionality of the use of those classifications. Most of the
scholarly writing on the topic focuses on the Court's use of the
term "exceedingly persuasive" to describe the justification neces-
sary for a sex-based classification to survive constitutional scru-
tiny." However, the most significant change worked by the Vir-
ginia decision has virtually escaped scholarly comment. In that
case, for the first time in its sex equality jurisprudence, the Su-
preme Court explicitly articulated an asymmetrical anti-
subordination test. It is unclear, however, what the Court meant
when it interpreted the Fourteenth Amendment to prohibit the
use of sex-based classifications that "create or perpetuate the le-
gal, social, and economic inferiority of women.""
A. Intermediate Scrutiny: Fit and Anti-Subordination
The Supreme Court has consistently considered the same two
elements - fit and anti-subordination - in all of the sex equality
cases that have come before it since the early 1970s. Craig v
Boren,5 decided in 1976, is generally understood as the case es-
"I See Janella Miller, The Future of Private Women's Colleges, 7 Harv Women's L J
153, 178 (1984) ("Separation may be necessary for women to develop our culture and im-
plement it within the confines of our own institutions. We will have the power to make
changes in these institutions and the base from which to demand changes in the larger
society."); Brief of Twenty-Six Private Women's Colleges as Amici Curiae in Support of
Petitioner at 2, available at 1995 WL 702837 ("Single-[sex] education for women greatly
increases the chances that a woman will succeed academically, pursue a career in a field
traditionally associated with men, or assume a leadership role in society.").
82 See Mississippi University for Women v Hogan, 458 US 718, 723-24 (1982).
" See note 114.
84 Virginia, US 518 at 534 (emphasis added).
429 US 190 (1976).
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tablishing intermediate scrutiny as appropriate for evaluating
the constitutionality of sex-based classifications. However, three
years before that case was decided, in Frontiero v Richardson,"'
the Court provided its most thoroughly reasoned explanation why
the Equal Protection Clause requires government use of sex-
based classifications to be subject to heightened judicial
scrutiny. 7 Frontiero involved a challenge to a federal statute that
automatically provided an extra stipend to married men to help
support their families, but only provided the extra stipend to
married women who could demonstrate that their husbands were
dependant upon them.8 The Frontiero Court explained that its
departure from the rational basis analysis traditionally used in
Equal Protection cases was justified by the fact "that our Nation
has had a long and unfortunate history of sex discrimination." 9
In fact, the Court analogized the history of women in the United
States to that of African Americans - both groups have endured
a long history of discrimination on the basis of immutable charac-
teristics and are politically underrepresented - and concluded
that "classifications based upon sex, like classifications based
upon race, alienage, or national origin, are inherently suspect,
and must therefore be subjected to strict judicial scrutiny."90 The
Court reasoned that close judicial examination of such classifica-
tions was necessary because legislation employing them was
411 US 677 (1973).
Id at 682. Before the 1970s, the Supreme Court employed rational basis scrutiny to
evaluate the constitutionality of the use of sex-based classifications. For example, in 1961
the Court applied rational basis scrutiny in upholding a Florida law that exempted women
from jury duty unless they volunteered to serve. Hoyt v Florida, 368 US 57, 61 (1961). The
Hoyt Court accepted the state's justifications for its use of the sex-based rule - promoting
administrative ease and permitting women to fulfill their responsibilities as "the center of
home and family life" - as reasonable. Id at 62-63. Ten years later, in Reed v Reed, the
Court purported to subject the Idaho law at issue in that case to that same low level of
constitutional scrutiny. 404 US 71, 76 (1971) (stating that sex-based classifications "must
be reasonable, not arbitrary, and must rest upon some ground of difference having a fair
and substantial relation to the object of the legislation, so that all persons similarly cir-
cumstanced shall be treated alike') (citation omitted). However, although the justifica-
tions offered by the state for its rule favoring men over women to administer estates -
avoiding intrafamily controversy and administrative convenience - were at least as rea-
sonable as those offered in Hoyt, the Reed Court was the first to strike down a sex-based
classification as violating the Equal Protection Clause. Id at 76-77. Thus, despite the
Court's claim that it was using rational basis scrutiny, the test applied in Reed was closer
to the level of intermediate scrutiny that the Court later declared to be appropriate for
evaluating the constitutionality of sex-based classifications in Craig v Boren, 429 US 190,
197 (1976) ("To withstand constitutional challenge, ... classifications by gender must
serve important governmental objectives and must be substantially related to achieve-
ment of those objectives.").
411 US at 678-79.
Id at 684.
Id at 688.
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likely to be both unfair and difficult to repeal through the majori-
tarian political process."
In application, the standard of review employed in Frontiero
fell somewhere between strict and rational basis scrutiny because
the Court closely analyzed state objectives - saving money and
administrative ease - that were not even arguably compelling
enough to survive the highest level of judicial review, but that
were easily sufficiently rational to pass the lowest level of review.
Thus, in practice, the constitutional test applied in Frontiero was
identical to the intermediate scrutiny test the Court later explic-
itly adopted to evaluate sex-based classifications in Craig v
Boren. Using this mid-level scrutiny, the Frontiero Court struck
down the statute because the government did not offer persuasive
evidence that the sex-based classification achieved its stated ob-
jective.2 Moreover, the objective actually served by the statute,
administrative ease, did not justify the disparate treatment of
men and women. 3 In other words, under the mid-level scrutiny
employed in Frontiero, the state was required to show both that
the sex-based classification actually serves the objective it was
intended to serve, and that its objective was sufficiently impor-
tant to rebut the presumption that the classification was moti-
vated by an intent to subordinate. Thus, Frontiero both estab-
lished that sex-based classifications were deserving of heightened
constitutional review and laid out the two elements to be taken
into consideration in conducting such a review: fit and anti-
subordination. 4
1. Fit.
In subsequent cases, the Supreme Court has made clear that
the fit element of the intermediate scrutiny test requires sex-
based classifications to "be substantially related to achievement
of [government] objectives." 5 Thus, in cases where sex is a poor
" While the Court conceded that, unlike African-Americans, women "do not consti-
tute a small and powerless minority," it held that the history of past discrimination and
the reasons for the continuing political underrepresentation of the two groups were suffi-
ciently similar that strict judicial scrutiny of legislation permitting disparate treatment on
the basis of either race or sex was necessary. See id at 686 n 17.
Frontiero, 411 US at 689.
Id at 690.
Three years later, the Supreme Court conclusively settled on intermediate scrutiny
as the appropriate standard of review for cases involving Equal Protection challenges to
sex-based classifications. See Craig, 429 US at 197.
' Id. See also J.E.B. v Alabama, 511 US 127, 136 (1994) ("Thus, the only question is
whether discrimination on the basis of gender in jury selection substantially furthers the
state's legitimate interest in achieving a fair and impartial trial."); Hogan, 458 US at 725
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indicator of the trait the government seeks to identify, the use of
sex-based classifications is constitutionally impermissible. For
example, in Craig v Boren,9" the Court held that sex was not an
"accurate proxy for the regulation of drinking and driving,"" and
therefore that a law allowing the sale of 3:2 beer to women at an
earlier age than to men was unconstitutional. 8 Moreover, the
Court has subsequently explained that "[t]he purpose of requiring
that close relationship [between the government's objective and
its use of sex-based classifications] is to assure that the validity of
a classification is determined through reasoned analysis rather
than through the mechanical application of traditional, often in-
accurate, assumptions about the proper roles of men and
women."99 By requiring the government to demonstrate that its
use of a sex-based classification substantially furthers the objec-
tive it intends to achieve, the intermediate scrutiny test can iden-
tify the arbitrary, misguided, or malicious use of sex as a proxy
for a trait with which it is not correlated.
2. Anti-Subordination.
The goal of the second element of intermediate scrutiny is to
test whether the government can rebut the presumption that its
use of a sex-based classification is motivated by the intent to sub-
ordinate. In conducting this evaluation, the Supreme Court has
examined whether the government's objective was legitimate,
whether the proffered justification in fact motivated the govern-
ment to enact the challenged legislation, and whether the gov-
ernment's objective was sufficiently important.
For example, even if there were a perfect fit between the use
of a sex-based classification and the government's ability to
achieve an illegitimate objective - such as "exclud[ing] or 'pro-
(stating that a party seeking to uphold a gender classification must show "that the classi-
fication serves 'important governmental objectives and that the discriminatory means
employed' are 'substantially related to the achievement of those objectives.'), citing
Wengler v Druggists Mutual Insurance Co, 446 US 142, 150 (1980); Califano v Webster,
430 US 313, 316-17 (1977) ("To withstand scrutiny under the equal protection component
of the Fifth Amendment's Due Process Clause, 'classifications by gender must serve im-
portant governmental objectives and must be substantially related to achievement of
those objectives.'), citing Craig, 429 US at 197.
429 US 190 (1976).
Id at 204. See also Stanton v Stanton, 421 US 7, 14-15 (1975) (noting that sex is a
poor proxy for educational need).
Craig, 429 US at 204.
Hogan, 458 US at 725-26. See also Joseph Tussman and Jacobu3 tenBroek, The
Equal Protection of the Laws, 37 Cal L Rev 341, 344-53 (1949) (discussing the possible
relationships between a class of people defined by a given trait, and the mischief the leg-
islature seeks to identify).
406 THE UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO LEGAL FORUM [1999:
tect[ing]' members of one [sex] because they are presumed to suf-
fer from an inherent handicap or to be innately inferior "1°" - the
legislation would not survive intermediate scrutiny.'' The Court
has also rejected proffered justifications for sex-based classifica-
tions on the grounds that they were not the true motivation for
the enactment of the legislation. 2 In those cases, the Court
viewed the government's failure to reveal its true intent as an
indication of an impermissibly discriminatory hidden motivation.
In addition, the Court has required that the government objective
achieved through the use of sex-based classifications be impor-
tant, and has struck down those classifications employed merely
to promote administrative convenience. 3 Under these circum-
stances, the presumption that the government's intent in using a
sex-based classification is to subordinate remains in force.
There is little disagreement about whether or not subordina-
tion is an appropriate factor to weigh in the intermediate scrutiny
test. However, there is substantial disagreement over whether
the anti-subordination inquiry should focus solely on the state's
intent in using a sex-based classification, or whether that inquiry
should also take into consideration the effects of the state's use of
Hogan, 458 US at 725.
See, for example, Stanton, 421 US at 10 (rejecting the argument that "'it is the
man's primary responsibility to provide a home and its essentials'" is legitimate justifica-
tion for the state's use of sex-based classification) (citation omitted); Orr v Orr, 440 US
268, 279 (1979) (holding that "the State's preference for an allocation of family responsi-
bilities under which the wife plays a dependent role" is illegitimate and cannot sustain the
use of sex-based classifications).
"02 See, for example, Hogan, 458 US at 727 n 13 (noting that the justification that the
state proffered for MUW was not the true impetus for the founding of the school); Vir-
ginia, 518 US at 533 ("The justification must be genuine, not hypothesized or invented
post hoc in response to litigation.").
10 See, for example, Reed v Reed, 404 US 71, 76 (1971) (striking down state law fa-
voring men over women for the administration of decedents' estates because "[t]o give a
mandatory preference to members of either sex over members of the other, merely to ac-
complish the elimination of hearings on the merits, is to make the very kind of arbitrary
legislative choice forbidden by the Equal Protection Clause"); Stanley v Illinois, 405 US
645, 656 (1972) (striking down state law declaring the children of unmarried fathers to be
wards of the state without conducting a hearing on parental fitness, because "the Bill of
Rights in general, and the Due Process Clause in particular .... were designed to protect
the fragile values of a vulnerable citizenry from the overbearing concern for efficiency and
efficacy"); Frontiero, 411 US at 690-91 (striking down rule automatically granting in-
creased benefits only to married military men because "according differential treatment to
male and female members of the uniformed services for the sole purpose of achieving
administrative convenience" violates the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment);
Wengler, 446 US at 152 (striking down state law requiring only men to prove dependency
in order to collect certain workers' compensation benefits because the justification of ad-
ministrative convenience was "insufficient to save the discrimination" in that case).
381] SINGLE-SEX PUBLIC SCHOOLS AFTER VIRGINIA 407
the classification. 1 4 Scholars are split on this question. For ex-
ample, Ruth Colker argues that "[i]nstead of creating a presump-
tion that a rule is invidious when it is phrased in race- or sex-
specific terms, courts should consider the impact of the rule."105
By considering impact, Colker argues, courts can more accurately
distinguish sex-based rules that subordinate from sex-based rules
that redress subordination."0 6 Colker acknowledges that courts
would then have the difficult task of analyzing how the use of the
classification "contribut[es] both to a history of inequality and to
the existing circumstances of inequality,"07 but contends that
those difficult questions are precisely the ones with which courts
should have to grapple in sex equality cases.'
Other scholars have countered that the evaluation of the so-
cial science evidence necessary to resolve those difficult questions
is beyond the institutional competence of the judiciary.0 9 For ex-
ample, in sex equality cases, courts might have to consider the
social, political, and economic consequences of the choice to use a
particular sex-based classification. Justice Hugo Black argued
that it also violates principles of federalism and separation of
powers for the federal judiciary to second guess the policy choices
of state legislatures by taking into account the effects of their
legislative choices."'
" Compare Heckler v Mathews, 465 US 728, 744 (1984) (considering whether the
state's intent in using a sex-based classification was to subordinate women by "ascertain-
ing whether the statutory objective itself reflects archaic and stereotypic notions" about
men and women) (internal citation omitted), with Hogan, 458 US at 729-30 n 15 (deter-
mining whether the state's use of a sex-based classification had a subordinating effect on
women by examining the impact of the policy on women's wages).
"' Ruth Colker, Anti-Subordination Above All: Sex, Race, and Equal Protection, 61
NYU L Rev 1003, 1060 (1986). See also Charles R. Lawrence III, The Id, the Ego, and
Equal Protection: Reckoning with Unconscious Racism, 39 Stan L Rev 317, 320-21 (1987)
(sympathizing with the argument that "disproportionate harm should trigger heightened
judicial scrutiny without consideration of motive").
106 Colker, 61 NYU L Rev at 1060 (cited in note 105).
Id at 1065.
306 See id at 1065-66.
109 See Donald N. Bersoff and Donald J. Glass, The Not-So Weisman: The Supreme
Court's Continuing Misuse of Social Science Research, 2 U Chi Roundtable 279, 295 (1995)
(noting the Court's "predilection for finding irrelevant research ... [and] for ignoring
relevant research"); Raoul Berger, Government by Judiciary: The Transformation of the
Fourteenth Amendment 335 (Liberty Fund 2d ed 1997) (arguing that courts are incompe-
tent to "serve as the arbiters of morals" evaluating the wisdom of social policy).
... See Harper v Virginia Board of Elections, 383 US 663, 673 (1966) (Black dissent-
ing) (arguing that it is improper for the Supreme Court "to use the general language of the
Equal Protection Clause as though it provided a handy instrument to strike down state
laws which the Court feels are based on bad governmental policy"). See also Lochner v
New York, 198 US 45, 75 (1905) (Holmes dissenting) ("The 14th Amendment does not
enact Mr. Herbert Spencer's Social Statics."); Saul Brenner, The memos of Supreme Court
law clerk William Rehnquist: conservative tracts, or mirrors of his justice's mind?, 76 Judi-
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Although the Supreme Court has looked to social science evi-
dence to demonstrate the effects of sex-based classifications, it
has neither explicitly included this element in its articulation of
the intermediate scrutiny test, nor stated that consideration of
this element is improper."' For example, in J.E.B. v Alabama,"'
in addition to examining the state's intent, the Court considered
that Alabama's use of sex-based peremptory challenges to exclude
men from juries "causes harm to the litigants, the community,
and the individual jurors who are wrongfully excluded from par-
ticipation in the judicial process.""' Presumably, the Court be-
lieved that it was better able to determine whether the state in-
tended to use the sex-based classification to subordinate by con-
sidering whether the classification did, in fact, work to subordi-
nate. However, the Court did not articulate its rationale for con-
sidering that evidence.
B. United States v Virginia Did Not Replace Intermediate
Scrutiny with Strict Scrutiny in Sex Equality Cases
Much of the scholarly commentary on Virginia has accepted
Justice Antonin Scalia's assertion that the case "drastically re-
vises [the] established standards for reviewing sex-based classifi-
cations.""" In his dissenting opinion, Justice Scalia complained
cature 77, 80 (Aug-Sept 1992) (quoting a bench memo written by then-law clerk William
Rehnquist to Justice Robert Jackson for Brown v Board of Education that argued that "[i]f
the Fourteenth Amendment did not enact Spencer's Social Statistics, it just as surely did
not enact Myrdah's [sic] American Dilemna [sic]").
'1 See John Minor Wisdom, Random Remarks on the Role of Social Sciences in the
Judicial Decision-Making Process in School Desegregation Cases, in Betsy Levin and
Willis P. Hawley, eds, The Courts, Social Science, and School Desegregation 137 (Transac-
tion 1975) ("Sociology has always played a part in the decision-making process, although
frequently it comes in wearing a mask. Sometimes the mask is public policy or the inter-
ests of justice, sometimes judicial notice or common knowledge, sometimes legislative or
constitutional facts.").
1 511 US 127, 140 (1994).
"' Id. See also Hogan, 458 US at 729-30 n 15 (taking into consideration the fact that
excluding men from the field of nursing depressed women's wages).
- 518 US 515, 566 (1996) (Scalia dissenting). See Sunstein, 110 Harv L Rev at 73
(cited in note 7) ("Virginia heightens the level of scrutiny [for sex] and brings it closer to
the 'strict scrutiny' that is applied to discrimination on the basis of race."); Jason M.
Skaggs, Justifying Gender-Based Affirmative Action under United States v. Virginia's
"Exceedingly Persuasive Justification" Standard, 86 Cal L Rev 1169, 1182 (1998) ("[W]hile
Virginia does not prescribe strict scrutiny for gender classifications, it does promote a
significantly more demanding standard of review than traditional intermediate scru-
tiny."); Christopher Pyle, Women's Colleges: Is Segregation By Sex Still Justifiable After
United States v. Virginia?, 77 BU L Rev 209, 233 (1997) ("Justice Ginsburg's opinion [in
Virginia] came as close to strict scrutiny as possible without actually embracing it.");
Larry CatA Backer, Reading Entrails: Romer, VMI and the Art of Divining Equal Protec-
tion, 32 Tulsa L J 361, 369 (1997) ("The brilliance of Justice Ginsburg's opinion is not that
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that "the Court never answers the question presented in anything
resembling [the form of a traditional intermediate scrutiny in-
quiry]. When it engages in analysis, the Court instead prefers the
phrase 'exceedingly persuasive justification."" 5 Echoing this
complaint, Cass Sunstein contends that in requiring the state to
provide an "exceedingly persuasive justification" for its use of a
sex-based classification, "the Court [in Virginia] did not merely
restate the intermediate scrutiny test but pressed it closer to
strict scrutiny.""' Other commentators have supported that as-
sertion by noting that the Court explicitly reserved the question
of whether sex-based classifications should be strictly scrutinized
and drew parallels between sex-based and race-based classifica-
tions."7
Justice Scalia's dissent and the law review articles that it has
sparked are somewhat alarmist."' The difference between strict
she was able to impose strict scrutiny in gender cases - she did not in this case - but
that she was able to craft an opinion that opened up the possibility that the Court might
soon move in that direction.").
Virginia, 518 US at 571 (Scalia dissenting).
Sunstein, 110 Harv L Rev at 75 (cited in note 7). However, Sunstein admits that:
"The revision of the standard of review is unlikely to produce different results from those
that would have followed under the intermediate scrutiny standard."
" See Skaggs, 86 Cal L Rev at 1186 (cited in note 114).
.1 In fact, I am tempted to regard Justice Scalia's portrayal of the Court's holding in
Virginia as a "de facto abandonment of the intermediate scrutiny [test] that has been our
standard for sex-based classifications for some two decades," as an effort to undermine the
precedential force of that opinion. Virginia, 518 US at 574 (Scalia dissenting). The tempta-
tion is very strong given that his dissent virtually invites lower courts to disregard the
opinion, which he refers to as "discredit[ed]," and as an attempt to "to muddy the waters,
[so as] to exact over-compliance by intimidation." Id at 579, 574 (Scalia dissenting).
The Justice's warning that Virginia means that all public funding for private sin-
gle-sex schools is unconstitutional is particularly excessive. Id at 600 (Scalia dissenting)
('The only hope for state-assisted single-sex private schools is that the Court will not
apply in the future the principles of law it has applied today."). Justice Scalia arrived at
this conclusion by extrapolating from Norwood v Harrison, in which the Supreme Court
held that [riacial discrimination in state-operated schools is barred by the Constitution
and '[i]t is also axiomatic that a state may not induce, encourage or promote private per-
sons to accomplish what it is constitutionally forbidden to accomplish.' 413 US 455, 465
(1973) (citation omitted).
However, Justice Scalia was too quick to analogize between single-race and single-
sex schools. While the constitutional status of single-sex public schools might be "open to
serious question," Virginia, 518 US at 561 (Rehnquist concurring), the Supreme Court has
never made a statement about single-sex public schools comparable to its declaration that
racially segregated public schools are "inherently unequal." Brown v Board of Education,
347 US 483, 495 (1954). In fact, the Court has acknowledged the educational benefits of
single-sex education. See Virginia, 518 US at 535. In addition, the Norwood opinion is
distinguishable because it was written in response to Mississippi's long history of ob-
structing federal court orders to desegregate its public schools. See Henry Allen Bullock, A
History of Negro Education in the South, From 1619 to the Present 260-61 (Harvard 1970).
No equivalent history exists with respect to single-sex schools. Moreover, the Supreme
Court's recent decision in Agostini v Felton, 521 US 203 (1997), which held that the provi-
sion of federal aid that indirectly advances the educational function of religious schools
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and intermediate scrutiny is qualitative, not merely quantitative
- and the standard for evaluating the constitutionality of sex-
based classifications that the Court applied in Virginia was not
the exacting test required by strict scrutiny. In evaluating the
constitutionality of race-based classifications under that highest
level of scrutiny, the Court has demanded not only that the gov-
ernment objective be compelling,"' but also that the use of race-
does not violate the Establishment Clause, counsels that the government may provide
funding to private schools that engage in educational practices that would be impermissi-
ble in public school settings.
19 A majority of the current Supreme Court Justices agree that the presumption
against the existence of a sufficiently compelling justification for the use of race-based
classifications is very strong, but would treat race as a constitutionally suspect basis of
classification, not a constitutionally impermissible one. At least five of the current Justices
agree that the need to eradicate "the practice and the lingering effects of racial discrimi-
nation against minority groups in this country" is a sufficiently compelling justification for
race-based government action. Adarand Constructors, Inc v Pefa, 515 US 200, 237 (1995)
(O'Connor writing for the Court). See also Missouri v Jenkins, 515 US 70, 112 (1995)
(O'Connor concurring) ("It is only by applying strict scrutiny that we can distinguish be-
tween unconstitutional discrimination and narrowly tailored remedial programs that the,
legislature may enact to further the compelling governmental interest in redressing the
effects of past discrimination.") (emphasis added); Miller v Johnson, 515 US 900, 920
(1995) (Kennedy writing for the Court) ("There is a significant state interest in eradicating
the effects of past discrimination.") (citation omitted); Adarand, 515 US at 247-48 (Stev-
ens dissenting) ("As a matter of constitutional and democratic principle, a decision by
representatives of the majority to discriminate against the members of a minority race is
fundamentally different from those same representatives' decision to impose incidental
costs on the majority of their constituents in order to provide a benefit to a disadvantaged
minority. Indeed, as I have previously argued, the former is virtually always repugnant to
the principles of a free and democratic society, whereas the latter is, in some circum-
stances, entirely consistent with the ideal of equality."); Adarand, 515 US at 269 (Souter
dissenting) ("The Court has long accepted the view that constitutional authority to remedy
past discrimination is not limited to the power to forbid its continuation, but extends to
eliminating those effects that would otherwise persist and skew the operation of public
systems even in the absence of current intent to practice any discrimination."); Adarand,
515 US at 273 (Ginsburg dissenting) ("The divisions in this difficult case should not ob-
scure the Court's recognition of the persistence of racial inequality and a majority's ac-
knowledgment of Congress' authority to act affirmatively, not only to end discrimination,
but also to counteract discrimination's lingering effects.").
However, there is also a strong minority of the Court who believe that the use of
race-based classifications is, almost without exception, unconstitutional. See Fullilove v
Klutznick, 448 US 448, 525 (1980) (Stewart dissenting) ("Under our Constitution, the
government may never act to the detriment of a person solely because of that person's
race."); Jenkins, 515 US at 121 (Thomas concurring) ("It is for this reason that we must
subject all racial classifications to the strictest of scrutiny, which (aside from two decisions
rendered in the midst of wartime [Hirabayashi v United States and Korematsu v United
States]) has proven automatically fatal.").
Justice Scalia similarly contends that there is only one sufficiently compelling
justification for the use of race-based classifications: "At least where state or local action is
at issue, only a social emergency rising to the level of imminent danger to life and limb...
can justify an exception to the principle embodied in the Fourteenth Amendment that
'[o]ur Constitution is colorblind, and neither knows nor tolerates classes among citizens.'
Richmond v J.A Croson Co, 488 US 469, 521 (1989) (Scalia concurring) (emphasis in
original), quoting Plessy v Ferguson, 163 US 537, 559 (1896) (Harlan dissenting). Follow-
ing Justice Scalia's reasoning, compensation for racial discrimination could never be a
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based classifications be "narrowly tailored" to the achievement of
that objective.12 ° In contrast, the Court has never interpreted in-
termediate scrutiny to require that sex-based classifications be
the most narrowly tailored means available to achieve a govern-
ment objective.'21 Whether or not alternative means are available,
if the sex-specific legislation furthers the government objective
and passes an anti-subordination test, the Court has upheld the
use of those classifications.'22 Virginia did nothing to change this.
VMI failed to survive constitutional scrutiny because the state
was not able to show that its use of a single-sex pedagogy sub-
stantially furthered its objective," not because there were other
methods the state could have used to do so. Thus, the test applied
in Virginia is not as exacting as strict scrutiny.
The Court in Virginia not only decided against applying
strict scrutiny to sex-based classifications, but also reaffirmed
sufficiently compelling justification for the use of a race-based classification scheme. See
Adarand, 515 US at 239 (Scalia concurring) ("In my view, government can never have a
'compelling interest' in discriminating on the basis of race in order to 'make up' for past
racial discrimination in the opposite direction."); Croson, 488 US at 520 (Scalia concur-
ring) ("The benign purpose of compensating for social disadvantages, whether they have
been acquired by reason of prior discrimination or otherwise, can no more be pursued by
the illegitimate means of racial discrimination than can other assertedly benign purposes
we have repeatedly rejected."). While Justice Scalia concedes that courts may require state
and local officials to employ race-conscious remedies in order to "eliminate [the state's]
own maintenance of a system of unlawful racial classification," he contends that evidence
of continuing effects of past discrimination is not sufficient to prove the existence of such a
discriminatory system. Id at 524. See also id at 525 ("Our analysis in Bazemore v Friday,
... reflected our unwillingness to conclude, outside of the context of school assignment,
that the continuing effects of prior discrimination can be equated with state maintenance
of a discriminatory system.").
" See Adarand, 515 US at 235 ("Our action today makes explicit what Justice Powell
thought implicit in the Fulilove lead opinion: Federal racial classifications, like those of a
State, must.., be narrowly tailored to further that interest."); Wygant v Jackson Board of
Education, 476 US 267, 280 (1986) ("Under strict scrutiny the means chosen to accomplish
the State's asserted purpose must be specifically and narrowly framed to accomplish that
purpose."); Fullilove, 448 US at 480 (Burger joined by White and Powell) ("any congres-
sional program that employs racial or ethnic criteria to accomplish the objective of reme-
dying the present effects of past discrimination [must be] narrowly tailored to the
achievement of that goal").
121 But see Virginia, 518 US at 573-74 (Scalia dissenting) (arguing that Virginia
requires a least-restrictive means analysis because "[tihere is simply no support in our
cases for the notion that a sex-based classification is invalid unless it relates to character-
istics that hold true in every instance.").
" See, for example, Califano, 430 US at 320 (upholding statute allowing women to
eliminate more low-earning years from the calculation of their retirement benefits than
men but noting that other statutory schemes were also constitutionally permissible).
" See Virginia, 518 US at 545-55 ("[T]he Commonwealth's great goal is not substan-
tially advanced by women's categorical exclusion, in total disregard of their individual
merit, from the Commonwealth's premier 'citizen-soldier' corps.").
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that intermediate scrutiny was appropriate for that task."2 The
Court articulated the classic statement of that test,25 inter-
changeably with a new phrase "skeptical scrutiny,"'26 and a less
common formulation of the intermediate scrutiny test, stating
that "[p]arties who seek to defend gender-based government ac-
tion must demonstrate an 'exceedingly persuasive justification'
for that action."'27
However, the "exceedingly persuasive justification" formula-
tion is not novel. It first appeared in the Supreme Court's sex
equality jurisprudence in 1979,128 and has been used consistently
in the years since - both in cases in which sex-based classifica-
tions have been upheld and in those in which they have been
struck down.'29 Thus, there is no support for the contention that
the formulation is new or that it mandates the invalidation of all
sex-based classifications.
Moreover, it is highly improbable that a majority of the Jus-
tices on the Supreme Court would have supported strictly scruti-
nizing sex-based classifications. On the current bench, only Jus-
tices O'Connor and Ginsburg have expressed any openness to-
ward reassessing that constitutional standard.180 To the contrary,
" Id at 523-24 (noting that the district court in Virginia had "correctly recognized
that Hogan... was the closest guide").
" Id at 533 (sex-based classifications must serve "important governmental objectives
and ... the discriminatory means employed' [must be] 'substantially related to the
achievement of those objectives" (citations omitted)).
' Id at 531.
"2 Id.
' See Personnel Administrator of Massachusetts v Feeney, 442 US 256, 273 (1979)
("[A]ny state law overtly or covertly designed to prefer males over females in public em-
ployment would require an exceedingly persuasive justification to withstand a constitu-
tional challenge under the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.").
" Compare Heckler v Mathews, 465 US 728, 744, 750-51 (1984) (upholding sex-based
classification in pension offset exception), with Hogan, 458 US at 724 (striking down sex-
based classification in nursing school admissions policy).
" See Hogan, 458 US at 724 n 9 (O'Connor writing for the Court) ("we need not de-
cide whether classifications based upon gender are inherently suspect"); Harris v Forklift
Systems, Inc, 510 US 17, 26 n (1993) (Ginsburg concurring) ("it remains an open question
whether 'classifications based on gender are inherently suspect' (citation omitted)); Vir-
ginia, 518 US at 532 n 6 (Ginsburg writing for the Court) ("The Court has thus far re-
served most stringent judicial scrutiny for classifications based on race or national ori-
gin.") (emphasis added).
However, only Justice Ginsburg is likely to vote to subject sex-based classifications
to strict scrutiny. Ginsburg spent a substantial portion of her legal career before becoming
a judge arguing for just such a result. See Deborah L. Markowitz, In Pursuit of Equality:
One Woman's Work to Change the Law, 14 Women's Rts L Rep 335, 341, 344 (1992). In
contrast, given her recent voting patterns, Justice O'Connor is more likely to side with
Justices Rehnquist and Scalia and vote against strictly scrutinizing sex-based classifica-
tions. See Richard G. Wilkins, Matthew K Richards, and Scott Worthington, Supreme
Court Voting Behavior: 1995 Term, 25 Hastings Const L Q 1, 57 (1996) ("Justice O'Connor
voted in an almost identical manner with the Chief Justice and Justice Scalia [in the 1995
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Chief Justice Rehnquist - who concurred in the majority opinion
- would probably favor lowering the level of scrutiny for sex-
based classifications to rational basis review. 131 In addition, the
Court gave no indication in the one sex equality case it has de-
cided since Virginia that it will now evaluate sex-based classifica-
tions by a more exacting test than it employed prior to that deci-
sion."' Therefore, the Court's use of the term "exceedingly per-
suasive justification" could not have raised the level of scrutiny
applicable to sex-based classifications.
Term]," although her voting patterns over the previous ten years had not significantly
correlated with their voting patterns).
It is possible that Justice Stevens would join Justice Ginsburg in voting to raise the
level of scrutiny for sex-based classifications. In Craig v Boren, Justice Stevens argued
"It]here is only one Equal Protection Clause.... [and it] does not direct the courts to apply
one standard of review in some cases and a different standard in other cases." 429 US 190,
211-12 (1976) (Stevens concurring). It is likely, therefore, that Justice Stevens would
support any reconfiguration that eliminates the different levels of scrutiny under the
Equal Protection Clause. See also Adarand, 515 US at 247 (Stevens dissenting) (criticizing
the Court's "insistence upon rigidly separate categories for discrimination against differ-
ent classes of individuals"); Croson, 488 US at 514 (Stevens concurring) ("instead of en-
gaging in a debate over the proper standard of review to apply in affirmative-action litiga-
tion, I believe it is more constructive to try to identify the characteristics of advantaged
and disadvantaged classes that may justify their disparate treatment"); City of Cleburne v
Cleburne Living Center, Inc, 473 US 432, 451-55 (1985) (Stevens concurring) ("Cases
involving classifications based on alienage, illegal residency, illegitimacy, gender, age or
- as in this case - mental retardation, do not fit well into sharply defined classifica-
tions."); Michael M. v Superior Court of Sonoma County, 450 US 464, 497 n 4 (1981) (Stev-
ens dissenting) ("Equal protection analysis is often said to involve different 'levels of scru-
tiny.' It may be more accurate to say that the burden of sustaining an equal protection
challenge is much heavier in some cases than in others. Racial classifications, which are
subjected to 'strict scrutiny,' are presumptively invalid because there is seldom, if ever,
any legitimate reason for treating citizens differently because of their race.").
" See Frontiero, 411 US at 691 (Rehnquist dissenting) (adopting the lower court
holding that "the law is well-settled that a statutory classification, challenged as an un-
lawful [sex] discrimination, should be upheld if it has a rational basis." (citing Frontiero v.
Laird, 341 F Supp 201, 206 (M D Ala 1972)). See also Craig, 429 US at 220-21 (Rehnquist
dissenting) (I would think we have had enough difficulty with the two standards of re-
view our cases have recognized ... so as to counsel weightily against the insertion of still
another 'standard' between those two."); Califano, 430 US at 225 (Rehnquist dissenting)
(urging that heightened scrutiny for sex-based classifications should not be "uncritically
carried over" to Equal Protection challenges to social insurance legislation). But see Rost-
ker v Goldberg, 453 US 57, 69 (1981) (Rehnquist writing for the Court) (declining to apply
rational basis review to sex-based distinctions drawn by Congress with regard to military
affairs and national security).
" See Miller v Albright, 523 US 420 (1998) (upholding requirement that citizen fa-
thers, but not citizen mothers, of illegitimate children born outside of the United States
provide proof of paternity before the child's eighteenth birthday for the child to be eligible
for United States citizenship on grounds that "[tihe biological differences between single
men and single women provide a relevant basis for differing rules governing their ability
to confer citizenship on children born in foreign lands").
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C. United States v Virginia Reaffirmed the Traditional Interpre-
tation of the Fit Requirement of Intermediate Scrutiny
In demanding a close relationship between the government's
use of sex-based classifications and the objective the government
seeks to achieve, the Supreme Court did not redefine the fit re-
quirement of the intermediate scrutiny test. Mid-level scrutiny
has consistently called for the same inquiry into the relationship
between the use of sex-based classifications and the government's
purpose for doing so.
Indeed, although the cases were decided fourteen years
apart, the Supreme Court conducted identical inquiries into fit in
determining that both Mississippi University for Women and the
Virginia Military Institute were unconstitutional.'33 Both schools
failed to satisfy the first element of the intermediate scrutiny test
because their respective single-sex policies did not substantially
further the stated government objectives. In Mississippi Univer-
sity for Women v Hogan,'34 the state maintained that "compen-
sat[ing] for discrimination against women"' justified the exis-
tence of an all-female nursing college. However, the Supreme
Court held that the state failed to show that its single-sex ap-
proach to teaching nursing satisfied its educational objectives. 36
Similarly, in Virginia the state argued that it had maintained the
all-male status of the military academy because a single-sex stu-
dent body was necessary to the success of the school's adversative
method.'37 The Court rejected that argument on the grounds that
"the Commonwealth's great goal is not substantially advanced by
women's categorical exclusion, in total disregard of their individ-
ual merit, from the Commonwealth's premier 'citizen-soldier'
corps. ""' s Therefore, with respect to the element of fit, Virginia
"adds nothing to the analysis of equal protection challenges to
[sex] based classifications that have not been part of that analysis
since 1979.""'
" Virginia, 518 US at 536 (describing the inquiries as similar).
3 458 US 718 (1982).
" Id at 727.
IN Id at 731 ("The uncontroverted record reveals that admitting men to nursing
classes does not affect teaching style ... that the presence of men in the classroom would
not affect the performance of the female nursing students .... and that men in coeduca-
tional nursing schools do not dominate the classroom.").
Virginia, 518 US at 535.
' Id at 545-46.
" Cohen v Brown University, 101 F3d 155, 183 n 22 (1st Cir 1996). See also William
Henry Hurd, Gone With the Wind? VMI's Loss and the Future of Single-Sex Public Educa-
tion, 4 Duke J Gender L & Pol 27, 49 (1997) ("Sex-based classifications are still to be
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D. United States v Virginia Suggests a New Interpretation of the
Anti-Subordination Requirement of Intermediate Scrutiny
Traditionally, the Supreme Court has phrased its anti-
subordination analysis in sex-neutral terms. The Court has
stated that the Equal Protection Clause prohibits "overbroad
stereotypes about the relative abilities of men and women,"14 but
permits sex-based classifications that "intentionally and directly
assist members of the sex that is disproportionately burdened."
4 1
This even-handed language suggests that laws that violate the
rule that "people who are similarly situated should be treated the
same irrespective of sex" are impermissible.
However, in Virginia, the Court used sex-specific language to
describe the anti-subordination principle. The majority opinion
announced that:
Sex classifications may be used to compensate women "for
particular economic disabilities [they have] suffered," to
"promot[e] equal employment opportunity," to advance full
development of the talent and capacities of our Nation's
people. But such classifications may not be used, as they
once were, to create or perpetuate the legal, social, and
economic inferiority of women. 42
Reading those words in isolation, one could conclude that the
Court meant that the outcome of an anti-subordination test
should hinge on the sex of the complaining party. In several early
sex-equality cases Justice Rehnquist suggested precisely that.
judged by intermediate scrutiny, and intermediate scrutiny still means what it meant
before."). But see Nabozny v Podlesny, 92 F3d 446, 456 n 6 (7th Cir 1996) ("We express no
opinion on whether the Court's ruling heightens the level of scrutiny applied to gender
discrimination in this circuit."); Engineering Contractors Assn v Metropolitan Dade
County, 943 F Supp 1546, 1556 (S D Fla 1996) ("This court cannot say for certain whether
the Supreme Court intended that the VMI decision signal a heightening in scrutiny of
gender-based classifications.").
" Hogan, 458 US at 728.
. J.E.B. v Alabama, 511 US 127, 131 (1994). The Fourth Circuit in Virginia also
articulated a sex-neutral test: "To achieve the equality of treatment demanded by the
Equal Protection Clause... we cannot conclude that the value of the benefits provided by
the state to one gender tends, by comparison to the benefits provided to the other, to
lessen the dignity, respect, or societal regard of the other gender." United States v Vir-
ginia, 44 F3d 1229, 1237 (4th Cir 1995).
1 Virginia, 518 US at 533 (citation omitted) (emphasis added).
See Craig, 429 US at 219 (Rehnquist dissenting) ("[Blefore today, no decision of
this Court has applied an elevated level of scrutiny to invalidate a statutory discrimina-
tion harmful to males."); Michael M., 450 US at 476 (Rehnquist writing for the Court)
(rejecting challenge to sex-based classification brought by male plaintiff on the grounds
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He argued that the Equal Protection Clause incorporates a sim-
ple one-way ratchet that applies heightened scrutiny to claims for
sex-discrimination when they are made by women, but not to
such claims when they are made by men. Because men have not
been historically oppressed on the basis of their sex, Rehnquist
reasoned that the anti-subordination principle should not protect
them from legislation that discriminates against them.'"
However, because the Court was not consistent in its use of
terminology in Virginia, it is difficult to understand how it in-
tended its asymmetrical statement of the anti-subordination
principle to be interpreted. In virtually the same sentence as the
Court wrote that sex-based classifications cannot create or per-
petuate the inferiority of women, it also wrote that differences
between the sexes cannot be cause "for denigration of the mem-
bers of either sex." 45 Moreover, sprinkled through the opinion is
language implying that sex-based classifications are inherently
subordinating. The Court wrote that Virginia's educational objec-
tive "is not substantially advanced by women's categorical exclu-
sion, in total disregard of their individual merit, from the Com-
monwealth's premier 'citizen-soldier' corps."146 If the government
violates the anti-subordination principle by using a proxy other
than a direct measure of individual merit to determine public
school admissions,1 47 then the use of sex-based classifications in
admissions is inherently problematic - and it is irrelevant how
those classifications function in any particular context.
The Court seems to be leaning toward adopting this type of
anti-differentiation principle in its race discrimination cases. For
example, in its decisions dealing with race-based reapportion-
ment, the Court has stated that the mere use of racial classifica-
tions is subordinating because it "reinforces racial stereotypes."1"
that "we find nothing to suggest that men, because of past discrimination or peculiar dis-
advantages, are in need of the special solicitude of the courts").
" Id.
Virginia, 518 US at 533 (emphasis added).
' Id at 546 (emphasis added).
"7 There is, of course, no direct measure of individual merit for the purposes of school
admissions - standardized test scores are notoriously bad predictors of school success.
See Sharif by Salahuddin v New York State Education Dept, 709 F Supp 345, 348 (S D NY
1989) (awarding Regents Scholarships solely on the basis of SAT scores has a disparate
impact on female students and violates Title IX of the Educational Amendments of 1972);
David M. White, Culturally Biased Testing and Predictive Invalidity: Putting Them on the
Record, 14 Harv CR-CL L Rev 89, 107-14 (1979) (discussing cultural bias in standardized
testing). However, many proxies for merit are more closely correlated with school success
than a student's sex.
'" Shaw v Reno, 509 US 630, 650 (1993). See also Miller v Johnson, 515 US 900, 920
(1995) ("But where the state assumes from a group of voters' race that they 'think alike,
381] SINGLE-SEX PUBLIC SCHOOLS AFTER VIRGINIA 417
The corresponding argument would be that the mere use of sex-
based classifications reinforces differences between the sexes,
which, given the history of inequality between the sexes, per-
petuates women's subordination." 9 In other words, the anti-
subordination principle would collapse into an anti-
differentiation principle.
The Court's opinion in Virginia raises difficult questions
about the state of equal protection doctrine in sex equality cases.
Although Virginia continues to apply intermediate scrutiny to
sex-based classifications and reaffirms the traditional interpreta-
tion of that test's fit requirement, the Court's articulation of an
asymmetrical anti-subordination principle raises a host of inter-
pretive problems - particularly when applied to the new genera-
tion of single-sex public schools. Part III of this Article works
through those interpretive problems and offers a framework that
provides fair and workable standards for judging the constitu-
tionality of single-sex public schools.
share the same political interests, and will prefer the same candidates at the polls,' it
engages in racial stereotyping at odds with equal protection mandates.") (citation omit-
ted). However, those cases also hint that the Court may evaluate the constitutionality of
race-based reapportionment decisions differently than other race-based government deci-
sion making because the former cases use race as a proxy for identity of political interest,
"the precise use of race as a proxy the Constitution prohibits." Id at 914.
"' The Court's race discrimination precedents do not apply directly to sex discrimina-
tion cases. Thus, the arguments in this Article that support the constitutionality of some
single-sex public education do not automatically transfer to the context of single-race
public schools. First, race-based classifications are subject to strict scrutiny, which re-
quires a tighter fit between the government's objective and the suspect means it selects to
achieve that objective; second, compared to intermediate scrutiny, strict scrutiny permits
fewer justifications to rebut the presumption that the use of the suspect means is not
subordinating.
More importantly, judicial review of race-based classifications by this more exacting
standard is justified and, therefore, it is appropriate for single-sex and single-race schools
to receive different treatment under the law. Discrimination on the basis of sex is not as
intractable as discrimination on the basis of race, not only because women are a numerical
majority, but also because the mechanism of women's subordination is different from the
mechanism by which people of color have been disempowered. While both groups have
been excluded from public life, unlike people of color who are most often bound together
into communities by familial ties, women have not tended to congregate into communities
of women (the law has contributed to this circumstance: anti-miscegenation laws have
worked to keep families one race and anti-sodomy laws have worked to keep them hetero-
sexual). As a result, sex-based discrimination cannot be said to affect people who are in-
terdependent. Because the effects of discrimination are passed and accumulate intergen-
erationally within families and communities of people who are interdependent, the means
by which individual victims of race discrimination can gather political and economic capi-
tal are more severely limited than the means by which women can protect their collective
interests. Accordingly, race-based legislation requires the most exacting judicial scrutiny.
Sex-based legislation is also deserving of some heightened review because women, who
have traditionally been isolated from one another, have often failed to recognize their
interests as collective.
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III. EVALUATING THE CONSTITUTIONALITY OF THE NEW
GENERATION OF SINGLE-SEX PUBLIC SCHOOLS AFTER
UNITED STATES V VIRGINIA
All single-sex education is not the same. In addition, the mo-
tivations of educators for establishing and maintaining single-sex
schools vary from school to school and over time. Many of the sin-
gle-sex schools in the older generation were established at a time
when the state's role in steering men and women into tradition-
ally sex-appropriate gender identities and roles had not yet been
successfully called into question - either in or out of court. As a
result, in many instances the primary intent of the founders of
those single-sex schools was to restrict the study of particular
subject matter areas to one sex or the other, and sometimes the
founders made little effort to determine whether the effect of sin-
gle-sex pedagogy was educationally beneficial.15 ° Today, however,
the proponents of single-sex schools generally make a conscien-
tious effort to match their use of single-sex pedagogy to a specific
educational goal, and thus are likely to be better able to produce
evidence that the pedagogy helps to achieve that goal.151 Moreo-
ver, in the face of credible evidence that the use of a single-sex
pedagogy is justified in a particular circumstance, it is inappro-
priate for courts to second guess the professional judgment of
educators on the question of fit.152
Given that these new schools are more likely to survive the
fit requirement of intermediate scrutiny than older single-sex
schools, courts will more frequently be required to consider the
second element of the test for evaluating the constitutionality of
such schools. Thus, the Supreme Court's interpretation of the
anti-subordination principle in Virginia is important because
that element of the intermediate scrutiny test is likely to be the
decisive factor in litigation over the constitutionality of the new
generation of single-sex public schools.
A. Fit After United States v Virginia
The fit requirement of the intermediate scrutiny test requires
that government use of sex-based classifications be substantially
related to the achievement of legitimate and important govern-
ment objectives. The evolution of traditional justifications for sin-
See notes 44-53 and accompanying text.
1 See notes 33-43, 156 and accompanying text.
See notes 165-67 and accompanying text.
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gle-sex education"' makes it likely that many of the single-sex
public schools that have been established in recent years will
survive the fit element of intermediate scrutiny.
First, if the Supreme Court's language in Virginia indicates
that enhancing the diversity of educational opportunities within
a school system is a sufficiently important state interest to justify
the use of sex-based classifications,' all of the new K-12 single-
sex public schools will survive the fit element of constitutional
scrutiny. As the new single-sex schools expand the options avail-
able to one sex by providing a choice between co-educational and
single-sex environments, without limiting the options available to
the other sex in co-educational settings, 55 it is plausible to say
that they enhance the diversity of educational opportunities
available in the public school system.
Second, if only because the threat of litigation has necessi-
tated a defensive posture, the proponents of the new crop of sin-
gle-sex public schools can likely make a credible showing that
some educational benefit flows from the all-male or all-female
composition of their student bodies. In order to make such a
showing, proponents of the schools would have to offer proof that
their use of a single-sex pedagogy responds to a sex-based ine-
quality in the student population, or that it redresses the dispa-
rate effect that gender bias in the co-educational public schools
would have on the academic performance of their students.1 6 For
example, the Young Women's Leadership School, an all-girls
public school that opened in East Harlem in the Fall of 1996,
could point to evidence that its students have higher math and
See notes 66-81 and accompanying text.
14 See Virginia, 518 US at 535 ("[I]t is not disputed that diversity among public edu-
cational institutions can serve the public good.").
The Court was wrong, however, to treat the creation of "diversity among public
educational institutions" as a sufficiently important state interest to justify the use of sex-
based classifications. The source of the Court's confusion may be the multiple ways it has
used the term "diversity" in its Equal Protection jurisprudence. In Regents of the Univer-
sity of California v Bakke, Justice Powell opined that seeking racial diversity in student
admissions is a constitutionally permissible government objective because "The atmos-
phere of 'speculation, experiment and creation' - so essential to the quality of higher
education - is widely believed to be promoted by a diverse student body." 438 US 265, 312
(1978) (opinion of Powell). However, the creation of different types of schools is a quantita-
tive change that does not necessarily result in the same qualitative educational improve-
ment produced by interaction among students from diverse backgrounds. Unfortunately,
Virginia seems to afford these two very different types of diversity the same constitutional
significance. See text accompanying note 69.
" See notes 66-68 and accompanying text.
15 See note 34.
420 THE UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO LEGAL FORUM [1999:
reading scores than female students in comparable co-educational
settings.157
Third, many of the new single-sex schools will survive the fit
element of constitutional scrutiny because they promote sex
equality. Single-sex public education is significantly related to the
project of promoting sex equality because it encourages students
to reevaluate the relationship between sex and gender in a way
that co-educational schools cannot.' Schools which further the
government objective of promoting sex equality should survive
the fit requirement of intermediate scrutiny.
Finally, as long as a state can produce credible evidence that
its use of a single-sex approach advances any of these interests
and is educationally beneficial, it is inappropriate for a court to
second guess the professional judgment of educators in their
choice of pedagogy. Indeed, recognizing the importance of institu-
tional academic freedom, courts usually exercise deference when
evaluating the constitutionality of state and local educational
policy choices.159 Therefore, Justice Rehnquist was wrong to argue
in his concurring opinion in Virginia that the majority should
have rejected the lower court's finding that "an adversative
method is pedagogically beneficial. " se As professional educators
are better positioned to evaluate the effectiveness of educational
choices than are judges," 1 courts should defer to their considered
judgments in this narrow area.
Indeed, the Supreme Court agrees that judicial deference is
appropriate in reviewing educational policy. In a series of cases
decided during the McCarthy Era, the Court first discussed the
... After one year in operation the school reported that 58.2 percent of its students
were reading at grade level. That percentage is more than 10 percent higher than the New
York city average, and is more than 20 percent higher than elsewhere in District 4. In
addition, 90 percent of students at the Young Women's Leadership School scored at or
above grade level on the math Medium or Higher Performance Assessment test compared
to 50.9 percent of students citywide; 62.7 percent scored at or above grade level in reading
compared to 44 percent of students citywide. See Bright Lights, Booming City, The NY
Daily News 26 (Feb 9, 1998); Maria Alvarez, Test Scores are a Sign of All-Girl Power, NY
Post 6 (Mar 8, 1998).
Even the most recent American Association of University Women report - al-
though it refused to conclude that positive benefits derive from factors unique to single-sex
programs - conceded that "[s]ingle-sex educational programs produce positive results for
some students in some settings." American Association of University Women Educational
Foundation, Separated by Sex: A Critical Look at Single-Sex Education for Girls 2 (The
Foundation 1998). The report encouraged educators to find ways to reproduce the benefits
of single-sex schools in co-educational settings.
"' See notes 74-81 and accompanying text.
See notes 163-74 and accompanying text.
Virginia, 518 US at 564 (Rehnquist concurring).
61 See notes 167-74 and accompanying text.
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principle of institutional academic freedom. Chief Justice Earl
Warren wrote:
The essentiality of freedom in the community of American
universities is almost self-evident. No one should underes-
timate the vital role in a democracy that is played by those
who guide and train our youth. To impose any strait jacket
upon the intellectual leaders in our colleges and universi-
ties would imperil the future of our Nation.... Teachers
and students must always remain free to inquire, to study
and to evaluate, to gain new maturity and understanding;
otherwise our civilization will stagnate and die.162
The Court recognized that in order to fulfill their educational
mission, schools must have substantial control over "who may
teach, what may be taught, how it shall be taught, and who may
be admitted to study.""6 ' Thus, in subsequent cases, the Court
constitutionalized a practice of judicial restraint in reviewing
educational policy:
Considerations of profound importance counsel restrained
judicial review of the substance of academic decisions....
Added to our concern for lack of standards is a reluctance
to trench on the prerogatives of state and local educational
institutions and our responsibility to safeguard their aca-
demic freedom, 'a special concern of the First
Amendment.'""
" Sweezy v New Hampshire, 354 US 234, 250 (1957). See also Shelton v Tucker, 364
US 479, 487 (1960) (stating that "unwarranted inhibition upon the free spirit of teachers
... has an unmistakable tendency to chill that free play of the spirit which all teachers
ought especially to cultivate and practice") (citation omitted); Elfbrandt v Russell, 384 US
11, 18 (1966) (noting that "public [school teachers] of character and integrity may well
forgo their calling rather than risk prosecution for perjury or compromise their commit-
ment to intellectual and political freedom"); Whitehill v Elkins, 389 US 54, 59-60 (1967)
('The continuing surveillance which this type of [loyalty oath requirement] places on
teachers is hostile to academic freedom.").
" Sweezy, 354 US at 263 (Frankfurter concurring) (quoting "Conference Statement of
the Open Universities of South Africa").
I" Regents of the University of Michigan v Ewing, 474 US 214, 225-26 (1985). While
the Sweezy Court implied that academic freedom might be a liberty interest protected by
the Fourteenth Amendment, later decisions have clarified that academic freedom is pro-
tected by the First Amendment. See Keyishian v Board of Regents of the University of the
State of New York, 385 US 589, 603 (1967) ("Our Nation is deeply committed to safe-
guarding academic freedom, which is of transcendent value to all of us and not merely to
the teachers concerned. That freedom is therefore a special concern of the First Amend-
ment"). See also J. Peter Byrne, Academic Freedom: A "Special Concern of the First
Amendment", 99 Yale L J 251, 257 (1989) (arguing that "the Court has developed a con-
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Although the principle of institutional academic freedom was
first enunciated in cases in which courts invalidated state stat-
utes requiring K-12 teachers and college professors to swear their
loyalty to the United States or to confess membership in organi-
zations that were considered to be subversive, courts have cited
that same principle to justify judicial deference to the judgments
of local educators and state legislators in cases involving matters
of student body composition," 5 faculty composition,1" and peda-
gogical choices." 7 For example, in Casteneda v Pickard,'" the
Fifth Circuit rejected a challenge brought by Mexican-American
parents to the school district's choice of bilingual education and
language remediation programs. The court declined to substitute
its judgment about the relative benefits of different educational
cept of constitutional academic freedom as a qualified right of the institution to be free
from government interference in its core administrative activities, such as deciding who
may teach and who may learn"); Walter Metzger, Profession and Constitution: Two Defini-
tions of Academic Freedom in America, 66 Tex L Rev 1265, 1284 (1988) (distinguishing the
professional definition of academic freedom that focuses on "the freedom of the academic,
not (on] the freedom of the academy," from the constitutional definition of academic free-
dom that does the opposite).
"' See, for example, Bakke, 438 US at 312 (Powell writing the plurality opinion)
(striking down university affirmative action policy, but acknowledging that "[the freedom
of a university to make its own judgments as to education includes the selection of its
student body").
'" See, for example, Ambach v Norwick, 441 US 68, 81 (1979) (upholding New York
statute forbidding resident aliens from teaching in K-12 public schools under the lowest
level of Equal Protection scrutiny because the "people of New York ... have made a judg-
ment that citizenship should be a qualification for teaching the young of the State in the
public schools"); Lieberman v Gant, 630 F2d 60, 67 (2d Cir 1980) ("A university's preroga-
tive to determine for itself on academic grounds who may teach is an important part of our
long tradition of academic freedom.") (internal citation omitted); Kunda v Muhlenberg
College, 621 F2d 532, 548 (3d Cir 1980) (finding that "it is clear that courts must be vigi-
lant not to intrude into [faculty employment] determination[s], and should not substitute
their judgment for that of the college with respect to the qualifications of faculty members
for promotion and tenure").
"e' See, for example, Settle v Dickson County School Board, 53 F3d 152, 156 (6th Cir
1995) (recognizing the existence of a "broad leeway of teachers to determine the nature of
the curriculum and the grades to be awarded to students"); Borger v Bisciglia, 888 F Supp
97, 99 (E D Wisc 1995) (noting that "the content of the curriculum is within the sound
discretion of school officials, with exceptions in rare cases"); Teresa P. v Berkeley Unified
School Dist, 724 F Supp 698, 713 (N D Cal 1989) (arguing that "courts should not substi-
tute their educational values and theories for the educational and political decisions prop-
erly reserved to local school authorities and the expert knowledge of educators, since they
are ill-equipped to do so"). See also Board of Education, Island Trees Union Free School
Dist No 26 v Pico, 457 US 853, 869 (1982) (limiting the power of school boards to remove
books from school libraries, but noting that school officials "might well defend their claim
of absolute discretion in matters of curriculum by reliance upon their duty to inculcate
community values") (emphasis in original); Epperson v Arkansas, 393 US 97, 104 (1968)
(striking down state law prohibiting the teaching of the theory of evolution, but stating
that "Uludicial interposition in the operation of the public school system of the Nation
raises problems requiring care and restraint").
" 648 F2d 989 (5th Cir 1981).
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strategies for students whose first language was not English for
that of the public school officials' because "choosing between
sound but competing theories is properly left to the educators and
public officials charged with responsibility for directing the edu-
cational policy of a school system."69
The Supreme Court has, however, made clear that judicial
deference in the name of institutional academic freedom is only
warranted when the challenged educational policy is a "genuinely
academic decision" intended to promote substantive learning.70
In Hazelwood School District v Kuhlmeier,7' the Supreme Court
held that li]t is only when the decision to censor a school-
sponsored publication ... has no valid educational purpose that
the First Amendment is so 'directly and sharply implicate[d],'...
as to require judicial intervention to protect students' constitu-
tional rights."172 Thus, the Hazelwood Court deferred to the
school officials' determination of what constitutes appropriate
content for a high school newspaper, reasoning that educators
must be able to exercise sufficient control over the school cur-
riculum to assure that students learn whatever lessons the ac-
tivity is designed to teach.'73 In cases involving genuine academic
decisions, the standard of judicial review is extremely permissive.
Courts "may not override [a genuinely academic decision] unless
it is such a substantial departure from accepted academic norms
as to demonstrate that the person or committee responsible did
not actually exercise professional judgment."74 Thus, if local edu-
cators and state legislators can produce credible evidence that
single-sex public education furthers their educational goals,
courts should defer to that professional judgment.
Given that many of the new single-sex public schools are
likely to survive the fit element of intermediate scrutiny by dem-
onstrating that they are pedagogically justified, the focal point of
" Id at 1009.
170 See Ewing, 474 US at 225 ("When judges are asked to review the substance of a
genuinely academic decision, such as this one, they should show great respect for the
faculty's professional judgment."); Clements v County of Nassau, 835 F2d 1000, 1005 (2d
Cir 1987) ("When courts review the substance of academic decisions... they should show
great respect for the teacher's professional judgment.") (citation omitted).
171 484 US 260 (1988).
Id at 273 (emphasis added) (citation omitted).
3 Id at 271.
1' Ewing, 474 US at 225. See also Horowitz, 435 US at 91 (finding district court's use
of a "clearly arbitrary and capricious" standard to review an academic decision of a public
university to be unobjectionable in this instance); Mahavongsanan, 529 F2d at 450 (ap-
plying a "reasonable academic regulation" standard); Gaspar v Bruton, 513 F2d 843, 850
(10th Cir 1975) (using an abuse of discretion standard in a nursing student's wrongful
dismissal action).
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cases challenging their constitutionality will be the anti-
subordination principle. The defenders of these schools still must
show that the schools do not violate that principle.
B. Anti-Subordination Analysis after United States v Virginia
The most difficult question left open by Virginia is how to
conduct an anti-subordination analysis. Although Virginia ar-
ticulated an asymmetrical anti-subordination principle, the lan-
guage of the opinion allows for several conflicting interpretations
and leaves the constitutional status of single-sex public schools
unclear.
The Court's asymmetrical statement of the anti-
subordination principle, which forbids the use of sex-based classi-
fications only when they disadvantage women, might be inter-
preted to mean that only women can challenge the constitution-
ality of single-sex public schools.175 As a result, the anti-
subordination principle might prohibit all-male schools, but allow
all-female schools. Numerous champions of all-female public edu-
cation have made arguments in support of the latter claim.17
Chai Feldblum, for example, argues that "men and women are in
distinctly different positions with regard to the ramifications of
exclusion from single-sex organizations. When males are ex-
cluded from all-female organizations ... this exclusion does not
create the same stigma or economic disadvantages as does the
exclusion of females from all-male organizations."77 Accordingly,
she concludes that courts should invalidate only all-male public
schools on constitutional grounds.
But this interpretation of the asymmetrical anti-
subordination language in Virginia is overly simplistic. Whether
a woman or a man challenges the constitutionality of a single-sex
public school, or whether a single-sex public school admits only
women or only men, is unrelated to whether or not the school
subordinates women. For example, the fact that a man sought to
7,8 See notes 142-43 and accompanying text.
See, for example, Amy H. Nemko, Single-Sex Public Education After VML The
Case for Women's Schools, 20 Harv Women's L J 19, 76 (1998) (arguing that "public single-
sex schools for women and girls can be justified, even if such schools for men and boys
cannot withstand constitutional scrutiny"); Miller, 7 Harv Women's L J at 165 (cited in
note 81) (suggesting an argument that "would permit all women's, but not all men's, col-
leges to remain in existence"); Center, 8 Wisc Women's L J at 1-2 (cited in note 46) ("[A]ll-
female groups function as positive forces in the movement for gender equality, and ...
their single-sex status should be protected.").
" Chai Feldblum, Nancy Fredman Krent, and Virginia Watkin, Legal Challenges to
All-Female Organizations, 21 Harv CR-CL L Rev 171, 216 (1986).
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challenge his exclusion from an all-women's public college that
trained women for low-paying, low status, politically disempow-
ering positions should not stop a court from concluding that the
school subordinates women. Indeed, the Hogan Court sustained a
challenge to a man's exclusion from an all-women's nursing
school that the Court found had depressed the wages of the
women in the field by "perpetuat[ing] the stereotyped view of
nursing as an exclusively woman's job."17 The Court in Virginia
undoubtedly did not intend to adopt this simplistic interpretation
of the anti-subordination principle which merely distinguishes
between male and female plaintiffs or between all-male and all-
female schools. Moreover, if courts interpret the Constitution to
prohibit only the exclusion of women from public schools, every
all-female institution would survive constitutional scrutiny de-
spite important differences between all-women's institutions. 79
This simple anti-subordination test seems underinclusive.
On the other hand, the Court's statement in Virginia that
differences between the sexes cannot be cause "for denigration of
the members of either sex"80 suggests that courts should judge
the constitutionality of single-sex public schools without regard-
ing the historic oppression of women. The Court's sex-neutral
phrasing implies that it might be possible to evaluate whether a
sex-based classification subordinates women without taking into
account the fact that only women have a history of systematic
oppression on the basis of sex. This interpretation equates all-
male and all-female schools, which would then stand or fall to-
gether under constitutional scrutiny. Either the existence of dif-
ferences between the sexes could justify the separate education of
men and women, or they could not. Moreover, as the Court's lan-
guage implies that all sex-based classifications inherently subor-
dinate women, it would mean the end of all single-sex schools -
despite the fact that some all-girls schools benefit girls educa-
tionally, 8' and despite the importance of sex-solidarity to ending
women's subordination."l 2 This anti-differentiation test seems
overinclusive.
There is another way to look at the asymmetrical formulation
of the anti-subordination principle that avoids these interpretive
missteps and provides a more nuanced way of evaluating individ-
... Hogan, 458 US at 729.
'" See notes 44-81 and accompanying text.
Virginia, 518 US at 533 (emphasis added).
"' See note 36.
' See notes 74-81 and accompanying text.
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ual single-sex public schools. This alternative approach requires
acknowledging two competing conceptions of subordination in the
legal and political traditions of the United States. On the one
hand, laws that negatively impact liberty interests are sometimes
considered to subordinate because they arbitrarily constrain in-
dividual choice.18 On the other hand, laws that negatively im-
pact equality interests can also be considered subordinating be-
cause they systematically harm the political and economic for-
tunes of people who share particular suspect traits, such as race
or sex."M Defining subordination for the purposes of evaluating
the constitutionality of single-sex public schools requires deciding
which of these two conceptions is more appropriate for that
task.'85
The anti-subordination principle makes the most sense if un-
derstood as privileging equality interests over liberty interests.
That is, the principle defines the constitutionally relevant harm
of the use of sex-based classifications as naturalizing notions of
the relationship between sex and gender that have historically
worked to diminish women's economic and political power' -
" See Robert Nozick, Anarchy, State and Utopia 334 (Basic Books 1974) (advocating
the minimal state, which by "[t]reating us with respect by respecting our rights... allows
us, individually or with whom we choose, to choose our life and to realize our ends and our
conception of ourselves, insofar as we can, aided by the voluntary co-operation of other
individuals possessing the same dignity"). See also notes 188-93 and accompanying text.
18 See Cass R. Sunstein, The Anticaste Principle, 92 Mich L Rev 2410, 2429 (1994)
("The motivating idea behind an anticaste principle is that without good reason, social and
legal structures should not turn differences that are both highly visible and irrelevant
from the moral point of view into systematic social disadvantages."). See also notes 197-
205 and accompanying text.
185 Amartya Sen correctly points out that posing liberty and equality as opposites
"reflects a 'category mistake.' They are not alternative, liberty is among the possible fields
of application of equality, and equality is among the possible patterns of distribution of
liberty.' Amartya Sen, Inequality Reexamined 22-23 (Harvard 1992) (emphasis in origi-
nal). The conflict between liberty and equality that is described in this article is over
which value should be taken into consideration first and given more weight.
" Traditionally female gender roles and identities are not inherently less valuable
than are traditionally male ones; rather, they are devalued because of their historical
association with a disempowered group. See Christine Littleton, Equality and Feminist
Legal Theory, 48 U Pitt L Rev 1043, 1047-48 (1987) ("There is strong evidence that skills
associated with women, or that come in combinations that appear to be associated with
women, are systematically devalued on that basis."). Some feminists have sought to ad-
dress this issue by opening the way for women to take on traditionally male gender identi-
ties and roles. See Wendy W. Williams, Equality's Riddle: Pregnancy and the Equal
Treatment/Special Treatment Debate, 13 NYU Rev L & Soc Change 325, 327 (1984-85)
(describing sameness feminism as the approach "best able to reduce structural barriers to
full workforce participation of women"). Other feminists have sought to reclaim the value
of traditionally female gender identities and roles. See Robin West, Jurisprudence and
Gender, 55 U Chi L Rev 1, 18 (1988) ("Cultural feminists, to their credit, have reidentified
these differences as women's strengths, rather than women's weaknesses. Cultural femi-
nism does not simply identify women's differences-patriarchy too insists on women's
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thereby reinforcing the privileged position of men in the hierar-
chy of sex and exacerbating the inferior position of women. The
Court's use of asymmetrical language to describe the anti-
subordination principle in Virginia is consistent with this inter-
pretation because it suggests that the objective of intermediate
scrutiny is to ferret out laws that turn differences between the
sexes into constitutionally impermissible disadvantages to
women, rather than to identify instances when laws take note of
differences between the sexes. Indeed, Virginia confirms that
"[s]ex classifications may be used to compensate women 'for par-
ticular economic disabilities [they have] suffered,' to 'promot[e]
equal employment opportunity,' [and] to advance full develop-
ment of the talent and capacities of our Nation's people."8 ' Under
this definition of anti-subordination, single-sex public schools will
survive constitutional scrutiny as long as they are voluntary,
educationally beneficial, allow alternatives to traditional gender
identities and roles, and do not harm women's economic or politi-
cal status.
1. Liberty Interests.
Liberty, defined as freedom from arbitrary, state-imposed
constraints on individual choice, has always been highly valued
in the American tradition. The Framers of the United States
Constitution were heavily influenced by political philosophers
who maintained that men are born free and equal, and that the
powers of government to constrain individual liberty are legiti-
mate only to the extent that men in the state of nature would
agree to contract their rights away in order to obtain security.188
As a result, the version of the Constitution ratified in 1789 fo-
cused on limiting the national government's power over the ma-
differences-it celebrates them. Women's art, women's craft, women's narrative capacity,
women's critical eye, women's ways of knowing, and women's heart, are all, for the cul-
tural feminist, redefined as things to celebrate."). See generally Carol Gilligan, In A Dif-
ferent Voice: Psychological Theory and Women's Development (1982). This Article proposes
a third approach: dominance feminism strives to dismantle the hierarchy of sex and to
disaggregate sex from gender.
"7 United States v Virginia, 518 US at 533 (citation omitted).
"7 See Bruce Ackerman, We the People: Foundations 20 (Belknap 1991) (describing
the Framers as "children of the Enlightenment, eager to use the best political science of
the time to prove to a doubting world that republican self-goveinment was no utopian
dream"); David A.J. Richards, Foundations of American Constitutionalism 24 (Oxford
1989) ("the founders understood themselves to be participants in the best Enlightenment
thought of Scotland, England, France, and others and defined their work as an elaboration
and extension of such thought") (citation omitted). See generally Thomas Hobbes, Levia-
than (Prentice Hall 1958); John Locke, Second Treatise of Government (Prentice Hall
1952); Jean-Jacques Rousseau, The Social Contract (Free Press 1970).
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jority, rather than on limiting the political majority's power over
minority groups.18 9 Indeed, from a perspective that privileges lib-
erty, the government cannot enact legislation designed to en-
hance the equality of politically disempowered groups, because
such legislation infringes on the majority's freedom to govern it-
self.9 ° For example, Herbert Wechsler's argument concerning
Brown v Board of Education,9' that the right of Whites to free-
dom of association should trump African-American interests in
attending integrated schools, is consistent with the American
tradition of privileging liberty interests.'92 Similarly, this tradi-
tion supports striking down laws prohibiting hate speech whether
or not those laws promote equality interests because they "cut to
the core of our system of free expression."'93 In this tradition,
freedom of choice is paramount, and laws that compromise that
freedom unconstitutionally subordinate individual interests.
2. All Single-Sex Schools Negatively Impact Liberty Interests.
All single-sex education negatively impacts liberty interests
because it limits the freedom of students to choose, based on their
" Some of the Framers believed that where "the real power lies in the majority...
the invasion of private rights is chiefly to be apprehended, not from acts of Government
contrary to the sense of its constituents, but from acts in which the Government is the
mere instrument of the major number of the constituents." Letter from James Madison to
Thomas Jefferson, October 17, 1788, in Michael Kammen, ed, The Origins of the American
Constitution: A Documentary History 369-70 (Penguin 1986) (emphasis in original). How-
ever, judging by the fact that neither the original constitution nor the Bill of Rights sought
to constrain state legislative power over individual rights, that was not the majority sen-
timent.
" Dorothy Roberts observes that those who would privilege liberty interests must
resign themselves to the fact that "[i]nequality is the price we may have to pay for free-
dom." Dorothy E. Roberts, The Priority Paradigm: Private Choices and the Limits of
Equality, 57 U Pitt L Rev 363, 371 (1996).
'' 347 US 483 (1954).
1 See Herbert Wechsler, Toward Neutral Principles of Constitutional Law, 73 Harv
L Rev 1, 34 (1959) ("[T]he question posed by state-enforced segregation is not one of dis-
crimination at all. Its human and its constitutional dimensions lie entirely elsewhere, in
the denial by the state of freedom to associate, a denial that impinges in the same way on
any groups or races that may be involved."). But see Charles L. Black, Jr., The Lawfulness
of the Segregation Decisions, 69 Yale L J 421, 424 (1960) (defining the central question in
Brown as whether the system of segregation in the South was "set up and continued for
the very purpose of keeping [a whole race of people] in an inferior station").
" Nadine Strossen, Regulating Racist Speech on Campus: A Modest Proposal?, 1990
Duke L J 484, 492. But see Robert Delgado and Jean Stefancic, Hateful Speech, Loving
Communities: Why Our Notion of 'A Just Balance" Changes So Slowly, 82 Cal L Rev 851,
852 (1994) (describing the defenders of hate speech regulation as seeing "the relevant
issue [as] whether campuses are free to impose reasonable rules to protect the dignity and
self-regard of vulnerable young African American undergraduates and other targets of
hate speech. These advocates place equality at the center of the controversy and portray
the defenders of racist invective as seeking to attack values emanating from the equality
- protecting Constitutional amendments.") (citation omitted).
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individual interests and abilities, whether or not to attend those
schools that exclude their sex.4 Thus, every single-sex school
would be unconstitutional if courts considered the anti-
subordination principle to be violated when liberty interests are
compromised.
If there were characteristics that were universally true of
each sex or were unique to one sex or the other, and if single-sex
schools tailored their programs to match those characteristics,
the schools would not compromise the liberty interests of either
sex because neither sex would desire or benefit from the training
offered to the other. However, even if one believes that the char-
acteristics most often cited to justify single-sex schools - men's
more aggressive nature and women's greater need for nurturing
educational environments195 - are both accurate on average and
are rooted in biological differences between the sexes, those traits
are not universally true of all men or all women, and none of
those traits is unique to one sex or the other. Rather, they, like
the vast majority of human traits, are distributed along a spec-
trum of prevalence, with men and women clustered more or less
heavily toward opposite ends. Indeed, some women exhibit even
the most' traditionally male traits and some men exhibit tradi-
tionally female traits. Therefore, single-sex schools that deny ei-
ther men or women the opportunity to express or develop traits
atypical for their sex arbitrarily impinge upon the liberty inter-
ests of those who do not share the average preferences for their
sex. For example, an all-male program that taught students to
channel their competitive natures in productive directions would
compromise the liberty interests of competitive women, because
they could not freely choose to participate in the program solely
because of their sex. Even sex-based classifications designed to
encourage the development of non-traditional traits negatively
impact liberty interests because they arbitrarily deny to members
of the opposite sex the chance to participate in the sex-restricted
activity. For example, an all-male program that taught male stu-
dents to be better at nurturing, on the assumption that only men
need such training, would arbitrarily compromise the liberty in-
terests of non-nurturing women.
1 See Norman Siegel, A Symposium on Finding a Path to Gender Equality: Legal
and Policy issues Raised by All-Female Public Education, Panel I: East Harlem Girls
School, 14 NY L Sch J Hum Rts 49, 49-50 (1997) ("What the New York Civil Liberties
Union objects to, and what we believe the law prohibits, is a school that denies admission
based solely on [sex].') (citation omitted).
" See notes 70-71 and accompanying text.
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Moreover, the few anatomical and physiological characteris-
tics that are unique to one sex or the other - that all men have a
Y chromosome and no women do,19 and that only women can be-
come pregnant and only men can impregnate - are not directly
related to questions of pedagogy. Therefore, those sex-based dif-
ferences cannot justify the existence of sex-segregated schools.
Consider, as a counter-example, that if the presence of a Y chro-
mosome were necessarily linked with the desire and need for a
particular pedagogy, then that pedagogy would be undesirable
and useless to anyone who did not have a Y chromosome. Under
those hypothetical circumstances, it would not significantly im-
pact the liberty interests of women to offer that pedagogy in an
all-male setting, because no women would desire or benefit from
the training. In real life, however, anatomical and physiological
differences between the sexes alone do not either directly or re-
liably account for disparate educational needs. Accordingly, all
public single-sex schools would fail constitutional scrutiny if sex-
based rules that have a negative impact on liberty interests were
considered to be subordinating because all single-sex public
schools impose arbitrary constraints on the individual choice of
students.
3. Equality Interests.
The Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment
is something of an enigma within the American tradition of
valuing individual liberty above all else. Indeed, the Fourteenth
Amendment transformed the American tradition by forcing law-
makers to balance liberty interests and equality interests. For
example, a primary motivating force behind the ratification of the
I "With respect to the Y chromosome, itis well-known that this chromosome is both
necessary and sufficient for male development. Indeed, regardless of the number of X
chromosomes, the presence of a single Y determines the male sex." Ramzi S. Cotran, Vinay
Kumar, and Stanley L. Robbins, Robbins Pathologic Basis of Disease 158 (Saunders 5th ed
1994). But see Anthony S. Fauci et al, eds, Harrison's Principles of Internal Medicine 2121
(McGraw Hill 1998) (describing "XX male syndrome" which occurs once in every 20,000-
24,000 live "male" births).
This binary definition of sex will suffice for the purposes of this article because a
construction of sex as binary undergirds the discussion of single-sex and mixed-sex educa-
tion in the law and in educational policy. However, some scholars have argued that "this
construct called 'sex' is as culturally constructed as gender; indeed, perhaps it was always
already gender, with the consequence that the distinction between sex and gender turns
out to be no distinction at all." Butler, Gender Trouble, at 7 (cited in note 3). See also
Katherine M. Franke, The Central Mistake of Sex Discrimination Law: The Disaggrega-
tion of Sex from Gender, 144 U Pa L Rev 1, 2 (1995) ("[S]exual equality jurisprudence has
uncritically accepted the validity of biological sexual differences. By accepting these bio-
logical differences, equality jurisprudence reifies as foundational fact that which is really
an effect of normative gender ideology.").
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Fourteenth Amendment was the desire to promote the equality
interests of newly emancipated African-Americans over the lib-
erty interests of still-disgruntled ex-slaveholders.197 In the context
of this history, equality is best defined as freedom from state-
enforced rules that perpetuate disparate political or economic
fortunes based on suspect traits such as race or sex.
Unfortunately, in the wake of Reconstruction and Redemp-
tion, courts interpreted the Fourteenth Amendment so as to de-
prive it of any significant transformative power.19 In Plessy v
Ferguson,99 the Supreme Court reverted to the practice of priori-
tizing the liberty interests of Whites over the equality interests of
African-Americans by holding that de jure racial segregation did
not violate the Equal Protection Clause. °°
Not until the middle of the twentieth century did the Su-
preme Court begin to prioritize equality interests over liberty in-
terests in race discrimination cases. For example, in Shelley v
Kraemer," the Court declared that state enforcement of racially
restrictive covenants was unconstitutional on the grounds that it
denied African-Americans the "full enjoyment of [their property]
rights on an equal footing [with Whites]," even though those
covenants were freely entered into.2 Twenty more years passed
before the Court recognized that the Fourteenth Amendment also
protected the equality interests of women2 3 - but in that con-
19 See Eric Foner, Reconstruction: America's Unfinished Revolution 257 (1988) (not-
ing that one of the immediate concerns motivating Republican congressmen who sup-
ported the Fourteenth Amendment was "to abrogate the Black Codes and eliminate any
doubts as to the constitutionality of the Civil Rights Act [of 1866]").
19 See, for example, Slaughter-House Cases, 83 US 36, 80-82 (1872) (interpreting the
Privileges and Immunities Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment narrowly); Civil Rights
Cases, 109 US 3 (1883) (holding that the enactment of the Civil Rights Act of 1875 ex-
ceeded Congress' power under the Thirteenth and Fourteenth Amendments).
'" 163 US 537 (1896).
2o Id at 537. The Plessy Court stated that:
If the two races are to meet upon terms of social equality, it must be the
result of natural affinities, a mutual appreciation of each other's merits,
and a voluntary consent of individuals .... Legislation is powerless to
eradicate racial instincts, or to abolish distinctions based upon physical
differences, and the attempt to do so can only result in accentuating the
difficulties of the present situation.
Id at 551. Whether or not legislation was powerless to enhance racial equality, the Court
did not believe that it was appropriate to attempt to do so in the absence of the free con-
sent of Whites.
2" 334 US 1 (1948).
Id at 19.
See Reed v Reed, 404 US 71, 76-77 (1971) (striking down state statute favoring
men over women to administer estates on the grounds that it violates the Fourteenth
Amendment).
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text, the Court has also prioritized the equality interests of
women over the liberty interests of men. For example, in Roberts
v United States Jaycees,2"' the Supreme Court upheld the consti-
tutionality of a Minnesota Human Rights Act that prohibited the
Jaycees from excluding women from their organization, in spite of
the law's impact on the male members' freedom of association. 20 5
In this counter-tradition, equality is paramount, and government
action that uses race or sex to perpetuate disparate political or
economic fortunes is subordinating.
4. Only Some Single-Sex Schools Negatively Impact
Equality Interests.
Not all single-sex schools negatively affect equality interests
because the purpose, as well as the effect, of a single-sex peda-
gogy can either enhance or diminish the relative political or eco-
nomic position of one sex to the other. Thus, only some single-sex
schools would be unconstitutional if the anti-subordination prin-
ciple is violated when equality interests are compromised.
Some single-sex schools naturalize traditional notions of the
appropriate relationship between sex and gender by training men
and women into sex-stereotypical behavior, and by validating the
preferences of average men and women. This is particularly true
of the older generation of single-sex schools - some of which
aimed to provide sex-specific training in an effort to prepare men
and women for their ostensibly biologically determined gender
identities and roles.2"' In fact, even when single-sex colleges of-
fered educational opportunities to women that had previously
been available only to men, those schools still inclined toward the
contradictory impulse of steering their students into traditional
gender roles. ' Because traditional gender identities and roles
subordinate women to men, single-sex schools that bolster them
simultaneously reinforce the privileged position of men in the
hierarchy of sex and exacerbate the inferior position of women in
that hierarchy."'
However, not all single-sex education negatively affects stu-
dent equality interests. Some single-sex schools allow students to
construct non-traditional gender identities and roles and encour-
468 US 609 (1984).
Id at 623 ("We are persuaded that Minnesota's compelling interest in eradicating
discrimination against its female citizens justifies the impact that application of the stat-
ute to the Jaycees may have on the male members' associational freedoms.").
See notes 44-53 and accompanying text
See notes 54-58 and accompanying text.
See note 184; notes 197-206 and accompanying text.
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age students to question the traditional relationship of sex to
gender.' 9 In addition, "Because of existing differences between
the sexes in power, opportunities, and resulting self-confidence,
on the average young women do better in their intellectual devel-
opment when they have at least a few years to learn and study
with one another than when they are in co-ed environments."2 10
Single-sex public schools established to promote sex equality
benefit their students educationally without steering them into
traditional gender identities and roles, thus advancing women's
equality interests by helping to dismantle the traditional hierar-
chy of sex. Because many of the new generation of single-sex
schools satisfy these criteria, they should survive constitutional
challenge.
Some scholars still contend that all single-sex public schools
negatively impact women's equality interests because any use of
sex-based classifications validates the notion that sex is a rele-
vant consideration in decision making.211 Their argument is not
that single-sex schools stigmatize individual men and women by
singling them out for sex-specific treatment without regard to
their desires or merit because participation in all of the single-sex
public schools and programs that are currently in existence is
voluntary. Rather, those scholars argue that single-sex education
harms women as a group by reinforcing a taxonomy traditionally
used to subordinate them.212 Wendy Kaminer, for example, fears
that "a return to separate single-sex schools may hasten the re-
vival of separate gender roles."' From this perspective, all sin-
gle-sex education subordinates women's equality interests.
' See notes 74-81 and accompanying text.
210 Carol Tavris, The Mismeasure of Woman 126-27 (Simon & Schuster 1992). See
also note 36 and accompanying text.
211 See Kaminer, Atlantic Monthly at 36 (cited in note 32); Valorie Vojdik, Girl's
Schools After VML Do They Make the Grade?, 4 Duke J Gender L & Pol 69, 84 (1997).
.12 Sylvia A. Law, Rethinking Sex and the Constitution, 132 U Pa L Rev 955, 957
(1984) (sex-based classifications historically have been "a core mechanism for [the] oppres-
sion of women"); Colker, 61 NYU L Rev at 1013 (cited in note 105) ("Historically, differen-
tiation has been a powerful tool in perpetuating the subordination of minorities and
women through segregation and exclusion."). See also Stephen L. Carter, Reflections of an
Affirmative Action Baby 55 (Basic Books 1991) (making similar claims about the dangers
of the use of race-based classifications. Affirmative action exacerbates what he describes
as the Best Black Syndrome, in which every Black professional "is assumed to have
earned his or her position not by being among the best available but by being among the
best available blacks.").
212 See Kaminer, Atlantic Monthly at 36 (cited in note 32). Valorie Vojdik concurs that
"[e]ven if a state claims that its support for all-female schools is based on its desire to
remedy the differential treatment of women in chilly coeducational classrooms rather than
accommodate innate differences between men and women, the distinction is apt to be
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However, in assuming that sex equality cannot be achieved
as long as people still make distinctions on the basis of sex, Ka-
miner's understanding of the impact of sex-based classifications
is unnecessarily pessimistic. Recognition of difference does not
necessarily presage hierarchy. Indeed, given that biological sex
will continue to have social significance whether or not the gov-
ernment may permissibly classify on that basis, Kaminer's defini-
tion of women's equality interests does not square with the belief
that sex equality can ever be achieved.214 Accordingly, her position
should be rejected.
C. Equality Interests Should Trump Liberty Interests in Evalu-
ating the Constitutionality of Single-Sex Public Schools
In order to define subordination for the purpose of evaluating
the constitutionality of single-sex public schools, one must first
decide which of the two conceptions of the harm caused by the use
of sex-based classifications is more appropriate for that task. The
anti-subordination principle must either be interpreted to privi-
lege liberty interests over equality interests - and therefore to
prohibit all single-sex schools - or interpreted to privilege
equality interests over liberty interests - and therefore to pro-
hibit only those single-sex schools that perpetuate women's op-
pression. The anti-subordination principle makes the most sense
if it is understood as privileging equality interests over liberty
interests - so that it prohibits only those single-sex schools that
steer men or women toward gender identities or roles that per-
petuate women's subordination.
1. Why Privilege Equality Interests?
As expressed preferences are only valuable to the extent that
they reflect authentic desires, in order to privilege liberty inter-
ests over equality interests, one must posit that the choices of
men and women are freely made. It would be easy to believe that
this were the case if the benefits and burdens of society were
more or less equally distributed between the sexes, or were ran-
blurred in a society in which [sex] inequity still exists." Vojdik, 4 Duke J Gender L & Pol
at 84 (cited in note 211).
214 Warren Beatty's character, Senator Jay Bulworth, in the movie Bulworth (Twenti-
eth Century Fox 1998), endorsed a similar idea. He argued that racial equality could best
be achieved through interracial sex and mixed-race children. Leaving aside the obvious
unfairness of foisting the duty to end centuries of racial strife upon mixed-race children, if
it is true that racial equality cannot be achieved until it is impossible to make distinctions
on the basis of race, we will be waiting a very long time for that happy event.
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domly distributed by sex, or if the distribution of those benefits
and burdens by sex reflected what one imagines the values of av-
erage men and women would have been but for a history of le-
gally constrained choice. However, even a cursory investigation
into the status of women reveals that by most measures, women
as a group are less well off than are men as a group, that gender
identities and roles traditionally associated with women are un-
dervalued compared to those associated with men - and that
women are not happy about those facts.215 Some scholars, like
Richard Epstein, are quite comfortable with the status quo and
argue that "[w]e should not look at the pattern of social interac-
tions as something that stands in need of correction simply be-
cause it has produced asymmetries in social roles."21 ' In fact, Ep-
stein argues that the current distribution is predictable because
each sex gravitates to the areas in which it has the greatest ad-
vantage; accordingly, the status quo "may be beneficial for all
concerned, instead of being exploitive of some." 17 This view gives
insufficient weight to history.
Without the long history of women's legal deprivation of eco-
nomic opportunity and political power, and of both men and
women being steered into a sex hierarchy that naturalized
215 Women have substantially less economic and political capital than do men. See
Barbara Vobejda, Poverty Rate Fell, Incomes Rose in 1997, Census Finds; Economic Gains
Crossed Racial, Regional Divides, Wash Post Al (Sept 25, 1998) (women earn 74 cents for
every dollar earned by men); Kathleen Feldstein, Social Security's Gender Gap, NY Times
A27 (Apr 13, 1998) (the poverty rate of women over 65 is twice that of men over 65); E. J.
Dionne Jr., Women on the March, Wash Post A27 (Oct 16, 1998) ("In 1997 ... in cities of
30,000 population or more... 203 of the mayors were women - or 20.1 percent. Nearly
1,600 women are state legislators, 21.5 percent of the total.... In [only] seven states -
Washington, Arizona, Colorado, Nevada, Vermont, New Hampshire and Minnesota - [do]
women hold 30 percent or more of the legislative seats."). See also Costello, Miles, and
Stone, The American Woman 1999-2000 at 332-61 (cited in note 63) (at every age and
within every racial group, women are more likely to be living in poverty than are men; and
in 1997, only 25 percent of statewide elected officials, 11.7 percent of the House of Repre-
sentatives and 9 percent of the Senate were women).
Moreover, this distribution of economic and political capital is not attributable
solely to women's free choice. See Vicki Schultz, Telling Stories about Women and Work:
Judicial Interpretations of Sex Segregation in the Workplace in Title VII Cases Raising the
Lack of Interest Argument, 103 Harv L Rev 1749, 1816-24 (1990) (arguing that the prefer-
ences women form prior to entering the labor market cannot fully account for women's
segregation into lower paying jobs in the work place). See also Mary Walshok, Blue Collar
Women: Pioneers on the Male Frontier xix (Anchor 1981) ("There is much to suggest that
what women workers seek in their work parallels in general terms what men seek in their
work. Both men and women seek feelings of competence, of making a contribution, of
being necessary, of being productive, and of being in control of time and energy. What
appears to differentiate the work experience and the meaning of paid employment for men
and for women is differing economic opportunities and societal expectations.").
"' Richard A. Epstein, Gender is for Nouns, 41 DePaul L Rev 981, 984 (1992).
217 Id.
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women's oppression, it might be appropriate to trust that the cur-
rent distribution of benefits and burdens reflects free choice. Un-
der these ahistorical circumstances, it would make sense to
privilege liberty interests over equality interests because choices
would truly be free - or at least they would not be tainted by a
history of sex-based oppression. In fact, under those circum-
stances, sex-based classifications that steer all women and all
men to share the interests and abilities of average men and
women would only violate liberty interests because the gender
identities and roles traditionally associated with men would not
be privileged over those traditionally associated with women.
However, because the history of discrimination in fact has
tainted the expressed preferences of men and women, it is better
to privilege equality interests over liberty interests. As Cass Sun-
stein argues, "a social or legal system that has produced prefer-
ences, and has done so by limiting opportunities unjustly, can
hardly justify itself by reference to existing preferences."21 ' In-
deed, those preferences are likely to be untrustworthy for several
reasons. First, preferences are shaped in significant part by op-
portunity and by the expectation that they will or will not be sat-
isfied:
People may convince themselves that they do not want a
good simply because they consider it to be unavailable; if
the good were available, it might have a high value to
them. In a converse phenomenon, people may overvalue a
good, even become obsessed with it, because they have
been unable to obtain it in the past.219
To assume the integrity of the current distribution of preferences
between the sexes would be to assume that our processes of pref-
erence formation are not affected by what we believe we are
likely to achieve or obtain. In addition, individual autonomy is
circumscribed by social circumstances and tradition. "[I]t is not
possible [for human beings] to be radically free ... pure personal
character and will" because individual preferences are formed by
acting in community with others.22 ° Although it would be inaccu-
rate to characterize community as an impediment to true auton-
218 Sunstein, 92 Mich L Rev at 2420 (cited in note 184).
219 Cass R. Sunstein, Legal Interference with Private Preferences, 53 U Chi L Rev
1129, 1135 (1986) (citation omitted).
"o Denise C. Morgan, Role Models: Who Needs Them Anyway?, 6 Berkeley Women's
Law J 122, 126 (1991).
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omy, it is important to acknowledge that our social context de-
termines who we are to a large degree.221 Because we are all em-
bedded in a history and culture that has oppressed women, the
current distribution of societal benefits and burdens and the pref-
erences that produced that distribution are suspect.
My point is not to call into question the possibility of human
autonomy, or to suggest that government should not respect lib-
erty interests. Rather, the above discussion is intended to show
that it is preferable to privilege equality interests over liberty
interests in the context of evaluating sex equality claims because
given the history of sex inequality, the expressed preferences of
men and women are often unreliable. Actually, the idea that ex-
pressed preferences are unreliable is neither radical nor particu-
lar to discrimination law - legal interventions that second guess
expressed preferences are common in modern contract and tort
law. 2 Thus, it follows that the best interpretation of the anti-
subordination principle is that it prohibits the use of the law to
bolster those sex-based classifications that steer either men or
women into gender identities and roles that are intended to, or do
in fact, perpetuate the political or economic inferiority of women.
2. Why an Asymmetrical Anti-Subordination Principle?
The Supreme Court's use of asymmetrical language in Vir-
ginia squares with an interpretation of the anti-subordination
principle that privileges equality interests over liberty interests
- and thus defines the constitutionally relevant harm of the use
of sex-based classifications as reinforcing the privileged position
of men in the hierarchy of sex and exacerbating the inferior posi-
tion of women in that hierarchy. The Court's choice of language
suggests that the objective of intermediate scrutiny is to ferret
out laws that convert differences between the sexes into constitu-
tionally impermissible disadvantages to women, rather than
merely to identify instances when laws take note of sex. That is
precisely what the Supreme Court used the intermediate scrutiny
"' See Michael J. Sandel, Liberalism and the Limits of Justice 179 (Cambridge 1982)
("I move in a history I neither summon nor command, which carries consequences none
the less for my choices and conduct."); Jennifer Nedelsky, Reconceiving Autonomy:
Sources, Thoughts and Possibilities, 1 Yale J L and Fem 7, 8 (1989) (discussing the need
for a new conception of autonomy that takes into consideration both the social and indi-
vidual nature of human beings).
' For example, the recognition of implied terms in contracts and nondisclaimable
duties in torts. See Duncan Kennedy, Distributive and Paternalist Motives in Contract and
Tort Law, with Special Reference to Compulsory Terms and Unequal Bargaining Power, 41
Md L Rev 563, 631-38 (1982) (describing different types of paternalist legal interven-
tions).
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test to do in Virginia: "The problem with the [VMI] system was
not that the state noticed a difference between men and women,
but that it turned that difference into a disadvantage.' 23
A symmetrical statement of the anti-subordination principle
asks whether the sex-based rule has an unjustified impact on ei-
ther sex. Therefore, the inquiry tends to focus on whether any
differences between men and women could justify their disparate
treatment. Traditionally, the use of sex-based classifications has
been justified by claiming the existence of inherent biological dif-
ferences between the sexes. In Bradwell v Illinois,2 for example,
the Supreme Court rejected an attack on the state's refusal to
license women to practice law by asserting that "[t]he natural
and proper timidity and delicacy that belongs to the female sex
evidently unfits it for many of the occupations of civil life."225 A
symmetrical statement of the anti-subordination principle im-
plies that proof of the existence of sex-based differences - per-
haps a showing of statistical differences between the men and
women - would be sufficient to justify their disparate treatment.
In contrast, an asymmetrical anti-subordination principle
requires courts to consider whether a sex-based rule perpetuates
the historical subordination of women. This statement of the
principle recognizes that the existence of biological differences
between the sexes does not necessarily imply anything about how
the law should respond to those differences. 22 So the fact that
' Sunstein, Leaving Things Undecided, 110 Harv L Rev at 74 (cited in note 7) (cita-
tion omitted). See also Lucinda M. Finley, Sex-Blind, Separate But Equal, or Anti-
Subordination? The Uneasy Legacy of Plessy v. Ferguson for Sex and Gender Discrimina-
tion, 12 Ga St U L Rev 1089, 1127 (1996) (describing the problem with VMI as "not [its]
single-sex basis per se, but [its] role in preserving a haven for a dominating and anti-
female understanding of men and masculinity").
224 83 US 130 (1873).
Id at 141 (Bradley concurring).
"' See Catharine A. MacKinnon, Sexual Harassment of Working Women 125 (Yale
1979):
Passing over the question of why biology ought to justify relative depriva-
tion, how many 'individuals' have to be afflicted by a social characteristic
before the problem is seen as group injustice - the exceptional individu-
als being those not afflicted?
Moreover, anatomical and physiological differences between men and women are a prob-
lematic basis on which to permit the disparate treatment of the sexes because it is very
easy to confuse biology with its social consequences. See, for example, Michael M. v Supe-
rior Court of Sonoma County, 450 US 464, 473 (1981) (upholding statutory rape law under
which adult men were criminally liable for having sex with minor women but did not
similarly punish adult women for having sex with minor men because "virtually all of the
significant harmful and inescapably identifiable consequences of teenage pregnancy fall
on the young female.").
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only women can become pregnant (or that only men can impreg-
nate) would only be the beginning of a discussion about how the
law should fairly respond to that circumstance.227 As Lucinda
Finley has argued, "Only basic political and moral judgments
about ultimate social aims can suggest a basis for choosing
[which] among possible similarities and dissimilarities [are rele-
vant].""z An asymmetrical anti-subordination principle neither
assumes that men and women are inherently different, nor does
it assume that differences between the average man and the av-
erage woman are socially constructed. From an asymmetrical
anti-subordination perspective, inquiry into the source of statisti-
cal differences between men and women is both misguided and
irrelevant.229
Rather, an asymmetrical inquiry focuses on the meaning of
the challenged rule in social and historical context, and perhaps
the political and economic impact that the rule has had on
women. As Catharine MacKinnon might say, the Court's use of
asymmetrical language in Virginia changed the paradigm for
anti-subordination from a difference approach to a dominance
approach:
If [sex] were merely a question of difference, sex inequality
would be a problem of mere sexism, of mistaken differen-
tiation, of inaccurate categorization of individuals. This is
what the difference approach thinks it is and is therefore
sensitive to. But if [sex] is an inequality first, constructed
as a socially relevant differentiation in order to keep that
See, for example, Note, Employment Equality under the Pregnancy Discrimination
Act of 1978, 94 Yale L J 929, 930 (1985) (describing "the fundamental issue for equality
analysis [as being] [blow, as a sex-specific capacity, is women's reproductive role system-
atically devalued?"); Samuel Issacharoff and Elyse Rosenblum, Women and the Workplace:
Accommodating the Demands of Pregnancy, 94 Colum L Rev 2154, 2156 (1994) (focusing
on the "consequences of pregnancy for the achievement of women's equal opportunity in
the work force").
Lucinda M. Finley, Transcending Equality Theory: A Way out of the Maternity and
the Workplace Debate, 86 Colum L Rev 1118, 1150 (1986).
See MacKinnon, Sexual Harassment of Working Women at 121 (cited in note 226)
("the fundamental assumption of the [dominance] approach.., is that the social meaning
given to the gender difference has little or no biological foundation, nor is biology itself
even particularly relevant"); Sunstein, 110 Harv L Rev at 76-77 (cited in note 7) (Virginia
.suggests that the problem of [sex] inequality is a problem of second-class citizenship, in
which the state uses women's differences from men as a justification for prescribing gen-
der roles in a way that deprives women of equal opportunity. Significantly, this conception
of [sex] equality avoids a claim that women are not biologically or socially different from
men. It also avoids a claim that those differences justify unequal treatment.") (citation
omitted).
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inequality in place, then sex inequality questions are
questions of systematic dominance, of male supremacy.23 °
Thus, understanding the Court's use of asymmetrical language in
Virginia to mean either that the use of sex-based classifications is
inherently subordinating, or that only all-male public schools are
problematic, is incorrect."1 Rather, the best interpretation of the
Court's new formulation of the anti-subordination principle is
that it signals a change in focus - away from a search for differ-
ences between the sexes that could justify the provision of sex-
specific education, and toward an effort to determine whether a
particular single-sex public school works to maintain or to dis-
mantle the traditional hierarchy of sex.
IV. ASYMMETRICAL ANTI-SUBORDINATION
AND K-12 SINGLE-SEX PUBLIC EDUCATION
Whether privileging equality interests over liberty interests
is the best approach to evaluating sex discrimination claims in
general, an interpretation of the Equal Protection Clause that
includes an asymmetrical anti-subordination test is the most ap-
propriate way to evaluate the constitutionality of K-12 single-sex
public schools." 2 The liberty interests of K-12 students are less
worthy of consideration than the liberty interests of adults be-
cause the expressed preferences of children and adolescents are
even less likely to be reliable than are those of adults. In addi-
tion, the equality interests of children and adolescents are
stronger than those of adults. As young people tend to be more
impressionable than adults, pedagogy intended to increase sex
equality is more likely to have a significant impact on their lives.
Finally, the interpretation of the anti-subordination test proposed
' Catharine A. MacKinnon, Feminism Unmodified 42 (Harvard 1987). See also
MacKinnon, Sexual Harassment of Working Women at 127 (cited in note 226) ("If the
problem of discrimination is arbitrariness, its target is inadvertence, ignorance, caprice, or
at most intentional invidiousness. If the problem is inequality, the target is determinate
acts, however unconscious, which preserve the control, access to resources, and privilege of
one group at the expense of another.").
' See text accompanying notes 140-49.
How the anti-subordination principle is defined will be, perhaps, even more impor-
tant in the context of evaluating the constitutionality of K-12 single-sex public schools
than in evaluating single-sex undergraduate and graduate institutions, because the fit
requirement of intermediate scrutiny may not be as exacting in the former context. In
considering the constitutionality of K-12 single-sex education, at least one court has cited
the "the special emotional problems of the adolescent years" as a reason that the law
should be more receptive to "innovation in methods and techniques" intended to achieve
the highest possible educational outcomes. See Vorchheimer v School District of Philadel-
phia, 532 F2d 880, 887-88 (3d Cir 1976).
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in this article enables our public education system to best serve
its proper democracy-enhancing function.
A. It is Inappropriate to Privilege the Liberty Interests of K-12
Students over Their Equality Interests
In order to justify the privileging of liberty interests over
equality interests, one must believe in the integrity of individual
preferences." As discussed in Part III, this belief assumes that
the individuals in question are autonomous beings capable of
making choices "with a full and vivid awareness of available op-
portunities, with relevant information, and without illegitimate
or excessive constraints on the process of preference formation.'
That assumption simply does not hold true for most children or
adolescents. While children may have strong personalities and
opinions - even before they are old enough to be verbal - they
are not small adults. And for the most part, adolescents are less
well-informed and more impressionable than adults. Moreover,
K-12 students are more likely than adults to be engaged in an
active process of learning and self-discovery.23 Accordingly, chil-
dren and adolescents are less likely to understand the range of
options available to them, or to have sufficient self-knowledge to
make informed choices among those options. Although one's ca-
pacity for rational thought and autonomous self-direction ripens
through childhood and adolescence, it properly remains suspect
until adulthood.2"e
Because children and adolescents cannot "make critical deci-
sions in an informed mature manner," the Supreme Court has
recognized that their lesser capacities justify lesser constitutional
freedoms.237 Indeed, in some cases the Court has gone too far in
this respect. For example, in Ohio v Akron Center for Reproduc-
tive Health,2"8 the Court upheld a state law requiring girls under
the age of eighteen either to notify one of their parents or to ob-
tain court approval at least twenty-four hours prior to having an
See notes 215-22 and accompanying text.
Sunstein, 92 Mich L Rev at 2420 (cited in note 184).
Erik Erikson, Identity, Youth and Crisis 122-28 (Norton 1968).
Of course, chronological age is not always the best measure of the ability for ra-
tional thought or autonomous choice. See Hillary Rodham, Children Under the Law, 43
Harv Ed Rev 487, 507-09 (1973) (arguing that minority status for children should be
abolished, or that the presumption of children's incompetence should be a rebuttable one);
John Holt, Escape from Childhood 18 (Holt 1974) (same).
' Bellotti v Baird, 443 US 622, 634 (1979) (striking down Massachusetts statute
regulating the access of minors to abortions).
m 497 US 502 (1990).
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abortion - even though the state did not impose similar restric-
tions on the free choice of adult women.2"" In that case, the Su-
preme Court incorrectly sanctioned the state's misguided effort to
encourage better parent-child communication in the face of evi-
dence that the law substantially compromised the liberty and
equality interests of the minor women on behalf of whom the
state claimed to be acting.2" However, the Court correctly recog-
nized that the liberty interests of children and adolescents do not
warrant the same level of consideration accorded to those of
adults.
As minors' capacity for autonomous choice is more suspect
than adults', the impact that single-sex public schools have on
their liberty interests is less significant than the impact that sin-
gle-sex admissions have on the liberty interests of adults. Intui-
tively it seems more problematic to exclude an adult man from an
all-women's engineering program for which he is qualified, than
to exclude an adolescent boy from an all-girls' science class. This
intuition is correct because it would be more arbitrary to exclude
the man than it would be to exclude the boy - the man's prefer-
ences are more likely to be informed by a wealth of self-
knowledge and an understanding of his future options, and his
qualifications are more likely to be the result of considerable per-
sonal investment than are the boy's. Therefore, the boy's liberty
interests are less worthy of consideration.
In addition, as liberty interests are frequently less robust in
educational settings, it would be particularly inappropriate to
privilege the liberty interests of K-12 students over their equality
interests. Indeed, the constitutional rights of adults are also less
substantial in K-12 public schools. 1 Accordingly, in recent cases
Id at 506-07.
Minors' liberty interests were impaired by the legislation, which the dissenting
Justices described as requiring a minor woman to "'conquer a multi-faceted obstacle
course' before she is able to exercise her constitutional right to an abortion." Akron Center,
497 US at 527 (Blackmun dissenting) (citation omitted). In addition, the legislation com-
promised minors' equality interests because minor women who must notify their parents
of their desire for an abortion are less likely to seek abortions; and "[wihen the state de-
nies women access to abortion, both nature and the state impose upon women burdens of
unwanted pregnancy that men do not bear." See Law, 132 U Pa L Rev at 1016 (cited in
note 212) (citation omitted).
", See, for example, Knox County Education Assn v Knox County Board of Education,
158 F3d 361, 384 (6th Cir 1998) (upholding the suspicionless drug testing of teachers
noting that "teachers are not just role models, but mentors, friends, and in some cases,
parent-figures that stand in the place of absent parents. Teachers leave indelible impres-
sions on the minds of their young students, because they are entrusted with the safe
keeping and education of children during their most impressionable and formative years.
Therefore, teachers must expect that with this extraordinary responsibility, they will be
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involving students' free speech rights,242 free press rights,243 free
inquiry rights,' due process rights, 5 and the right to be free
from unreasonable searches and seizures,2 48 the Supreme Court
has recognized that the liberty interests of students can be
trumped by a state's desire to achieve legitimate pedagogical ob-
jectives.247 The Court correctly distinguished between liberty in-
terests in educational and non-educational settings, and weighed
the former less heavily. Schools - particularly at the K-12 level
- must teach selected viewpoints and values in order to enhance
the critical thinking and rational deliberation skills that students
need to become effective and productive citizens.2 4' Accordingly,
in that context, courts should give student liberty interests less
weight.
subject to scrutiny to which other civil servants or professionals might not be subjected,
including drug testing."); Ambach v Norwick, 441 US 68, 81 (1979) (upholding New York
statute forbidding resident aliens from teaching in K-12 public schools under the lowest
level of Equal Protection scrutiny).
'2 See Bethel School District No 403 v Fraser, 478 US 675, 683 (1986) (holding that
"schools, as instruments of the state, may determine that the essential lessons of civil,
mature conduct cannot be conveyed in a school that tolerates lewd, indecent, or offensive
speech and conduct").
See Hazelwood School District v Kuhlmeier, 484 US 260, 273 (1988) (holding that
"educators do not offend the First Amendment by exercising editorial control over the style
and content of student speech in school-sponsored expressive activities so long as their
actions are reasonably related to legitimate pedagogical concerns").
'" See Board of Education of Island Trees v Pico, 457 US 853 (1982) (the First
Amendment prohibits school boards from removing books from public school libraries
based upon disagreement with constitutionally protected ideas in those books, but permits
school boards to remove library books if they are motivated by educational concerns).
See Ingraham v Wright, 430 US 651 (1977) (the Due Process clause does not re-
quire notice and hearing prior to imposition of corporal punishment on K-12 students).
' See New Jersey v T.L.O., 469 US 325, 341 (1985) (upholding the legality of
searches and seizures in public schools "based on suspicions that, although 'reasonable,' do
not rise to the level of probable cause" under the Fourth Amendment); Veronia School
District 47J v Acton, 515 US 646 :1995) (upholding suspicionless drug testing of student
athletes under the Fourth Amendment).
" But see Tinker v Des Moines Independent Community School District, 393 US 503,
514 (1969) (rule prohibiting students from wearing black arm bands to protest the Viet-
nam war violates the First and Fourteenth Amendments absent a showing that the rule is
necessary to avoid interference with school discipline); Goss v Lopez, 419 US 565, 576, 581
(1975) (due process requires that students suspended from school be notified of charges
against them and given an opportunity to respond).
See Amy Gutmann, Democratic Education 91 (Princeton 1987) ("The purposes of
primary education - even the democratic purposes - are not exhausted by the successful
cultivation of the participatory virtues. The disciplinary virtues - the imparting of
knowledge and instilling of emotional along with intellectual discipline - are also among
the purposes of democratic education, and apparently they are not always most effectively
taught by the most democratic methods, especially among those students least committed
to learning."). Compare Richard L. Roe, Valuing Student Speech: The Work of the Schools
as Conceptual Development, 79 Cal L Rev 1269, 1324 (1991) ("[S]tudent speech that di-
minishes the effectiveness of the school's curricular message can still fall short of inter-
fering or being inconsistent with the school's curriculum.").
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Moreover, the current crop of single-sex public schools poses
less of a threat to the liberty interests of students than the older
single-sex schools. In this generation, a handful of voluntary sin-
gle-sex programs and institutions have been added to a mix com-
posed overwhelmingly of co-educational offerings.249 As a result,
every student has the opportunity to engage in every area of
study in a co-educational setting - and either boys or girls can
choose to study some of those subjects in single-sex settings.
Therefore, the adolescent boy who wanted to enroll in the all-girls
science class in the last example could study the same science
curriculum, in the same school district, in a class with both boys
and girls. In comparison, given the intentionally sex-specific edu-
cation of some of the schools in the old regime,5 ° it was less likely
that someone excluded from a single-sex educational opportunity
would have access to the subject matter taught at that school
without much personal inconvenience. 1 Thus, from the perspec-
tive of student liberty interests, the new generation of single-sex
schools considerably improves upon the older generation.
Of course, in most cases parents make educational choices for
their children. Thus, parents' liberty interests are most signifi-
cantly affected when children are denied the opportunity to at-
tend single-sex public schools designed exclusively for the other
sex. That fact, however, should not affect the relative weight
given to liberty and equality interests when evaluating the con-
stitutionality of K-12 single-sex public schools.
Recognizing that "[c]hild-rearing is one of the ways in which
many people fulfill and express their deepest values about how
life is to be lived,"252 the Supreme Court has acknowledged a pa-
rental liberty interest in directing the education of children.253
Accordingly, in Wisconsin v Yoder, " the Court struck down a
compulsory school attendance law on the grounds that it violated
the rights of Amish parents to raise their children in their relig-
, See notes 33-43 and accompanying text.
See notes 44-53 and accompanying text.
' See note 68 and accompanying text.
22 David A. J. Richards, The Individual, the Family, and the Constitution: A Juris-
prudential Perspective, 55 NYU L Rev 1, 28 (1980).
See Meyer v Nebraska, 262 US 390, 400 (1923) (state law forbidding the teaching of
any language other than English to children infringes upon the right of parents to instruct
their children); Pierce v Society of Sisters, 268 US 510, 534 (1925) (state law requiring all
children to attend public school violates the right of parents to direct the education of their
children); Farrington v Tokushige, 273 US 284 (1927) (state law regulating the operation
of foreign language schools violates the right of parents to direct the upbringing of their
children).
2" 406 US 205 (1972).
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ion." Yoder is, however, the high water mark of parental rights
cases. Many similar cases have been resolved less favorably to
parents,56 and because Yoder rests upon the Free Exercise
Clause, its logic does not support the assertion that the child-
rearing interests of parents who are not motivated by religious
beliefs are equally weighty.257
Since Yoder was decided, courts have declined to take the
position that the parental right to direct the education of children
is absolute or fundamental,258 but instead have balanced that
right against the interests of the state (and, sometimes, the
rights of children).259 Courts have consistently upheld the
authority of states to impose conditions on the education of chil-
dren - even in cases where the state's interests came into con-
flict with the rights of religious parents.26 ° Indeed, the interests of
Id at 214 ("[A] State's interest in universal education, however highly we rank it, is
not totally free from a balancing process when it impinges on fundamental rights and
interests [of parents].").
See, for example, Hatch v Goerke, 502 F2d 1189, 1192 (10th Cir 1974) (stating that
"school regulations of the length of a male student's hair do not 'directly and sharply im-
plicate basic constitutional values' and are not cognizable in federal court" although they
conflict with the religious, cultural, and moral values of Native American children and
their parents) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted); Duro v North Carolina,
712 F2d 96, 97 (4th Cir 1983) (Pentecostal parent not exempt from compulsory school
attendance laws although he believed that "exposing his children to others who do not
share his religious beliefs would corrupt them"); Fellowship Baptist Church v Benton, 815
F2d 485, 489 (8th Cir 1987) (declining to apply "the Amish exemption" to Baptist parents
who objected to compulsory school attendance laws).
' See Michigan v Bennett, 501 NW2d 106, 115 (Mich 1993) (distinguishing Yoder as
turning on the Free Exercise rights of parents and noting that "neither this Court nor any
other court has held that parents have a fundamental right to direct their children's edu-
cation under all circumstances").
See Socoma v Chicago Board of Education, 391 F Supp 452, 461 (N D l1 1974)
("Plaintiffs have established no fundamental right which has been abridged by the com-
pulsory attendance statute.") (citation omitted); Murphy v Arkansas, 852 F2d 1039, 1043
(8th Cir 1988) (stating that there is no "fundamental right of parents to supervise their
children's education"); Null v Board of Education of County of Jackson, 815 F Supp 937,
939 (S D W Va 1993) (finding that "parents' liberty interest is subject to reasonable state
regulation").
' See Duro, 712 F2d at 99 n 3 ("[Olur chief consideration must be the welfare of the
Duro children. When we examine their well-being, along with their state constitutional
right to an education, we conclude that the children's right to an education that will pre-
pare them for their future is paramount."). See also Yoder, 406 US at 245 (Douglas dis-
senting) (noting that "[i]t is the future of the student, not the future of the parents, that is
imperiled by today's decision").
' See Blackwelder v Safnauer, 689 F Supp 106, 128 (N D NY 1988) (state law gov-
erning the setting of minimum standards for home schooling does not violate free exercise
rights of Christian parents for whom "allowing their children to attend public schools,
where 'religiously integrated' studies are prohibited, would violate [their] fundamental
religious tenets"); State v Riddle, 285 SE2d 359, 367 (W Va 1981) ("Biblical Christian"
parents cannot violate compulsory school attendance laws and thereby "keep their chil-
dren in medieval ignorance, quarter them in Dickensian squalor beyond the reach of the
ameliorating influence of the social welfare agencies, and so to separate their children
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the state in K-12 public education are sufficiently strong that
even the Yoder Court was forced to acknowledge them: "There is
no doubt as to the power of a State, having a high responsibility
for education of its citizens, to impose reasonable regulations for
the control and duration of basic education."261 Thus, as parental
liberty interests in the context of single-sex public education are
not significantly stronger than those of their children - and
would be in conflict with the state's right to regulate education -
those interests should also be secondary to student equality in-
terests.
B. It is Necessary to Privilege the Equality Interests of K-12
Students
The same justifications for according the liberty interests of
K-12 students less consideration than those of adults also support
the argument that the equality interests of K-12 students should
have more protection than those of adults. During childhood and
adolescence, when individuals grow into and choose the self-
images that will guide their subsequent life experiences, their
personal preferences and understanding of their relative posi-
tions in society are most significantly constructed.2"2 If the goal of
from organized society in an environment of indoctrination and deprivation that the chil-
dren become mindless automatons incapable of coping with life outside of their own fami-
lies.").
Compare James G. Dwyer, Parents'Religion and Children's Welfare: Debunking the
Doctrine of Parents' Rights, 82 Cal L Rev 1371 (1994) (arguing that the law should not
recognize a parental right to control the upbringing of children), with Stephen G. Gilles,
On Educating Children: A Parentalist Manifesto, 63 U Chi L Rev 937 (1996) (arguing that
parental educational rights deserve constitutional protection).
" Yoder, 406 US at 213. Significantly, that opinion did not repudiate Prince v Massa-
chusetts, 321 US 158 (1944), in which the Court held that a legal guardian's interest in
having her child distribute religious literature could be trumped by the state's interest in
protecting children from exploitation in the labor market.
= See Erikson, Identity, Youth and Crisis at 159-63 (cited in note 235).
"[A]dolescence is an especially critical time in women's development because it poses a
problem of connection that is not easily resolved ... to connect her life with history on a
cultural scale, [a young woman] must enter - and by entering disrupt - a tradition in
which 'human' has for the most part meant male." Carol Gilligan, Prologue, in Carol Gilli-
gan, Nona P. Lyons, and Trudy J. Hanmer, eds, Making Connections 4 (Harvard 1989).
Confronted with the values of an androcentric society that has traditionally been "am-
bivalent toward female achievement, proficiency, independence, and right to a full equal
life," adolescent girls tend to lose self-confidence, to undervalue their abilities, and to be
inhibited in their efforts to excel academically. Orenstein, SchoolGirls at xix (cited in note
34). See also, Carol Gilligan, Teaching Shakespeare's Sister: Notes from the Underground
of Female Adolescence, in Gilligan, Lyons, and Hanmer, eds, Making Connections at 10
(cited in this note) (concluding from the results of the Dodge study that "[a]dolescence
seems a watershed in female development, a time when girls are in danger of drowning or
disappearing").
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promoting sex equality - or at least of not perpetuating sex ine-
quality - is an important one, then the period of preference for-
mation that occurs during childhood and adolescence is crucial.
During that time, when interests and abilities are most malle-
able, it is particularly important to privilege the equality inter-
ests of students.
The most fundamental task of childhood is identity forma-
tion.26 This process of self-construction is not simply the result of
the maturation of in-born tendencies. Rather:
[I]dentity formation employs a process of simultaneous re-
flection and observation, a process taking place on all lev-
els of mental functioning, by which the individual judges
himself in the light of what he perceives to be the way in
which others judge him in comparison to themselves and
to a typology significant to them; while he judges their
way of judging him in the light of how he perceives himself
in comparison to them and to types that have become rele-
vant to him.2"
This process is affected by the actions and judgments of adult and
peer role models and by a child's historical and cultural context.
Gender identity is similarly affected by role models and con-
text: "[a]s children begin life surrounded by exemplars of both
sexes and subjected to the contingencies operating in this sex-
typed world, it would be strange indeed if [their] behaviors were
not affected by environmental events."285 By creating an environ-
ment in which all of a student's peers are of the same sex and in
which a range of gender identities and roles are filled by students
of that sex, single-sex schools can enable students to challenge
the societal traditions that constrain each sex to particular gen-
der identities and roles. Voluntary single-sex public schools and
programs that are educationally beneficial, allow alternatives to
traditional gender identities and roles, and do not harm women's
economic or political status, can help start children on the path
Erikson, Identity, Youth and Crisis at 211 (cited in note 235) ("Identity ... has a
claim to recognition as the adolescent ego's most important accomplishment").
Id at 22-23.
Beverly I. Fagot, Mary D. Leinbach, and Richard Hagan, Gender Labeling and the
Adoption of Sex-Typed Behaviors, 22 Developmental Psych 440, 443 (1986). See also Gut-
mann, Democratic Education at 113-14 (cited in note 248) (describing how the authority
structure of most K-12 schools, in which most of the teachers are women and most of the
administrators and principals are men, "serves as an additional lesson in the nature of
'normal' gender relations. Girls learn that it is normal for them to rule children, but ab-
normal for them to rule men. Boys learn the opposite lesson.").
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toward lives less encumbered by the history of women's oppres-
sion.
C. Equality and Democratic Education
Finally, privileging the equality interests of K-12 students
over their liberty interests best allows the public education sys-
tem to further democracy. Because public schools can shape the
self-images, preferences, and abilities of future generations, they
are uniquely suited to break the traditions and to reorder the hi-
erarchies of the past. As long as that potential is harnessed to
enhance the equality of the citizenry - as do single-sex public
schools which are voluntary, educationally beneficial, allow al-
ternatives to traditional gender identities and roles, and do not
harm women's economic or political status - those schools will
promote democratic self-government.
Although no state had institutionalized a system of free pub-
lic education at the time the United States Constitution was rati-
fied,2"' the Framers perceived a strong connection between educa-
tion and the maintenance of a democratic society." 7 Thomas Jef-
ferson is often quoted as having said that "[i]f a nation expects to
"In not a single state did such a public school [supported by state taxes] exist. One
can scarcely generalize from the educational practices of the period that education was an
affair of government at all.... Outside of New England, where education was largely a
local function, elementary and secondary education was left to private initiative, or to
church or charity schools. The states contributed nothing toward the maintenance of edu-
cation." Frank Bourgin, The Great Challenge: The Myth of Laissez-Faire in the Early Re-
public 132-33 (George Braziller 1989) (citation omitted).
' Thus, the Constitution's silence on the subject of education was not due to the
Framers' failure to appreciate the importance of an educated citizenry to the preservation
of the nation. Rather, that omission is akin to their failure to provide for a national air
force - it is excusable because neither the modern system of public schools nor the air-
plane had been invented at the time. However, because it is not specifically mentioned in
the document, the Supreme Court has declined to interpret the Constitution as embodying
a right to education. See San Antonio Independent School District v Rodriguez, 411 US 1,
35 (1973) ("Education, of course, is not among the rights afforded explicit protection under
our Federal Constitution."). But see Certain Named and Unnamed Non-Citizen Children
and their Parents v Texas, 448 US 1327, 1332 (1980) (describing Rodriguez as reserving
the question of whether "there is a constitutional right to a minimal level of free public
education"); Papasan v Allain, 478 US 265, 284 (1986) (same).
The arguments of scholars who have sought to identify a federal constitutional
right to education have, to date, fallen on deaf ears. See Frank I. Michelman, Foreword:
On Protecting the Poor Through the Fourteenth Amendment, 83 Harv L Rev 7, 50 (1969);
Betsy Levin, The Courts, Congress and Educational Adequacy: The Equal Protection Pre-
dicament, 39 Md L Rev 187, 253-63 (1979); Penelope A. Preovolos, Rodriguez Revisited:
Federalism, Meaningful Access and the Right to Adequate Education, 20 Santa Clara L
Rev 75, 120 (1980); Denise C. Morgan, What's Left to Argue in Desegregation Law?: The
Right to Minimally Adequate Education, 8 Harv BlackLetter J 99, 124-26 (1991); Susan
Bitensky, Theoretical Foundations for a Right to Education under the U.S. Constitution,
86 Nw U L Rev 550, 579-626 (1992).
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be ignorant and free, in a state of civilization... it expects what
never was and never will be." In addition, at least one of the
Framers understood that the education of women would also fur-
ther democracy. Dr. Benjamin Rush wrote:
[Women] should not only be instructed in the usual
branches of female education, but they should be taught
the principles of liberty and government; and the obliga-
tions of patriotism should be inculcated upon them. The
opinions and conduct of men are often regulated by the
women in the most arduous enterprizes [sic] of life; and
their approbation is frequently the principle reward of the
hero's dangers, and the patriot's toils. Besides, the first
impressions upon the minds of children are generally de-
rived from the women. Of how much consequence, there-
fore, is it in a republic, that they should think justly upon
the great subject of liberty and government.2"9
These men regarded education principally as a tool to train the
citizenry to participate responsibly and effectively in the political
process.
Despite the founding generation's appreciation of the impor-
tance of education, the movement for common schools funded out
of public monies and controlled by public authorities did not be-
gin until the 1820s.2 7 ° That movement gained momentum in the
Northern states about ten years later,27' but did not catch on in
the Southern states until near the end of the Civil War.272 Educa-
tional theorists like Horace Mann, who advocated the creation of
a system of common schools supported by public funds and at-
tended by children of all religions, classes, and ethnic back-
grounds, led the expansion of public schooling.273 Mann believed
that such schools "beyond all other devices of human origin,
[would be] the great equalizer[s] of the conditions of men - the
Gordon C. Lee, ed, Crusade Against Ignorance: Thomas Jefferson on Education 18-
19 (Chambria 1961) (citation omitted).
Edgar W. Knight and Clifton L. Hall, eds, Readings in American Educational His-
tory 706 (Greenwood Publishing 1951).
20 See Stephen Goldstein, Law and Public Education 8 (Bobbs-Merrill 1974).
271 See Brown v Board of Education of Topeka, 347 US 483, 489 n 4 (1954).
See Lawrence Cremin, American Education: The Metropolitan Experience 214
(Harper & Row 1988) ("[It was during Reconstruction that the common school system was
finally extended to the South.").
273 See Lawrence Cremin, The Genius of American Education 61 (Random House
1965).
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balance wheel of the social machinery."27 4 In Mann's eyes, the so-
cial functions that public education served, knitting society to-
gether and reducing inequality among the citizenry, were its most
important duties.275
The link between education, equality, and democracy has
only strengthened over time. During Reconstruction, there was
an explicit appeal to education as the principle means by which
recently emancipated African-Americans could secure inclusion
in the United States polity.276 Indeed, "schooling [was viewed] as
the foundation of a new egalitarian social order."277 And by the
beginning of the twentieth century, John Dewey was able to pro-
claim that "[t]he devotion of democracy to education is a familiar
fact."27 ' He, like Mann before him, contended that the relation-
ship between democracy and education was not simply that edu-
cation was necessary to exercise the right to vote responsibly, but
that education could promote the equality of the citizenry. In-
deed, Dewey warned that "a society to which stratification into
separate classes would be fatal, must see to it that intellectual
opportunities are accessible to all on equable and easy terms."279
Inequality corrodes democracy by systematically loading the
game board to favor certain players; equal education has the po-
tential to help players compete on a more level field. Nearly
thirty years later, the Supreme Court echoed Dewey's warning in
what is, perhaps, its most famous statement about education:
Today, education is perhaps the most important function
of state and local governments. Compulsory school atten-
dance laws and the great expenditures for education both
demonstrate our recognition of the importance of educa-
tion to our democratic society. It is required in the per-
formance of our most basic public responsibilities, even
service in the armed forces. It is the very foundation of
good citizenship. Today it is a principal instrument in
" Lawrence Cremin, ed, The Republic and the School: Horace Mann on the Education
of Free Men 87 (Teachers College 1957).
' Id ("The spread of education, by enlarging the cultivated class or caste, will open a
wider area over which the social feelings will expand; and, if this education should be
universal and complete, it would do more than all things else to obliterate factitious dis-
tinctions in society.").
' James Anderson, The Education of Blacks in the South, 1860-1935 4-32 (Chapel
Hill 1988) (describing the influence of formerly enslaved African-Americans on the devel-
opment of public education in the South).
Foner, Reconstruction at 365-66 (cited in note 197).
"' Dewey, Democracy and Education at 101 (cited in note 69).
Id at 101-102.
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awakening the child to cultural values, in preparing him
for later professional training, and in helping him to ad-
just normally to his environment. In these days, it is
doubtful that any child may reasonably be expected to
succeed in life if he is denied the opportunity of an educa-
tion. Such an opportunity, where the state has undertaken
to provide it, is a right which must be made available to
all on equal terms.2"'
Ideally, public schools should provide the intergenerational mo-
bility that is essential to prevent democratic society from ossify-
ing into a hierarchical caste system marked by differences passed
from generation to generation."1
That ideal public school system would enhance the equality
of the citizenry by making the economic, social, and political cir-
cumstances of one generation less dependant on the circum-
stances of the generations that preceded it. Because public
schools are free and therefore available to students regardless of
their economic background, in those schools all citizens should be
able to develop the qualifications necessary to succeed in a com-
petitive job market. Because the student bodies of public schools
are most often composed of children of different racial, religious,
cultural, and class backgrounds, those schools should be able to
loosen the grip of parochialism and prejudice. Public schools pro-
vide a civic space that does not exist elsewhere in our society, and
the conflict and cooperation inherent in setting an agenda for
those schools should encourage a sense of democratic
community.282 Finally, the commitment of public education to ad-
vancing political equality is reflected in the fact that we have not
left the task of socializing future generations of United States
citizens solely to the discretion of individual families, but instead
have placed it under our common control. As a result, in the pub-
lic schools, all students should be able to attain the skills neces-
sary to communicate their political positions and to learn to par-
ticipate effectively in the political process irrespective of the
amount of political capital possessed by the families. To do oth-
erwise would be to run the risk that some people would be inca-
0 Brown v Board of Education, 347 US 483, 493 (1954).
- See generally Denise C. Morgan, The Less Polite Questions: Race, Poverty, and
Public Education, Ann Surv Am L (forthcoming 1998).
2 See Gutmann, Democratic Education at 5 (cited in note 248) ("In a democracy,
political disagreement is not something that we should generally seek to avoid. Political
controversies over our educational problems are a particularly important source of social
progress because they have the potential for educating so many citizens.").
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pable of providing adequate educational opportunities for their
children, and that others would be more interested in preserving
and passing down familial power and cultural traditions at the
expense of the larger project of producing a democratic citizenry.
That result would be inconsistent with the egalitarian promise of
free public education.
Of course, the public school system in the United States has
never lived up to this ideal. The goal of enhancing the equality of
the citizenry has long coexisted with the goal of educating some
children - particularly girls and all children of color - for sec-
ond class citizenship or for exclusion from the body politic.' In-
deed, some educational theorists have argued that:
[T]he educational system does not add to or subtract from
the overall degree of inequality and repressive personal
development.... Schools foster legitimate inequality
through the ostensibly meritocratic manner by which they
reward and promote students, and allocate them to dis-
tinct positions in the occupational hierarchy. They create
and reinforce patterns of social class, racial and sexual
identification among students which allow them to relate
"properly" to their eventual standing in the hierarchy of
authority and status in the production process."
The public school system, these theorists claim, has traditionally
worked to validate and perpetuate hierarchies of power.
The actual ability of the public school system to alter tradi-
tional allocations of power probably lies somewhere between the
naively optimistic and grudgingly cynical extremes represented
by different educational theorists. While it is true that an idealis-
tic vision of our public education system cannot explain the stub-
born persistence of economic and political subordination among
women and all people of color from generation to generation, 285
the more cynical view fails to acknowledge the role public educa-
tion has played in bringing about greater equality.26 However,
See generally Sadker and Sadker, Failing at Fairness (cited in note 34); Anderson,
The Education of Blacks in the South at 2 (cited in note 276) (discussing how the educa-
tion available to Blacks in the South between 1860 and 1935 was "part and parcel of the
larger political subordination of blacks").
See Samuel Bowles and Herbert Gintis, Schooling in Capitalist America 11
(Harper Collins 1976).
See note 215 and accompanying text.
See L. Scott Miller, An American Imperative: Accelerating Minority Educational
Advancement 11 (Yale 1995) (stating that "there appears to be a strong link between edu-
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interpreting the Equal Protection Clause to permit those K-12
single-sex public schools that are voluntary, educationally benefi-
cial, allow alternatives to traditional gender identities and roles,
and do not harm women's economic or political status, is most
consistent with strengthening the ability of public education to
serve its democracy enhancing function. By encouraging sex soli-
darity and thereby weakening the link between the social, politi-
cal and economic circumstances of one generation and that of the
next, such schools both promote the equality of the citizenry and
strengthen democracy.
V. APPLICATIONS
Distinguishing those single-sex schools that dismantle the
hierarchy of sex from those that reinforce it is a complex task.
Accordingly, this Article's explication of the demands of the Equal
Protection Clause is more properly directed toward local educa-
tors and state legislators than to courts. Not only are those offi-
cials more knowledgeable about current trends in educational
policy, but they also have more and better resources at their dis-
posal to assess the pedagogical advantages and disadvantages of
particular choices. However, when a decision to establish a sin-
gle-sex school is challenged as having no valid educational pur-
pose, judges should not shy away from their duty to resolve the
dispute. It is precisely when constitutional rights are "'directly
and sharply implicated'" by educational policy that judicial inter-
vention is necessary to protect student interests. 27
The first consideration in distinguishing constitutionally
permissible single-sex education from constitutionally impermis-
sible single-sex education is whether the use of a single-sex peda-
gogy satisfies an educational need - the question of fit.' In or-
der to prove that a school satisfies this first concern, its defenders
should have to produce evidence of a sex-based disparity in edu-
cational needs, and to show that a single-sex pedagogy could re-
spond to those educational needs. Nevertheless, as long as a
genuine academic concern motivates the use of a single-sex ap-
proach, and not caprice, despair, or a desire for a larger number
of schools of any nature, courts should not second guess profes-
cational performance and the capacity of minority groups to climb all rungs of the
intergenerational advancement ladder").
Hazelwood, 484 US 260, 273 (1988).
See notes 95-99 and accompanying text.
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sional judgments about educational policy.289 Although propo-
nents must make an evidentiary showing on this point, the em-
phasis of the constitutional test should not be on the question of
fit, as some commentators have interpreted Virginia to imply.290
The second consideration in distinguishing constitutionally
permissible single-sex education from constitutionally impermis-
sible single-sex education is whether the single-sex pedagogy
subordinates women - the asymmetrical anti-subordination
question.291 In addition to confirming that the justification prof-
fered for the single-sex school is, in fact, the one that motivated
its establishment,292 defenders of a single-sex school must show
that the school does not serve to perpetuate traditional gender
identities or roles,293 and that it does not worsen women's political
or economic standing compared to men.294 Courts should consider
school officials' intent in selecting the single-sex pedagogy, as
well as the effects of the chosen approach, in order to distinguish
between single-sex schools that redress subordination and those
that subordinate. 95
Under the framework proposed in this Article, empirical evi-
dence of differences between men and women could be used to
justify the use of a single-sex pedagogy only when that educa-
tional approach worked to redress those inequities between the
sexes. For example, in response to empirical evidence confirming
that men are currently better at engineering and women are bet-
ter at secretarial skills, it would be permissible to add an all-male
typing class and an all-female engineering program to the cur-
riculum, assuming that sex-segregated classes improved student
performance. That approach would be permissible because nei-
See notes 159-74 and accompanying text.
See notes 116-17 and accompanying text.
See notes 100-13 and accompanying text.
See note 102 and accompanying text.
See notes 100-01 and accompanying text.
See notes 104-13 and accompanying text.
Id. The most obvious case of subordination would be if the facilities in the single-
sex public school were inferior to those in neighboring co-educational public schools. The
most instructive precedent in this regard is the series of cases leading up to Brown v
Board of Education, in particular, Sweatt v Painter, 339 US 629 (1950). The Sweatt Court
examined two types of factors in determining whether a separate law school established
for Black students was the constitutional equivalent of the University of Texas Law
School, which was all-White: tangible and intangible. The tangible factors included the
"number of faculty, variety of courses and opportunity for specialization, size of the stu-
dent body, scope of the library, availability of law review and similar activities," id at 633-
34, and the intangible factors included the "reputation of the faculty, experience of the
administration, position and influence of the alumni, standing in the community, tradi-
tions and prestige." Id at 634.
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ther the class nor the program would reinforce the current distri-
bution of interests and abilities between men and women. If no
men showed up for the all-male typing classes, so be it. If a par-
ticular distribution of interests and abilities between men and
women accurately reflects fixed preferences (or inherent differ-
ences between the sexes), the use of sex-based classifications
cannot change that fact (nor would the classifications be neces-
sary to ensure their permanence). However, a school could not
add an all-female typing class or an all-male engineering pro-
gram to the curriculum - whether or not they improved student
performance. To do so would steer men toward the privileged po-
sition in the sex hierarchy traditionally reserved for masculine
persons - and, thus, it would be fair to say that the intent of the
single-sex program is to subordinate women. It would also be ap-
propriate to look at the effect that steering women toward the
study of typing and men toward the study of engineering had on
the relative economic positions of the sexes. Assuming that engi-
neering was the more lucrative of the two fields, it would be fair
to conclude that the single-sex program also had the effect of per-
petuating women's economic subordination.
A. All-Girls K-12 Public Education
All-girls K-12 public schools are more likely than their all-
male counterparts to survive constitutional scrutiny under this
revised framework. This is so both because all-girls public schools
are more likely to be educationally beneficial than are all-boys
public schools, 296 and also because they are less likely to subordi-
nate women. As the Supreme Court quoted in Virginia:
The all-male college would be relatively easy to defend if it
emerged in a world in which women were established as
fully equal to men. But it does not. It is therefore likely to
be a witting or unwitting device for preserving tacit as-
sumptions of male superiority - assumptions for which
women must eventually pay.2
97
Although it is less likely that all-girl public schools will perpetu-
ate these same tacit assumptions, those schools would still have
to show that they respond to particular educational needs of their
See note 36.
518 US 515, 535 n 8, quoting Christopher Jencks and David Riesman, The Aca-
demic Revolution 297-98 (Doubleday & Co 1968).
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students and that neither their purpose nor their effects are sub-
ordinating to women. Accordingly, an all-girls public school like
the Young Women's Leadership School, the all-girls public school
that opened in East Harlem in 1996, should survive constitu-
tional scrutiny as long as it responds to an educational need, its
students continue to outperform others in the same district, and
it does not steer its students toward traditional gender identities
or roles.
B. All-Boys K-12 Public Education
Under the framework proposed in this article, some all-boys
schools - like the Malcolm X school, an all-boys public school
proposed by the Detroit Board of Education in 1991 - would still
not survive constitutional scrutiny.29 When the legality of that
school was challenged, the Detroit Board of Education "proffered
no evidence that the presence of girls in the classroom [bore] a
substantial relationship to the difficulties facing urban males."'
In fact, the Board's characterization of its pedagogical choice as
an experiment that was necessary because nothing else had been
successful made that choice seem more like an expression of des-
peration than an exercise of professional judgment."° Like the
defenders of MUW and VMI, the Detroit school officials did not
show a sufficiently tight fit between their educational objective
and their choice of pedagogy.
Moreover, even if its proponents could have shown that the
Malcolm X school was pedagogically justified, given the design of
the school it is unlikely that it could have survived an asymmet-
rical anti-subordination inquiry. The school's "Rites of Passage"
curriculum, which was intended to "prepare boys to be men"
through a series of sex-specific lessons - such as "men know the
power of money and a job" and "men understand the political sys-
tem and how to use it for the benefit of the community" - would
have been particularly susceptible to the charge of perpetuating
traditional notions of how boys should be gendered. 01 Even
though the school tempered those lessons by asserting that men
may reject sex stereotypes, because it sought to steer its male
students toward the privileged position in the sex hierarchy that
See note 29.
Garrett v Board of Education of Detroit, 775 F Supp 1004, 1007 (E D Mich 1991)
(emphasis added).
Id at 1008.
See Detroit Board of Education, Academy Grades K-8: A Demonstration Program
for At-Risk Males 31-34 (Dec 1990) (on file with publisher).
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is reserved for people who are traditionally masculine the school
would have violated the anti-subordination principle. 2
However, not every all-boys school would fail under the stan-
dards proposed in this article. For example, if an all-boys school
was created in response to research showing that the teacher-
student dynamics and/or the student-peer dynamics in single-sex
schools helped strengthen the self-images of boys who had few
male (but not necessarily traditionally masculine) role models in
their communities after which to pattern themselves, and there-
fore improved their academic performance, the school could sur-
vive the fit inquiry. And if, in addition, the all-boys school offered
alternatives to traditional masculine behavior and did not nega-
tively impact the life chances of the girls in the community,3 3
then the school could survive the anti-subordination requirement.
One example of a school that might survive that requirement is
an all-boys school for parenting teenagers. K-12 single-sex public
schools that allow either boys or girls to develop non-traditional
gender identities, and thus contribute to the equal valuing of men
and women,'" should survive constitutional scrutiny.
C. Parallel Single-Sex Programs for Boys and Girls
Despite the failure of the parallel program approach in Vir-
ginia,"5 at least one commentator has insisted that symmetry
3W Of course, not all rites of passage programs promote traditional sex roles. For
example, the co-educational programs sponsored by the Indiana Rites of Passage Kollec-
tive aim to "promote the interdependence between self, family, community and the world
along with instilling a sense of confidence and positive self-esteem. Each of these pro-
grams work to build character, promotes self-discipline and the importance of taking re-
sponsibility for one's own actions and choices. Youth will be provided with tools and in-
formation to help develop improved study skills, the ability to plan for one's future, in-
creased practical knowledge of political, economic and social systems that impact their
lives." Indiana Rites of Passage Kollective, What is Rites of Passage (1999) (on file with
publisher).
See Morgan, 14 NY L Sch J Hum Rts at 118 (cited in note 9) ("Rather than pit one
sex against the other we should remember that the boys and the girls in [the school dis-
trict served by the Young Women's Leadership School] are not autonomous self-contained
competing camps - they are brothers and sisters, cousins, friends, next door neighbors -
they are part of the same community.").
' See Case, 105 Yale L J at 7 (cited in note 3) (arguing that "the world will not be
safe for women in frilly pink dresses - they will not, for example, generally be as re-
spected as either men or women in gray flannel suits - unless and until it is made safe
for men in dresses as well').
" In response to the litigation against VMI, the Commonwealth drew up a plan for
the Virginia Women's Institute for Leadership ("VWIL") at Mary Baldwin College, a pri-
vate all-women's liberal arts college. See United States v Virginia, 44 F3d 1229, 1233 (4th
Cir 1995) (reviewing VWIL's history); John F. Harris, Wilder Eyes a VMI For Women;
Funding Proposed For Separate School, Wash Post B01 (Sept 26, 1993) (describing the
plan for VWIL). However, the Supreme Court held that the existence of VWIL did not cure
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will cure any constitutional infirmity in K-12 single-sex public
schools."' In fact, school officials in California established paral-
lel single-sex programs in the hope of avoiding law suits by re-
quiring equivalent provisions for both boys and girls.0 7 The New
York City Board of Education has been encouraged to adopt a
similar approach.0 However, parallel single-sex programs are no
more likely to survive constitutional scrutiny than are each of
their component schools. Single-sex public schools do not have a
"curative" effect on one another - if they have constitutional de-
fects, the only remedies are to integrate the schools, shut them
down, or support them with private funds.
CONCLUSION
W.E.B. DuBois counseled that "voluntary organization for
great ends is far different from compulsory segregation for evil
purposes.""0 9 The only problem is that it can be terribly difficult to
distinguish between the two. This dilemma has become more
pressing in the past few years as the popularity of single-sex
public schools and programs has increased, and the debate over
the educational benefits of such offerings has come to a head.
Rather than resolving the quandary, the Supreme Court's deci-
sion in United States v Virginia left important questions unan-
swered. Does the Constitution require co-education in public
VMI's constitutional defects. Although VMI and VWIL shared essentially the same educa-
tional mission, the methodologies by which they sought to achieve that mission differed
substantially. Consistent with the tradition that military training, particularly VMI's
adversative method, was inappropriate for women, VWIL adopted a cooperative educa-
tional methodology "which reinforces self-esteem rather than the leveling process used by
VMI." United States v Virginia, 852 F Supp 471, 476 (W D Va 1994). In addition, the aca-
demic program at VWIL, the caliber of VWIL's faculty, the size of its endowment, and the
school's physical training facilities were substantially inferior to those at VMI. See id at
502-03 (unlike VMI, Mary Baldwin College - and thus VWIL - does not offer a bachelor
of science degree or engineering courses; only 68 percent of VWIL's faculty hold Ph.D.s
compared to 86 percent of VMI's faculty; Mary Baldwin College's endowment was $19
million compared to VMI's $131 million endowment; and Mary Baldwin College does not
offer the vast array of physical training facilities that are available at VMI).
3 See Hurd, 4 Duke Gender L & Pol at 49 (cited in note 139) (arguing that parallel
single-sex schools are most likely to survive constitutional scrutiny).
*' See Nanette Asimov, Single-Sex Schools in S.F. Pioneering Academy to be Closely
Watched, SF Chron A19 (Sept 12, 1997).
3" See Somini Sengupta, East Harlem District is Considering an All-Boys Public
School, NY Times B9 (Dec 12, 1996); Jacques Steinberg, Crew Says No to Compromise on
All-Girls Middle School, NY Times B3 (Sept 25, 1997) (New York City Public Schools
Chancellor Rudy Crew refusing to create a parallel program for boys to match the Young
Women's Leadership School because "he saw no compelling educational reason to create a
boys' school").
' W.E.B. DuBois, Whither Now and Why, in The Education of Black People: Ten
Critiques 1906-60 152 (Massachusetts 1973) (Herbert Aptheker, ed).
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schools? If not, how should judges distinguish between constitu-
tionally permissible and constitutionally impermissible single-sex
public schools and programs?
The framework for evaluating the constitutionality of single-
sex public education proposed in this article recognizes that the
role of courts in weighing the effectiveness of different educa-
tional policies should be limited. Accordingly, particularly in an
educational context, the emphasis of the intermediate scrutiny
test should shift from the question of fit to the question of anti-
subordination. This change allows the decision-making authority
to remain primarily with those who are best positioned to resolve
questions of pedagogy: professional educators at the local and
state level.
However, because single-sex public schools and programs can
significantly affect the equality of the education provided to fu-
ture generations of United States citizens, and thus can impact
the strength of our democratic system, courts must take special
care in evaluating the constitutionality of these schools. Far from
removing the bite from intermediate scrutiny, shifting the em-
phasis of that test from fit to anti-subordination focuses the judi-
cial inquiry on the most important question in sex equality juris-
prudence: whether government use of sex-based classifications
works explicitly or implicitly to perpetuate the hierarchy of men
over women. This interpretation of the anti-subordination princi-
ple makes clear that merely pointing to evidence of statistical
differences between the sexes cannot justify the disparate treat-
ment of men and women. In addition, it acknowledges that the
social meanings of integration and separation by sex have
changed, and will continue to change, over time - and allows
educators and courts the flexibility necessary to respond to those
changing circumstances.
Of course, interpreting the anti-subordination principle in
the manner proposed in this Article raises a host of new and
challenging questions. How should the economic and political
ramifications for women of maintaining a particular single-sex
public school be measured? When does education - single-sex or
co-educational - perpetuate traditional gender roles? Under
what circumstances can we be confident that sex-segregation will
work to empower students without creating the impression that
they have been ghettoized? We should welcome the opportunity to
address these questions. That we struggle over them, with the
goal of identifying and eliminating rules that function to main-
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tain the traditional hierarchy of men over women, is what the
Equal Protection Clause requires.
